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
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# MEMOIRS

OF THE

# KINGS OF SPAIN.

*SECOND EDITION.*

FIVE VOLUMES.

VOL. V.

# MEMOIRS

OF THE

# KINGS OF SPAIN

OF THE

# HOUSE OF BOURBON,

## FROM THE ACCESSION OF PHILIP V.

## TO THE DEATH OF CHARLES III.

## 1700...TO...1788.

DRAWN FROM ORIGINAL AND UNPUBLISHED DOCUMENTS.

BY

WILLIAM COXE, M.A. F.R.S. F.S.A.
ARCHDEACON OF WILTS, AND RECTOR OF BEMERTON.

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# MEMOIRS

OF

# SPAIN.

## CHAPTER THE SIXTY-EIGHTH.

### 1774—1777.

*Unfortunate expedition against Algiers—Disputes with England and Portugal—Causes which occasioned the resignation of Grimaldi and the appointment of Florida Blanca.*



WHILE Charles was engaged in domestic regulations, and in vain attempts to restore Spain to her former pre-eminence in Europe, Grimaldi, anxious to distinguish his administration by a brilliant exploit, planned an expedition which was flattering to the national feeling, and not likely to provoke opposition from the maritime powers.

Although the onerous possession of the forts and posts on the coasts of Barbary, had given rise to a discussion on the expediency of relin-

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quishing all except Oran and Ceuta, the national resentment was roused by a petty attack of the emperor of Morocco against Melilla and Peñon de Velez. This unprovoked aggression led to a determination in the spanish cabinet either to exterminate or awe this nest of pirates. An expedition was formed on an extensive scale against Algiers, as well to avenge the insults offered to the spanish arms as to reduce a place which formed the central point of the moorish states, and by its situation was peculiarly exposed to an attack. After numerous delays derived from the tardiness of the spanish government, and the uncertainty of naval operations, armaments were collected in the different ports, amounting to 46 ships of war, and 22,000 men, which were finally united at Carthagena, under the command of general O'Reilly.

The expedition sailed in the latter end of June, 1775, and anchored in the bay of Algiers on the 1st of July, with sanguine hopes of the most complete success. After new delays, which damped the ardour of the troops, and enabled the moors to mature their measures of defence, the first division of 8,000 men was disembarked in the morning of the 7th of July, on the strand between the river Arraz and Algiers. Deceived by a feigned retreat of the moors, they advanced towards the town; but being entangled in passes

and entrenchments by the numerous host of the infidels, they were broken and disgracefully driven back towards the shore. CHAP. 68. 1774—1777.

Meanwhile, the second division had been disembarked with part of the artillery and stores. Thrown into disorder by the retreat of the fugitives, they were in their turn assailed before they could form, and shared the danger and disgrace of their companions. In this disastrous situation the whole army must have been cut to pieces, had not the general thrown up a slight entrenchment, behind which the troops found shelter from the charge of an impetuous enemy. The relief was, however, merely temporary; for as the soldiers, exhausted with fatigue and heat, stretched themselves on the burning sands to obtain a momentary repose, they were exposed to a destructive fire from the moorish carabines, which ranged to a greater distance than the spanish musquets. Batteries were also erected by the enemy to complete the carnage of the day, and repeat the terrible defeat which the Christian army had experienced under Charles the fifth. No hopes of safety remained except in a hasty retreat; and as soon as the close of night covered their movements, the troops were silently drawn to their boats. Fortunately, the enemy wanted skill to harrass them in this dangerous operation; and at three in the morning the

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last division embarked, leaving sixteen pieces of artillery, several chests of ammunition, their tents, and 1,500 slain, and carrying off nearly 3,000 desperately wounded.

To compensate for this disgrace, O'Reilly proposed to bombard the town; but it was found that the provisions had been conveyed on shore, and the stores remaining on board scarcely sufficed to subsist the troops on their return. A division of the fleet was accordingly left in the bay to awe the algerine cruizers, and this ill-fated armament returned to the coast of Spain, bearing the first news of its failure.*

Scarcely indeed did any public disaster ever excite more general indignation. Tumults took place in different parts of the kingdom, O'Reilly himself narrowly escaped from the fury of the populace, and a detachment of troops and artillery was found necessary to maintain the respect due to the royal residence in the capital. To

* Spanish documents in the Mercurio Historico for July 1775. ——Lord Grantham's correspondence.——Journal of the expedition in Swinburne's Travels.

Extract of a letter from Algiers, in the papers of Mr. R. Walpole.

"There is very little or no damage done here by the spaniards. I am informed that four or five hundred houses were destroyed, and that the algerines lost four or five hundred men; but that loss is very trifling in a town containing 150,000 inhabitants. The spaniards would have caused infinitely more mischief had there not been something like treachery among themselves, for I saw above 1,000 of their shells that did not burst, the greater part of which were filled with rubbish and sand instead of gunpowder."

appease the people, the king dismissed the unsuccessful commander from the government of Madrid, and sent him to a species of honourable banishment as captain general of Andalusia.

Grimaldi was deeply affected by the failure of this enterprise, by the stifled concern of the king at the dishonour of his arms, by the unjust persecution of his friend O'Reilly, by the secret machinations of the minister of war count Ricla, and above all by the murmurs of the nation, who from this partial misfortune stigmatised his whole administration. The delicacy and danger of his situation, which he had long and anxiously felt, now pressed on his mind with redoubled force. The examples of Alberoni and Ripperdá had taught him the fate of strangers, called to rule over a high spirited and discontented nation; and in the alarming commotion which threatened the life of Squillaci, he had witnessed a still more terrible instance of national hatred against foreign ministers.

In the first moment of alarm and agitation, he tendered his resignation, as he had already done at the disgrace of Squillaci, and again reluctantly submitted to the wishes of the king, to retain him at the helm. But the embroiled state of foreign affairs, and his own irksome situation at the court, strengthened his determination to with-

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draw from a scene, which neither suited his temper, his health, or his age.

The chief of his embarrassments abroad was derived from the recent changes at the court of France, and the loss of that influence which had contributed to his rise, and fortified his credit with the king. He had vainly looked forward to the accession of Louis the sixteenth, with the hope, that the influence of the queen, an austrian princess, would restore to power his friend and patron Choiseul, the author of the austrian alliance. In this hope, however, he was grievously disappointed. The new monarch, though personally devoted to his queen, was deeply imbued with the antient maxims of bourbon policy, and anxious to prevent the preponderance of the court of Vienna. Hence he directed his choice to ministers of anti-austrian principles. The veteran statesman, Maurepas, was recalled from a long exile to become his political Mentor; and at his recommendation, the post of minister for foreign affairs was confided to the count de Vergennes, the personal enemy of Choiseul.

Had the important embassy of Paris been still filled by a friend and confidant of Grimaldi, his dexterity might yet have maintained a greater degree of cordiality between the two governments,

than had subsisted in the time of d'Aiguillon. But the only channel of communication was d'Aranda, who, instead of promoting his views and credit, decried his measures, and expatiated on the odium which he had incurred by the fatal expedition to Algiers.

Besides the total want of cordiality between the bourbon courts, the conduct of the french cabinet and the situation of the government, proved a new source of vexation to the spanish minister. Louis the sixteenth was a monarch of upright intentions and laudable views, but deficient in experience and judgment; anxious for reforming abuses, but without the talents or energy requisite for effecting a safe and important change in the constitution of the country. Eager to assume the political influence of his predecessors, yet checked by the disorder of his finances; the sport of different parties, and the dupe of different projectors; alternately swayed by affection for his queen, and respect for his political advisers; his administration presented the same combination of restlessness and weakness abroad, with still greater vacillations at home, than had marked the policy of Louis the fifteenth.

At this period also, the aspect of the political horizon portended troubles both with England and Portugal. With England, the disputes on

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the antiquated subject of commercial and territorial jealousy subsisted in full force. The casual landing of an english vessel on Crab Island, a spot in the West Indian seas, scarcely of sufficient importance to attract the notice of the geographer, would have become the germ of war, or at least of protracted negotiation, had not the moderation of the english government concurred with the fears of Grimaldi in forwarding an accommodation, but without soothing the hostile feelings of the two countries.

A dispute, far different in its consequences, had arisen with Portugal, from the interminable question of the contested limits between the South American colonies. The secret instigations of the spanish ministers of war and marine, had stimulated the governor of Buenos Ayres to extend his establishments in the territory claimed by Portugal, as far as the Rio Grande de San Pedro, and even to attack the more advanced of the portuguese settlements. This aggression led to retaliation by the government of the Brazils. It was also resented by the portuguese minister, Pombal, who, to a personal contempt of Grimaldi, added an inveterate antipathy to Spain, and was eager to extend the domains of Portugal in the new world. The dispute appeared likely to connect itself with the troubles which had arisen in British America; for, while the

french court fomented the rebellious spirit of the colonists, they instigated Spain to increase the embarrassments of England, by an attack against Portugal.

Though Grimaldi invariably experienced that confidence and regard which his royal master habitually shewed to those who were endeared to him by long service, yet he had frequently to contend in vain with an unbending temper, a pertinacious adherence to favourite principles, and above all, with a punctilious jealousy for the dignity of his crown and nation. In more than one instance, he indiscreetly complained even to the british embassador of the inflexible and pertinacious spirit of the king, and lamented that neither argument or representation could rectify his mistaken notions, or induce him to change a resolution, however erroneous. "Such," he added, with a mixture of disappointment and chagrin, "is *the man*, whose counsels I am employed to direct."

These embarrassments overwhelmed the timid mind of Grimaldi, depressed by advancing age and premature infirmities. He struggled several months with his disquietude, in obedience to the wishes of his sovereign; but in this interval, he made repeated and earnest instances to be delivered from his irksome office.

In proportion to his difficulties, his fears

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increased, and he scarcely ventured to execute the slightest public act without the approbation of his colleagues. The same motives induced him to extort from the king a reluctant consent for the admission of the prince of Asturias into the cabinet council, with the hope of diminishing the popular odium, and his own responsibility. But this very expedient increased his mortifications. The prince, instigated by the adherents of d'Aranda, who formed a powerful body under the denomination of the aragonese party, became a vehement opponent of the minister, in all the private deliberations of the cabinet. This opposition was inflamed and directed by d'Aranda, whose influence had been displayed by the introduction of his relative, count Ricla, into the ministry of war, on the death of Don Gregorio Muñiain. Lastly, Grimaldi suffered a severe shock by the desertion of his friend the count of Fuentes, who was offended by the permission given, without his knowledge, to his son, prince Pignatelli, to accompany the fatal expedition to the coast of Africa. On his death, his numerous family and adherents swelled the aragonese party, and the court of the prince.

Thus circumstanced, without a friend or confidant, thwarted by his colleagues in office, deprived of his long established influence at Versailles, embarrassed abroad, and opposed in the cabinet,

Grimaldi at length extorted the reluctant consent of the king to his resignation. He still, however, possessed sufficient credit to baffle the hopes of d'Aranda to return to office; for the king, dreading the violent spirit of the ex-minister, and offended by the interference of the prince, left to Grimaldi the choice of his successor. By the advice of his first secretary, del Campo, he recommended Don Joseph Moñino, rccently created count Florida Blanca, who filled the spanish embassy at Rome. The nomination was accepted, to the mortification of Grimaldi's numerous opponents, and he was himself chosen to supply the vacant embassy. Though impatient to retire, he continued to execute his office till the arrival of the new minister. After introducing him to the business of his department, and accompanying him on his first appearance in the closet, he took a hasty leave of a court where he had figured for a period of seventeen years. The parting was short and affectionate; the king assured him of the continuance of his esteem, and testified his intention to consult him on important occasions. The following morning he withdrew from the capital, and having spent a short period with his family, repaired to Rome. After his departure, the king rewarded his merits and services, by granting the rank of duke and grandee to himself and his family. Few words

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are necessary to sum up this account of Grimaldi. Though exposed to odium as a foreigner, he was esteemed by the liberal part of the spanish nation for his mildness and urbanity; his love and patronage of literature and the arts, and his zeal for the national improvement.

The new minister, Don Joseph Moñino, was a native of the petty village of Hellin, in Murcia, and the son of an escribano episcopal. Attaching himself to the study of the law, he became a pleading advocate, and was brought into notice by the powerful family of Ossuna, to whom he was recommended by father Patrick Curtis, their domestic chaplain and preceptor. By their interest, he was nominated one of the fiscals of the council of Castile, and distinguished himself under the administration of d'Aranda. His conciliating character and agreeable address, joined to a knowledge of ecclesiastical business, and superior talents, occasioned his nomination to the embassy of Rome, a post of the utmost importance. He fulfilled the hopes and views of his employers, by acquiring considerable influence at the papal court, and contributing to the nomination of Pius the sixth, in opposition to the intrigues of the jesuit party. He promoted the reconciliation between the roman see and the bourbon courts, after the dispute occasioned by the interdict against Parma, obtained the

formal abolition of the jesuits, and arranged various negotiations relative to the interests of the House of Bourbon in general, and those of Spain in particular.

Florida Blanca was scarcely less astonished at his own elevation, than those who had been eagerly grasping at the reins of government. Unconnected with any party, and imperfectly known even to the king, he entered on his office with a diffidence and reserve natural to the novelty of his situation. But he speedily acquired confidence and decision, conciliated the good will of the king, and displayed an energy of character and capacity for business, which fully justified the recommendation of his predecessor.*

* We have derived our inteiligence relative to the ministry and resignation of Grimaldi, and the appointment of Florida Blanca, from oral information of the most respectable kind, from the interesting dispatches of lord Grantham, and official documents from Madrid, London, and Paris. Some incidents are also drawn from Cumberland's Memoirs, and Townshend's Travels in Spain.

## CHAPTER THE SIXTY-NINTH.

### 1775—1778.

*Renewal of hostilities with Portugal, relative to the settlements in South America—Capture of the isle of St. Catherine and the colony of Sacramento—Death of Joseph the first, king of Portugal, and removal of Pombal—Accommodation with Portugal by the intervention of the queen mother—Treaties of limits, commerce, and amity—Remarks of Florida Blanca on the advantages of this accommodation.*

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THE first measure of the new minister, Florida Blanca, was the presage of a successful administration.

Spain had no sooner terminated the enterprise against the Barbary states, and concluded a temporary accommodation with the emperor of Morocco, than her attention was again directed to Portugal. Preceding events have sufficiently shewn, that no treaty between the two powers could prove lasting, while the vicinity of their settlements on the Rio de la Plata furnished inexhaustible fuel to their commercial and political jealousy. The forced accommodation, recently concluded, was, like the past, nothing more than a suspension of arms, and an additional cause of irritation. Spain endeavoured to

cut off the obnoxious colony of Sacramento from the bank of the Rio de la Plata, by occupying the intermediate district, while the portuguese laboured to extend their limits, in order to preserve the advantages of a port, and to continue the contraband traffic with Buenos Ayres. In consequence of these jarring pretensions, the two neighbouring governments were engaged either in endless bickerings or actual hostilities.

At length the portuguese minister, Pombal, prepared openly to recover and defend the contested territory. He imperceptibly increased the naval and military force in the new world, while he made warlike preparations to repel an invasion from Spain. As the spaniards had before shewn the example of aggression without a declaration of war, a portuguese squadron, with nine regiments and a formidable train of artillery, sailed up the Rio Grande, reduced the forts of St. Thecla, St. Theresa, and Monte Video, and defeated a detachment from Buenos Ayres, with the loss of 500 men.

The progress of these armaments had not escaped the vigilance of the spanish court. Troops were marched towards the portuguese frontier, reinforcements sent to America, and France was summoned to grant the assistance stipulated by treaty. A similar appeal was made by Portugal to England, and a series of con-

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change in the conduct and relations of the two powers. An armistice was immediately concluded, and the king of Spain entered into a negotiation with the court of Portugal, under the most favourable circumstances.

Notwithstanding the double marriages which had taken place between the two royal houses, it had required all the dexterity of Elizabeth Farnese to restrain the national rivalry during the reign of Philip. The influence of queen Barbara contributed no less to allay this animosity in the time of Ferdinand; but the political system and extensive views of Pombal were calculated to revive it in all its force. From this principle, the queen of Portugal, as a spanish princess, was excluded from any political influence, which might have tended to reunite the two nations. With the same views for his own aggrandisement, and the prosperity of Portugal, Pombal seems to have formed the plan of abrogating the decree passed in the cortes of Lamego, which established the female succession; and of transferring the crown to the next male, in the person of Joseph, prince of Brazil, grandson of the reigning sovereign.

He gained the consent of the king, and even prepared the act of renunciation, which was to be ratified by the signature of the princess. The secretary of state, to whom the secret was neces-

sarily confided by Pombal, betrayed the design to the queen mother. She instructed her daughter to evade compliance; and, in the mean time, made application to her brother, the king of Spain. Accordingly, when Joseph presented the act of renunciation to the princess for her signature, she requested a delay, under the pretence of consulting her mother; and the king, perceiving that the secret had been divulged, retired with mortification and disgust. By this delay, time was gained for the return of an answer from Spain; and Charles having declared his resolution to support the rights of his niece with his whole force, the king and minister suspended, if they did not relinquish, their design. Accordingly, on the death of her father, the princess succeeded without opposition.

The new queen was grateful to Charles for his support; and the removal of Pombal prepared the way for a renewal of harmony between the two courts. In these circumstances, the pending negotiation took a new direction. The portuguese court became sensible of their own weakness, and the impossibility of drawing assistance from England; and Charles was satisfied with gaining the object of such long and violent contention. A treaty of limits was accordingly arranged, and signed at St. Ildefonso, by Oct. 1, 1777.

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count Florida Blanca and the portuguese plenipotentiary.*

This treaty finally settled the three principal objects so long in dispute. With regard to the first, Portugal ceded the colony of Sacramento, and with it the navigation of the Rio de la Plata, and the rivers Paraguay and Parana, as far as the conflux of the Peperiguazu with the Uraguay.

The second point was the arrangement of a distinct boundary between Brazil and Paraguay, more particularly on the side of Rio Grande and the sea shore, where the two nations had maintained an almost incessant contest. To establish this boundary, Spain relinquished a portion of territory on the Laguna Grande and Mairin, to which she had hitherto laid claim.

The third point was the arrangement of the limits between Brazil and Peru. In this quarter, as a compensation for Sacramento, Spain yielded a vast region, little known, which formed the greater part of the land of the Amazons, and a district in the south-east part of Peru.

In consequence of this arrangement, Spain restored the isle of St. Catherine, and Portugal relinquished those claims to the Philippines,

* Silva Historia de Portugal, t. 3, p. 98.——Beccatini, p. 289.——Chatelet's Travels in Portugal, with additional remarks by Burgoing, ch. 17.

which it was intitled to advance by the celebrated demarcation of Alexander the sixth.

The king of Spain employed his influence over his sister to draw closer the bonds of amity with Portugal, and to attach that kingdom to the interests of the House of Bourbon. Accordingly, under the pretext of removing some obstacles to the execution of the preceding treaty, he drew his sister to his court, and by her intervention arranged the plan of a family, commercial, and political union with Portugal, conformable to the wish expressed in the hostile declaration of 1762, "that either in peace or war, Spain and Portugal might be considered as belonging to one master." This alliance was confirmed in a treaty concluded at the Pardo, on the 24th of March, 1778. The treaty of 1668, and others, more antient, are made the basis of the same connection between the two nations, as subsisted during the reigns of Charles the first and Philip the second of Spain. Neither was to engage in a war, alliance, or in any measure to the prejudice of the other; and they mutually guaranteed their respective territories in Europe and South America, according to the limits traced in the preliminary treaty of 1777. If either should engage in war, the other was to observe the strictest neutrality; with the reservation, however, that in case of invasion, the reciprocal defence, pro-

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mised by the two crowns, was to be without a breach of their engagements with other powers.

With regard to commerce, the treaty of 1668, and that of 1667, between Spain and Great Britain, were made the basis of their intercourse, in addition to the stipulation of equality with the most favoured nations, and the revival of the privileges enjoyed in the reign of Sebastian, king of Portugal, by the subjects of both crowns. The two governments were accordingly to revise and amend their respective tariffs of duties, conformably to the changes since the period of those treaties, to specify and reduce their prohibitions to articles absolutely necessary, and to draw up a collection of their reciprocal privileges in the time of king Sebastian, as a part of this treaty.

Under this head it was likewise settled, that, to compensate for the concessions of Spain, and enable the subjects of both countries to carry on the slave trade, without being confined as formerly to foreign companies, Portugal should cede to Spain the isles of Annobon and Fernando Po, on the coast of Africa.*

The usual stipulations are made, with respect to the asylum afforded to their respective ships, in cases of necessity; for the mutual delivery of

* Since the abrogation of the asiento with the south sea company, Spain had employed the assistance of private traders to supply her colonies with slaves.

criminals, among whom are comprehended smugglers, coiners, and deserters; and other regulations of temporary or local accommodation are introduced in the treaty.*

These treaties with Portugal were justly considered by Florida Blanca as one of the most important and solid achievements of his ministry. In the review of his administration,† presented to the king of Spain, he dwells with peculiar satisfaction on the difficulties which were overcome, and the advantages resulting from the arrangement.

After briefly recapitulating the previous contests and imperfect accommodations with Portugal, under foreign mediation, he observes, "It was left to me to enable your majesty to attain this object alone. It was one of the most fortunate events of my ministry, to become the instrument and witness of this acquisition, which destroyed a shelter of foreign contraband, in the centre of the Rio de la Plata, and took from our enemies the means of disturbing the quiet of our provinces with insurrections, and appropriating the riches of our South America. Hence, the

* Treaties of St. Ildefonso and the Pardo, in Marten's Recueil, t. 1.

† A Review and Apology for his Administration, presented by Florida Blanca to Charles the third, in October, 1788, and afterwards to Charles the fourth. From the original spanish, in MS. (See the Appendix.)

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colony of Sacramento was deemed of such importance in the late reign, that, to acquire it, the territory of the Ibicui was ceded, comprising more than five hundred leagues in Paraguay. On this principle, the treaty of 1750 was concluded; but your majesty was obliged to annul it, by the intrigues of the jesuits, and the unwillingness of the court of Portugal to relinquish the cessions made to this crown.

"By the last treaty of 1777, and by the definitive one which followed, your majesty succeeded in acquiring the Ibicui, as well as the ceded places of Paraguay, and in extending your dominions to the Laguna Mairin, from the Castillos Grandes, to which they were bounded by the treaty of 1750; you thus acquired, on the side of Marañon and Rio Negro, all the necessary territory, and fixed bounds, to secure the property of your crown.

"Those who are unacquainted with the true interests of the monarchy, and who only covet acquisitions, whether useful or dangerous, have censured the terms of our last treaties, because we relinquished the town of Rio Grande, with Laguna de los Patos, and restored the conquered island of St. Catherine. They do not reflect that Rio Grande could not have been justly retained, contrary to the treaty of Paris, that the

general Don Pedro Cevallos, who conquered it, represented it as unsuitable for us, and that the isle of St. Catherine, without the immediate district of the Brazils, would have occasioned an unprofitable waste of expence, was exposed to irruptions, and likely to be lost in the first war. That the whale fishery, which is there carried on, may be rendered more successful on our own shores of Buenos Ayres, and the whole southern ocean as far as the straits of Magellanes, where we neglect far superior advantages. Lastly, that extending ourselves in the Brazils, as some desire, under the right of the famous division made by Alexander the sixth, was a project impossible to carry into execution, and contrary to preceding engagements. Indeed, on this principle, we must have relinquished to the portuguese the Philippine islands, which by that demarcation belong to them.

"The utility of these treaties was not limited to these advantages and acquisitions. By them your majesty obtained the cession of the isles of Annobon and Fernando Po, with the power of trafficking for negroes directly with the coast of Africa. Whoever is acquainted with the necessity of employing negroes in our vast colonies of both Americas, the immense sums we have paid on that account to the portuguese, french,

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and english, and those which we are now paying to the last, must perceive the advantages which may be derived from this power. The good or bad use hitherto made of these advantages, does not concern me, who have not been charged with the execution of the treaty.

"Besides what has been mentioned, we obtained by this treaty from the court of Portugal the offer of the guaranty and security of Peru, and the other provinces of South America, not only against foreign enemies, but against internal commotions. It would seem as if *we foresaw the impending war with England*, which broke out in 1779, since in that contest, when the court of London desired to form an expedition against Peru, the powerful offices of the portuguese ministry prevented this mischief, in order not to see themselves compromised by the engagements of the guaranty. Let it be considered what fatal effects an english expedition produced in those provinces during the famous rebellion of Tupac Amar and his partisans. The hand of Providence, for the protection of your majesty and this monarchy, formed the treaty of Lisbon to preserve those vast dominions.

"The good correspondence and friendship established by the treaty with Portugal procured us many advantages in the war with England,

It was the first in which our enemies have not abused the power of frequenting the ports and coasts of Portugal to our detriment, and in which we have made use of them for many important objects. The portuguese flag has, besides, served to bring us much treasure from America without risk, particularly a sum exceeding 3,000,000 of dollars, left by the Buen Consejo, in the isle of Fayal, and brought from thence by a portuguese ship of the line, sent on purpose with extraordinary dexterity by that court, in order to avoid the danger of privateers."*

The assertions of Florida Blanca are by no means exaggerated, for the effects of the treaty were as sudden as remarkable in the commercial annals of Spain. By annihilating the contraband carried on under the name of the portuguese, a new impulse was given to the trade of Buenos Ayres, and its value as a military and commercial station raised to the highest rank in this part of South America. To promote the beneficial effects of the treaty, this district of Paraguay was soon afterwards erected into a new viceroyalty, of which Buenos Ayres was the capital, and the existing restrictions on its com-

* Statement of Florida Blanca's Administration, No. 1, Appendix.

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merce removed. A single instance will suffice to shew the result. Before the treaty, the exports of Buenos Ayres did not annually exceed 2,000,000 dollars; afterwards they amounted to 5,000,000; and it is scarcely doubtful that the imports were augmented in a superior proportion.*

* Humbold's Travels.

## CHAPTER THE SEVENTIETH.

### 1776—1779.

*Origin and progress of the american revolution—Secret interference of France—Treaty with the revolted provinces—War with England—Intrigues at Madrid—Interposition and mediation of Charles—His captious proposals—Unites with France—Declaration of hostilities.*



AFTER the conclusion of this favourable treaty with Portugal, which removed one great cause of trouble in America, and left the spanish monarch without a single opponent in Europe, he had full leisure to turn his attention to the contest between England and her colonies, in which France had interfered, and of which it was impossible for a bourbon prince, and the sovereign of extensive colonies, to remain an indifferent spectator.

It would be foreign from our design to examine the origin and progress of this unfortunate contest. We need only observe, that the acquisition of Nova Scotia, Canada, and Florida, removed a salutary check on the fears of the americans, by rendering unnecessary the protection of the mother country against the endless aggressions of the french and their dependent

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indians. Their useful services in the last war, had accustomed them to military discipline, and inspired them with a high opinion of their own strength and importance. Their confidence was augmented by their rapid increase in numbers and wealth. To these causes was added, the spirit of republicanism, imbibed by the original settlers during the civil troubles of England, and fostered by the habits of hunters and traders, who in their own provincial constitutions saw only a faint shadow of monarchical government, without its splendour or concomitant advantages.

People of such a character were ill-disposed to submit to a distant sway; and the events which followed the peace of Paris, soon called the latent spirit of independence into action. The first symptom of trouble appeared on the laudable efforts of the british government to suppress the contraband trade with the spanish colonies, which had supplied an inexhaustible source of misunderstanding with the court of Madrid. While the colonists were yet murmuring against this restriction, a new and more serious cause of discontent arose. Amidst the financial embarrassments derived from the war, the british cabinet adopted the just and natural principle, that colonies which owed their safety and prosperity to the exertions and sacrifices of the mother country, should bear a proportionate share in

the common burthens of the state. They therefore formed the design of levying a contribution on the americans, exclusive of the moderate charges required for the support of their immediate government. To accommodate the expedient to the feelings of an independent people, this tax was imposed in the unobjectionable shape of a stamp duty.

The imposition was, however, indignantly opposed by the colonists, on the abstract plea that the principles of the british constitution admitted of no taxation without representation. The royal officers charged with the duty of distributing the stamps, became therefore the objects of insult and outrage. In England, the cause of the colonists found zealous advocates, and the transient administrations which rapidly succeeded each other, were driven into a line of conduct neither calculated to awe or conciliate a people jealous of their governors, and impatient of restraint. The obnoxious tax was repealed; but 1765.
the repeal was accompanied with a declaratory act, asserting the right assumed by the british parliament, and was followed by other imposts more objectionable than the stamp duty in their principle and shape. These in their turn were superseded, in the commencement of lord North's administration, by a single duty on tea, which 1770.
appeared rather intended as a salvo for the

CHAP. 70. 1776—1779.

honour of the mother country, than for any efficient purpose. Amidst these proofs of weakness and vacillation the ferment continued to spread; and the mischief was aggravated by the violent declamations of the different parties who figured on the political theatre of England.

Encouraged by their numerous supporters in the mother country, the chiefs of the discontented colonies ventured to assume the attitude of open resistance. Measures on the other hand were adopted to maintain the authority of government. But these measures were dictated by the same spirit of indecision which had given audacity to revolt; and by the presumptuous confidence of the administration, who contemptuously undervalued the strength, spirit, and talents, of the disaffected. Forces were indeed sent to America; yet inadequate to exact submission, if submission were to be exacted; and while the powers of government were weakly exerted, repeated attempts to negotiate stimulated the zeal of a people already successful beyond their hopes. France did not neglect the favourable opportunity, and encouraged the insurgents by secret promises and assistance.

The events of the contest partook of the colour of most civil commotions. At the first appearance of a disciplined army, the insurgents were foiled in every conflict; but acquired expe-

rience and courage even from defeat, because the nature of the country afforded an asylum to rally and renew their efforts. The strong posts and principal communications were indeed occupied by the royal army; yet it was impossible to subdue a numerous population, scattered over a wild, extensive, and intricate territory, and roused by every motive which the art of their chiefs, or the nature of the contest, could call into action. CHAP. 70. 1776—1779.

During this struggle, the rebellion was reduced into system, by the assembly of a regular congress of deputies from the insurgent provinces at Philadelphia. The scheme was not yet sufficiently matured, nor the feelings of the people prepared to tear asunder the bonds which united them with the land of their fathers. The new assembly, however, assumed every function of government, issued paper money, levied and organised troops, passed laws in the shape of regulations, and intrusted the command of the army to Washington, a planter of Virginia, who had distinguished himself in the preceding war, and may justly be styled the Fabius of America. They proved also the futility of their professions of loyalty and moderation, by an invasion of Canada and an attack on Quebec; and they made an insidious appeal to Jamaica, to Ireland, and even to the people of England. Dec. 5, 1774.

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Still, however, the congress did not throw off the mask, till the british troops were obliged by want to evacuate Boston. They profited by the effect which this event produced on the public mind, to issue a declaration of independence, and to digest a system of federal government, under the title of a Confederation and Perpetual Union, at first comprising eleven of the provinces, and eventually the whole thirteen. The first act of sovereignty was the mission of accredited agents to the principal courts of Europe, particularly to France, to whom they chiefly looked for patronage and support. The persons selected for this mission were Silas Deane and Arthur Lee, and afterwards the celebrated Franklin, the prime mover of the revolution; and these agents were received and protected, though not publicly acknowledged, by France.

March 17, 1776.

Oct. 4, 1776.

The increase of the rebellion roused the british government to make an exertion, which at an early period would probably have been successful. An army of 50,000 men was dispatched to the western world to vindicate the insulted rights of the british crown. General Howe, who commanded the main body, obtained repeated advantages over all the caution and skill of the american chief; the congress was driven from Philadelphia; the army, discouraged and weakened, owed its existence to the woods and wilds; even

Sept. 27.

Washington himself despaired of the cause for which he was contending. But ignorance of the public sentiment, and the nature of the country, led to the fatal expedition from Canada, under general Burgoyne, which terminated in the loss and surrender of 10,000 men, at the post of Saratoga, and raised the spirit of the americans at the moment when they were most depressed by their reverses. This was a signal which had been long impatiently expected by the french. While the event was uncertain, they had clothed their hostilities under the guise of an insidious neutrality; fomented the insurrection by succours in money and arms, and sent officers to supply the want of military science. But when a crisis arrived which seemed likely to extort such concessions from England as might lead to a reconciliation, when commissioners were actually appointed to effect an accommodation which might render british supremacy compatible with colonial freedom, they assumed a direct and open part. A treaty of union, friendship, and commerce, was concluded with the american agents, at Paris, by which their independence was acknowledged; and in return an engagement extorted that they would never return to their obedience to the british crown. The notification of this engagement to England, on the 13th of the following March, was the

Oct. 16, 1777.

CHAP. 70. 1776—1779.

signal for a war. Within two months after the signature, a french squadron of twelve men of war, with a force of 4,000 men, including marines, sailed to America under the command of d'Estaign, who was accompanied by M. Gerard, secretary to the council of state, as accredited minister to the new republic.*

The sword being drawn, vigorous preparations were made for an arduous contest. An army of 50,000 men was assembled on the coasts of Normandy and Britanny, to threaten an invasion of England, and powerful fleets were equipped on both sides to contend for the mastery of the channel. An indecisive engagement ensued off Ushant, between Keppel with a fleet of thirty-one sail, and d'Orvilliers with thirty-two; and though the french presumptuously claimed the victory, yet they were deterred from making any attempt against the british isles.

July 27, 1778.

While the result of the struggle was yet undecided in Europe, both nations carried their hostilities into other quarters of the globe. The english captured St. Lucie and the french Dominica; on the coast of Africa, they respectively reduced the rival settlements of Gorée and Senegal; and in the east, where the war had been

Sept. 7, 1778.

* We refer the reader to Mr. Adolphus's History of George the third, for the best and most accurate account of the rise and progress of the american revolution.

rather suspended than terminated, the french were again compelled to surrender their only remaining settlement, Pondicherry.

Madrid, as on former occasions, again became the theatre of a political struggle between the belligerent powers. On one hand, England endeavoured to alarm the fears of the king for the tranquillity of his own colonies, if encouraged by the example of successful rebellion; on the other, France recurred to the usual arguments derived from the common interest of the House of Bourbon, and from the pride, aggressions, and maritime tyranny of England. The king of Spain was urged to seize so favourable an opportunity of crushing a rival power, enfeebled by internal divisions, and the colonial rebellion, and robbed of that influence which she had formerly exercised among the states of the continent.

For a time, Charles hesitated between these two opposite motives, and appeared inclined to imitate the wise neutrality of Ferdinand. He assured the british embassador, lord Grantham, that he was a stranger to the treaty concluded between France and America; and even to the notification of this alliance, before it was made public. Florida Blanca also solemnly declared, that he considered the independence of the american colonies as no less detrimental to Spain

CHAP. 10. 1776—1779.

than to Great Britain herself. He averred that the king, his master, had positively rejected the instances of France to acknowledge their independence; and even affected to testify great displeasure at the conclusion of a treaty with America without his knowledge.

Notwithstanding these solemn and reiterated assurances, the spanish minister continued his hostile preparations, and meditated a junction with France to share the spoils of a nation considered as hastening to its decline. The manner, however, in which the rupture was effected, was neither open or manly, but an insidious design, contrary to the generous character of the spanish nation, and derogatory to the honour of a sovereign who prided himself on good faith and equity. The ostensible pretence for interference, was the hacknied expedient of a mediation; and to give it additional effect, a new embassador, the marquis of Almodovar, was nominated to the court of London. Immediately after the commencement of hostilities, the king of Spain reiterated his wishes to promote harmony, and draw closer the bonds of union between Spain and England. He next tendered his mediation; and, without any apparent cause, captiously complained of the neglect shewn to his good offices. On the reply of the british government, that it was inconsistent with national honour to

Jan. 17, 1779.

solicit the interference of a foreign power, till the views of France were known, he expressed his readiness to open a negotiation, and spare both parties the humiliation of making the first advances. He suggested, that each government should transmit their conditions to Madrid, tendered his interference in promoting a free and dispassionate discussion, and proposed to draw, from the offers and demands of both, a plan for the conclusion of a definitive treaty.

England confined her demands to one single article. Assuming, as an undoubted principle, her right to treat with her own colonies, independent of foreign intervention, she declared, whenever France would withdraw her assistance from the americans, she would readily concur in establishing the harmony which had subsisted between the two crowns. France, on the contrary, required as a preliminary, that England should acknowledge the independence of the colonies, and withdraw all her forces, both by land and sea. She further reserved the power of bringing forward additional demands, under the pretence of amending and explaining preceding treaties.

On these foundations, the negotiation proceeded. France persisted in her demands, on the principle that the honour of the crown did not permit her to desist from her engagements, and that the colonists themselves had announced

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their resolution to listen to no negotiation till their independence was acknowledged. She, at the same time, declined specifying the nature of the pretensions reserved for future discussion. England, in reply, protested against this captious mode of treating. Without relinquishing her original proposition, she expressed a willingness to grant a general amnesty to the revolted colonies, and to treat with them as confederating individuals, for the restoration of legal government, and the redress of grievances.

Assuming the character of an umpire, the king of Spain proved his partiality to France, and contradicted his own professions by rejecting the modifications offered by England, and producing a plan of pacification, comprising, either virtually or expressly, the fundamental principle of independence established by France. His suggestions were formed into three different proposals.

First, a truce with the colonies for twenty-five years, during which a peace might be negotiated, and the articles in dispute between England and France adjusted. Secondly, a truce with France, including the colonies. Thirdly, an indefinite truce with both the colonies and France, to determine only after a year's notice, during which, plenipotentiaries of the three parties might form a congress at Madrid, with a fourth

on the part of Spain. The convention to be signed by the american agents at Paris, for the approbation of their principals, which France pledged herself to obtain. Meanwhile, the colonies were to enjoy a freedom of trade and independence *de facto*, the british forces to be withdrawn or reduced, and their communication with the revolted country regulated.

Such a plan of peace, as the british ministers justly observed, "seemed to proceed on every principle which had been disclaimed, and to contain every term which had been rejected." It was therefore declined by England, with the declaration, that if compelled or reduced to grant such conditions, it was more consistent with the dignity of the nation to concede them directly to the americans themselves, rather than through the intervention of France. This refusal was accompanied with a strong testimony of respect and consideration for the person and character of the spanish monarch.

Before, however, this final reply had reached Madrid, Charles had already taken his resolution. Having employed the long interval of the negotiation in maturing his naval and military preparations, he suddenly threw off the mask, and, withdrawing his interference with an affectation of displeasure, ordered his embassador to quit the

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british court, without the customary ceremony of taking leave.

June 26, 1779.

To give additional colour to this breach of his word, a violent letter was written to the secretary of state, lord Weymouth, by his embassador, Almodovar, in which, without the slightest colour of truth, he reproached Great Britain with meditating an attack against Cadiz, and an invasion of the Philippine islands. This angry letter was followed by a declaration of hostilities, in a long and laboured manifesto, one of the most singular compositions which occurs in diplomatic correspondence. It contains a studied and tedious detail of the outrages which Spain had endured from Great Britain, such as infringements of territory, insults of the spanish flag, prizes wrongfully taken, partial awards of the british courts of admiralty, incroachments and devastations in the bay of Honduras, and on the borders of Louisiana. These are enumerated with an arithmetical precision truly ludicrous. The outrages committed against the spanish ships, including packets, are stated to amount to twelve; the insults of the spanish navy to eighty-six; the invasions of the spanish territory to eleven; and the whole number of grievances, between 1776 and 1779, omitting many smaller offences, are summed up *at nearly one hundred.*

To this is added an erroneous and partial account of the recent negotiation, accompanied with complaints of the personal contempt shewn towards the king of Spain by the rejection of his mediation. Finally, a charge is advanced against the british government for offering to the americans, both publicly and privately, conditions far superior to those tendered without effect by Spain, and for endeavouring to deceive the colonies into a treaty, to turn their joint forces against the House of Bourbon.

It has been supposed by intelligent judges, that, before Charles had absolutely taken his decision, and while he yet testified his displeasure against France for acknowledging the independence of the colonies, some concession of importance might have at least secured his neutrality. Indeed, his embassador in London threw out an obscure hint, relative to the offer of Gibraltar by Mr. Pitt, and desired a copy of the memorable dispatch written on that occasion. But whether this suggestion was sincere, or whether it was mere diplomatic artifice, is a matter of conjecture, rather than of history; it is at least doubtful whether such a species of neutrality as Spain would naturally have adopted, would not have been too dearly purchased by so great a sacrifice.

As the diplomatic address of the british embassador, lord Grantham, who conducted the colla-

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teral negotiation at Madrid, was in vain employed to counteract the machinations of the french embassador and his partisans; or to vanquish the determination previously adopted by Florida Blanca to unite with France in the war, the british government had no other alternative than to justify their conduct to Europe. From the spirited declarations, as well as from the correspondence of the two courts, it may appear as a matter of surprise, that, among the mass of grievances so studiously accumulated in the spanish declaration, many had never before been noticed; and others mentioned with a degree of indifference, which shewed the little importance really attached to them.*

* Correspondence between lord Weymouth and lord Grantham, Grantham Papers.——Florida Blanca's Statement, No. 5, Appendix.——Adolphus's History of George the third, v. 3, p. 162—172, which contains a well-drawn abstract of this negotiation from the most authentic sources; also the collections of public papers, english and foreign.

## CHAPTER THE SEVENTY-FIRST.

### 1779—1781.

*Hostile preparations of Spain, before the declaration of hostilities—Alliances calculated to diminish the influence of England—Treaty with Morocco—Junction of the bourbon fleets, their appearance in the channel, and return to their own coasts—Temporary misunderstanding between France and Spain—Blockade of Gibraltar—Expedition of Rodney for its relief—Loss of a spanish convoy—Defeat of the squadron under Don Juan de Langara—Capture of the british East and West India fleets—Expedition of admiral Solano to the West Indies—Reduction of West Florida—Hostilities against the british settlements in the bay of Honduras.*



IF any proof were yet wanting of the resolution taken by the spanish court to provoke hostilities, and of their insincerity in the preceding negotiation, it might be found in the previous preparations and arrangements, both public and private, with every power, either at enmity with England, or likely to be turned against England, in the impending contest. With this view, Florida Blanca continued the negotiation which the preceding minister, in conjunction with France, had opened with Hyder Ally, against the british power in the east. He formed also an intimate connection with the king of Prussia, who, since the peace of Paris, had fostered the bitterest

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enmity against England. He soothed the temporary resentment which the conduct of France, during the contest for the bavarian succession, had excited in the court of Vienna. He succeeded even in allaying the deep-rooted jealousy of Prussia and Austria; and, by their co-operation, turned the principal weight of the germanic body against the hereditary enemy of the House of Bourbon.

The negotiations of the spanish minister extended even to St. Petersburgh. He obtained sufficient influence in the russian court and cabinet to weaken that partiality which was the effect of the long, intimate, and advantageous connection with England.* By the united representations of the bourbon courts, the empress was not only induced to lay aside her design of assisting England with her fleet, and uniting her arms with Prussia against Austria; but she was even persuaded to mediate the peace of Teschen, and thus to prevent the continuance of the war in Germany, which would have recalled a part of the french force from distant operations to their own frontier.†

May 13, 1779.

He, at the same time, aided the machinations

* Florida Blanca, in his Statement, No. 5, avows these hostile designs against England; and acknowledges that the previous negotiation had enabled Spain to mature her preparations.—Appendix.

† House of Austria, v. 2, ch. 42.

of France to foment the commercial jealousy of Holland, and lured the cupidity of this trading people by the prospect of succeeding to the commercial privileges hitherto enjoyed by the english in Spain.

But his principal efforts were directed to the barbary states, whose friendship and assistance would essentially favour the attack meditated against Gibraltar, which was always the first hostile project of Spain in her disputes with England. As the failure of the unfortunate expedition against Algiers had sufficed to convince the minister that direct hostilities would only lead to disappointment and disgrace, he recurred to negotiation, and, for the first time, entered into a regular treaty with a people hitherto considered as irreconcilable enemies, both of the nation and of its religion.

By bribes, and the customary modes of solicitation, the emperor of Morocco was induced to send an embassador to Madrid, under the pretence of giving public satisfaction for the attack against Melilla. Through the agency of this minister, a treaty was concluded, which alienated the moorish prince from England, and attached him to Spain. He even deposited a part of his treasure in Spain, as a pledge of his sincerity, opened his ports to spanish ships, and favoured the projects of the court in all their subsequent

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operations. Besides these direct advantages, the friendship of the moors enabled the spaniards to reduce their garrisons on the african coast, and even to diminish the artillery and magazines. Speaking of this treaty, its author, Florida Blanca, observes, "Your majesty comprehends better than any other person, how great would have been our embarrassment, if, by omitting to form this connection in time, England had incited the moors to attack Ceuta or Melilla, or by piratical cruizes in the straits, to derange all our measures for the blockade of Gibraltar, and the transport of provisions to our camp."*

Among the measures directly connected with the views of Spain, may be placed the alliance with Portugal, which secured the tranquillity of the colonies in South America, and converted from an enemy into an ally, a power whose dominions alone could favour an attack against her own frontier.

As all the measures of external policy had been directed to increase the weight and influence of the crown, so at home every preparation was matured for prompt and vigorous hostility. By the assistance of Portugal, considerable remittances were obtained from the new world; the usual expedients employed to accumulate a fund in the treasury; and the new taxes, projected in

* Statement of Florida Blanca, No. 2.

1770 for the event of a war, were carried into effect. The army was more numerous, and in a higher state of discipline and equipment, than at any period since the war of the succession; and the disposable part of the navy, exclusive of the ships destined for the service and protection of the colonies, exceeded forty sail of the line.

Thus secure at home and abroad, supported by powerful alliances, and provided with every requisite for defence or aggression, Spain proudly hoped that the time was arrived to obtain ample compensation for former losses and mortifications, and to crush a nation apparently sinking under the multiplied attacks of a host of enemies. As the british navy, the dread of Europe, appeared now scarcely equal to cope with the maritime force of France, it was triumphantly concluded, that an addition of 40 sail would secure the dominion of the seas, and lead to the degradation, if not the conquest, of a country, hitherto the principal barrier to the ambition of the House of Bourbon, and whose power and prosperity had been alternately the object of dread and envy.

To give effect to this superiority of force, and anticipate the efforts of England, the enterprising minister of Spain proposed to dispatch the fleet during the negotiation, a plan which must have led to the most decisive consequences. But his

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proposal was over-ruled by the solicitude of the government to secure the national commerce; and by the scruples of Charles himself, who was anxious to avoid the appearance of aggression.* The design was therefore formed, to unite the bourbon fleets at the moment when Spain should notify her junction with France.

The french army on the coast was increased to 50,000 men, furnished with transports and every requisite for a descent; and the intrigues of France found traitors to aid their designs in the very bosom of England, when the united fleets were ready to advance and favour the passage of the armament across the channel. On the 3rd of June, d'Orvilliers, with 30 sail of the line, hastened from Brest, in an imperfect state of equipment, before the british fleet was in a condition to resume its station; and directed his course towards the spanish coast. Arriving off Ferrol, where he was to be joined by a division of eight sail, he gave the concerted signals; but the spanish commander, Don Louis d'Arce, refused to obey, under the pretence that the wind was contrary, and afterwards excused his delay, by raising a dispute relative to rank.† The french admiral therefore, proceeding towards Cadiz, was joined by the grand armament of 30 sail, and by the division from Ferrol in his

* Florida Blanca's Statement. † Beccatini, p. 303.

return. The whole force, forming an aggregate of 68 sail of the line, exclusive of frigates and smaller vessels, then directed its course towards the channel.

Never since the time of the armada had the british isles been threatened with so tremendous an armament, and seldom so unequally prepared for a contest. Lulled into a dangerous security by the insidious professions of Spain, and vainly confiding in the obvious interest of the spanish monarch to discountenance the colonial revolt, the british government had made no preparation for defence, adequate to the magnitude of the danger. The fleet, commanded by admiral Hardy, did not exceed 38 sail, and the efforts for raising a military force, with the precautions against an invasion, in the first moment served only to augment the general alarm. A panic spread over the southern coasts, and the timid even sought a refuge in the interior of the country.

But those divisions which never failed to arise between the french and spaniards when united in war, greatly contributed to frustrate a plan so judiciously combined. The bourbon fleets, though covering a vast extent of sea, passed that of admiral Hardy unnoticed, and approached the entrance of the channel towards the latter end of July. But while the spaniards proposed to carry the descent into immediate execution, the

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french persisted in the design of previously annihilating the british fleet, which must have fallen a sacrifice to an overwhelming superiority of force. Hence, after parading before Plymouth, they again directed their course towards the mouth of the channel. They ranged about the Land's-end and the Scilly isles the greater part of the month, and at length had the mortification to see the british admiral gain the entrance of the channel, notwithstanding all their efforts. They followed him above Plymouth, but did not venture to risk the chance of a partial action in the narrow part of the channel, where they might be unable to draw advantage from their superior numbers.

The loss of this important interval decided the fate of the enterprise. After the first alarm had roused the nation to a sense of danger, warlike preparations were rapidly matured, and the country, recently so defenceless, was speedily in a situation rather to court than to dread an attack. The combined fleets, on the contrary, were depopulated by sickness, the effect of imperfect equipment, and increased by the exertions of their cruize. Hopeless of success, and dreading the gales of the approaching equinox, in their debilitated state, they returned to Brest. Except this mortifying, though ineffectual, insult to the british flag, an insult which it had not

experienced since de Ruteyr, the dutch admiral, penetrated to Chatham, the bourbon courts obtained no other compensation for their mighty efforts, nor any other trophy of their superiority, than the capture of the Ardent, of 64 guns, which mistook their armament for the british fleet. Nor did Spain draw any other advantage from the magnificent promises of her ally, than the severe and mortifying lesson of a failure before an inferior force. Of the spaniards above 3,000 men fell a sacrifice to hardship and disease; of the french a number far superior; and for several months this vast armament was too far reduced to return to sea.*

This failure occasioned a serious misunderstanding between the two bourbon courts; and their disputes were aggravated by the refusal of France to co-operate in the plans of Spain for the immediate reduction of Gibraltar and Minorca, the recovery of the Floridas, and the conquest of Jamaica.

In the midst of these operations, Gibraltar had been invested by land and blockaded by sea; and, from the distress to which the garrison were reduced, the spanish court hoped for a speedy surrender. Knowing the energy of the british marine, and aware that an armament was

* Florida Blanca's Statement.——Beccatini, p. 304——Official accounts.

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equipping under Rodney for its relief, they accommodated their disputes with France to frustrate the attempt. The utmost activity was employed to send their dilapidated fleets to sea; d'Aranda himself, then spanish embassador at Paris, repaired to Brest to forward the preparations; and a plan was formed to distribute their naval force on stations where it was likely to intercept the british fleet on its passage.

Off Brest it was to have been met by a combined fleet of 40 sail, and should it escape this danger, measures were adopted to unite a squadron of 15 ships from the ports of Galicia, with the 11 employed in the blockade of Gibraltar, and to attack it at its entrance into the mediterranean.*

These designs were, however, baffled by a concurrence of events which human prudence could not foresee, and by the superior promptitude and skill of the english commander. Florida Blanca had calculated that, after providing for the defence of the channel, the british court could not venture to detach more than twelve sail for distant objects. This conjecture was strengthened by the orders issued from the british admiralty, the substance of which was transmitted by the spies whom Almodovar had gained in England. But at the moment when

* Florida Blanca's Statement.

the preparations were completed, Rodney was dispatched with 20 sail, and passed Brest before the combined fleet was ready for sea.

Fortune appeared to smile on his progress. He had scarcely reached the coasts of Spain before he descried a convoy of 15 sail, accompanied by a 64 gun ship and four frigates, which had been fitted out by the Caracca company, to convey a great supply of naval stores and provisions from St. Sebastian to Cadiz. Not a single vessel escaped capture; the naval stores were sent to England; and the provisions contributed to augment the supply destined for the suffering garrison at Gibraltar.

This capture was but the harbinger of more distinguished success. At this crisis, the intended junction of the two spanish squadrons in the straits was prevented by violent gales. The blockading squadron, commanded by Don Juan de Langara, was driven into the mediterranean; that from Gallicia, under Don Luis de Cordova, after suffering severely in its passage, took refuge in Cadiz. Langara, however, refitted at Carthagena, and resumed his station. But at this moment, intelligence was received from Paris, that instead of a detachment, the british admiral had put to sea with nearly the whole channel fleet. But the orders sent to Cadiz arrived too late to prevent the departure of Lan-

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gara,* and being driven to sea by a gale of wind, he was met off Cape St. Vincent by Rodney. Astonished and confounded by the apparition of so superior a force, he attempted to escape. But neither tempestuous weather, the dangers of a lee shore, or the approach of night, could disconcert the skill and intrepidity of the british admiral. By a bold manœuvre, the spanish commander was cut off from his own ports, and had no other resource than to vindicate the honour of his flag by a brave, though fruitless defence. At four in the afternoon the engagement began, and lasted eight hours, amidst the raging of the tempest, and the darkness of night. In the commencement of the action, the St. Domingo, a spanish 74, blew up, six others successively struck, two of which were driven on shore, and only four escaped. All the captains did honour to the national flag; but the defence of the commander in chief has been seldom paralleled. Although himself severely wounded, and his masts shot away, he bore the fire of four antagonists from almost the commencement to the close of the battle, and did not strike till his own ship was reduced to a complete wreck.†

Jan. 16, 1780.

From this blow the spanish marine did not

* Florida Blanca's Statement.

† Beccatini, p. 312.——Official accounts.

recover during the war. Although a division of six sail, under admiral Gaston, arrived from Brest, and although Rodney continued a month in the bay of Gibraltar, no attempt was made to attack him at his anchorage, or to obstruct his progress. The hopes and plans of Spain were frustrated by the relief of Gibraltar and Minorca, and the successful admiral departed with a part of his fleet to gather new laurels in the West Indies.

From being the assailants, the spaniards were now reduced to measures of defence. Every exertion was employed to protect the colonies from british enterprise, and admiral Solano, with a fleet of 12 sail, and 63 transports, conveying reinforcements and supplies, was dispatched after Rodney to unite with the french force in the West Indies. In Europe, the recent failures of the bourbon courts led to a temporary division of force; for the king, in the anguish of disappointment, refused to concur in a new expedition to the channel, and forbade his fleet from quitting the spanish seas.

At this juncture, the spanish minister had the opportunity of retaliating on the english, and obtaining an advantage, which weakened the impression of past disasters. Apprised by his spies in England that the united fleets, conveying supplies and merchandize to the East and West Indies, were about to sail under a weak escort,

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Florida Blanca formed the plan of intercepting them at the point of separation off the Azores. He obtained the reluctant permission of the king, and with his own hand dispatched the necessary orders to Cordova, who with Gaston was cruizing in the straits. The enterprise was crowned with the most signal success. The english, at the moment of conscious security, were struck with consternation at the sudden apparition of the bourbon fleet. A man of war and frigate, the only force appointed for their protection, with difficulty effected an escape, and the whole convoy fell into the hands of the spaniards.

So rich a prize had never before entered the harbour of Cadiz. A nation accustomed only to anticipate from a british war the ruin of its marine, the reduction of its colonies, and the loss of its wealth, beheld with astonishment and exultation a captive fleet of near sixty sail, a train of prisoners comprising persons of every rank and station, among whom were 1,800 of the Royal and East India company's troops, and a booty in stores and merchandise amounting to nearly 2,000,000*l.* sterling. The value of this rich and unexpected capture was enhanced by the recollection of the distress and disappointment entailed by its loss on the british settlements for which it was destined.*

* Florida Blanca's Statement.

In the midst of these operations, the spanish government was not inactive in the new world. While the americans, in conjunction with the french, were occupying all the force of Great Britain in the north, an attack was planned against Jamaica and the Leeward islands, in which the expedition under Solano was destined to co-operate. He reached the West Indies in safety, eluded the vigilance of Rodney, who was waiting to intercept him, and effected a junction with the french admiral, de Guichen, under Dominica. Their united fleets formed a force of 35 sail, and their armament, military and naval, appeared sufficient to over-balance all the british force in that quarter; for the fleet amounted only to 20 sail, and the settlements were weakly garrisoned, and from the loss of the valuable convoy off the Azores, but scantily provided for defence. No foresight, however, could avert the disasters attending warlike operations in this baneful climate. The crowded situation of the troops on board the transports, the length of the voyage, the change of climate, and above all, the want of precautions, occasioned a contagious disorder, which, after raging fatally among the spaniards, extended its ravages to the french fleet. This dreadful mortality damped the spirit of enterprise, as well as exhausted the means of action; and the misfortune was aggra-

April 18, 1780.

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vated by the usual disputes and animosity between the two nations. After some ineffectual attempts to check the progress of the pestilence, the two fleets separated. De Guichen returned with the homeward-bound convoy; Solano proceeded to the Havannah, to assist in the military operations which were now begun against Florida.

July 5.

On the continent of America, the spaniards were more successful than in their naval operations. The requisite preparations having been previously made, Don Bernardo Galvez, governor of Louisiana, commenced hostilities soon after the spanish court announced their union with France. Collecting a force of 2,000 men, he made an irruption into West Florida, which was defended by only 1,800, the principal part at Pensacola, and the rest scattered in the different garrisons. Having formally recognised the independence of America, he set his troops in motion, ascended the course of the Mississippi, and after a siege of nine days, reduced a fort erected at the mouth of the Ibbeville, and garrisoned with 500 men. Proceeding up the river, as far as the Natches, he occupied the forts and settlements which formed the barrier of the province on the west, and over-ran a fertile country no less than 1,200 miles in extent.

April 19.

September, 1779.

Before the season for action, he concerted with the governor of the Havannah a plan for

reducing Pensacola, and the remainder of the province. With this view, he embarked his troops at New Orleans, and, under the convoy of several frigates and light vessels, proceeded to the bay of Mobile, where he was to be joined by an additional force from the Havannah. After a continued struggle of above a month with the tempests common to the climate, many of his vessels were wrecked, and 800 of his men cast on the beach, without arms, clothes, or necessaries. He bore this reverse with the characteristic firmness of his nation. As the greater part of his artillery was lost, he formed ladders from the wrecks, and prepared for the desperate attempt of reducing fort Mobile by escalade. At this moment, he was relieved by the arrival of part of the succours from the Havannah, and encouraged with the prospect that the remainder would shortly follow. He re-embarked his troops, and, after encountering a new series of difficulties, landed within three leagues of the fort, which was defended by only 284 men, including inhabitants. Approaches were formed, and three days afterwards a battery opened with such effect, that before night the besieged proposed a capitulation. The garrison surrendered prisoners of war; and such was the good fortune which attended this enterprise, that they

1780.

March 14, 1780.

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were marched out at the moment when general Campbell, the military commander of the province, appeared in sight with a force of 1,100 men for their relief.

The fort was instantly occupied, and such preparations made for resistance, that the british commander did not venture to risk an attack. The remainder of the season was spent in some partial contests, and the interval between this and the ensuing spring employed in active exertions for reducing the capital, Pensacola. Galvez repaired to the Havannah to accelerate the preparations, and resumed his operations at the head of a new expedition of 8,000 men, which sailed at the commencement of 1781. He again suffered from violent hurricanes, lost four of his principal ships, with 2,000 men, and was driven back to the Havannah. But the arrival of the armament under Solano enabling him to refit and resume his design, he once more put to sea with a force of 5,000 men, under the convoy of five sail of the line, and was followed by the remainder of the fleet, amounting to fifteen. As there was no naval force to oppose him, he effected a landing with little difficulty, and commenced his attack both by sea and land. He experienced a desperate resistance from the garrison, though composed of a motley mixture of

foreigners, negroes, and indians, with a few regulars. But no defence can long balance a decided superiority of numbers, with the advantage of position. The trenches were regularly, though slowly, advanced, and the batteries opened with effect against the advanced works which covered the town. A shell having blown up the magazine belonging to the principal battery, the assailants profited by the momentary confusion, pushed forward, and established themselves on the ruins, and the dependent works. The accident decided the event of the siege. From this position, the fire even of their small arms swept all the defences of the place; the commandant, unable to keep his troops to their quarters, obtained an honourable capitulation. The garrison of 800 men marched out with the honours of war, and experienced the treatment due to their gallantry, from a generous conqueror. The reduction of Pensacola completed the subjugation of the whole province.*

At the moment when Galvez directed his attacks against the forts on the Mississippi, the governor of Yucatan commenced hostilities against the british settlers on the bay of Honduras, and plundered the principal establishment at St. George's Key. The progress of the spa-

* Beccatini, p. 309.——Official accounts.

CHAP. 71. 1779—1781.

niards was, however, arrested by the efforts of these hardy and enterprising settlers; till the accidental junction of a small squadron and succours from Jamaica, enabled them to retaliate for the aggression. As a division of valuable register ships had taken refuge in the harbour defended by the fort of San Fernando de Omoa, they formed the daring design of attacking this fortress, which had been constructed with peculiar labour and skill.

Without artillery to make an impression on the walls, this motley force, amounting to 500 men, settlers, sailors, and soldiers, scaled a fortress defended by nearly an equal number, and carried the works with a spirit seldom equalled. Of the garrison 100 escaped in the confusion of the assault, and almost 400 were made prisoners. The treasure which had been a temptation for the attack was removed to a place of safety; but on board the vessels in the harbour was found a booty of above three millions of piasters, including a valuable supply of quicksilver for the use of the mines, which the successful assailants disinterestedly refused to relinquish for any ransom.

Oct. 24, 1779.

This signal success led to the arrangement of a convention between the british and spanish officers for the liberation of the captive settlers.

A garrison was left in the fort, but from the unhealthiness of the station it was soon evacuated, after the artillery and defences had been rendered useless.*

* Annual Register, 1779, 1781.——Adolphus, v. 3. p. 193.——Beccatini, p. 307, 309.——Official accounts.——Beatson, v. 6, p. 163.

## CHAPTER THE SEVENTY-SECOND.

### 1779—1781.

*Rising divisions between France and Spain—Secret negotiation with England through the agency of Mr. Cumberland and Mr. Hussey—Discussion relative to the cession of Gibraltar—Narrative of Mr. Cumberland's mission to Madrid—His fruitless conferences with Florida Blanca—Rupture of the negotiation.*

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AFTER tracing the principal operations in the new world, in which the spaniards were concerned, we resume the narrative of their transactions in Europe.

The disputes which arose with France after the failure of the expedition against England, nearly produced a separation between the two bourbon courts. Commodore Johnstone, the british commander on the Lisbon station, having hinted that lord North might be induced to purchase the friendship of Spain by the cession of Gibraltar, Florida Blanca induced his sovereign to make a direct though clandestine proposal to England. It was transmitted through the channel of Mr. Hussey, an Irish priest, chaplain to the king of Spain, and belonging to the houshold of Almodovar, who had been left in England

after the departure of the embassador. He employed the agency of a person who acted as a spy both to the spanish embassador and the british cabinet, and opened the negotiation with Mr. Cumberland, then private secretary to lord George Germaine, minister for the american or war department. A communication was immediately made, both to lord George Germaine and lord North, conveying the most positive assurances that Spain was disposed to withdraw from the french alliance; requiring, however, the restoration of Gibraltar as an indispensable condition, but offering to purchase it with liberal concessions in ships, treasure, and territory.

November 1779.

As the affairs of England were at this crisis in a deplorable situation, the two ministers, to whom the secret was confided, were possibly not disinclined to accede to the demand. At all events they deemed it impolitic not to listen to the proposal, and to decline a negotiation, which, even if unsuccessful, might tend to weaken the mutual confidence between Spain and France. Accordingly, Mr. Hussey was encouraged to return to Madrid, under pretence of his private affairs; but he was not authorised in the slightest degree to make any promise relative to Gibraltar. With the approbation of the king of England, he was charged with a letter from lord George Ger-

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maine, addressed to himself, and calculated to give countenance to his mission.

December, 1779.

"Understanding that you are soon to set out for Madrid, where, from your connections, frequent opportunities will probably occur of conversing with persons in high trust and office, I persuade myself you will not be wanting to improve every opportunity of cultivating any disposition which you may discern in the ministry towards a renovation of that harmony between the two nations, which, to their reciprocal prejudice, has of late been interrupted. As there is every reason to conclude that the disposition of the spanish minister will be found to be such, as in wisdom and sound policy it ought to be, so I am sure the communications you have had with men of power in this country, can give no colour to your report, but what must tend to the encouragement of any motions on the part of Spain towards an accommodation with Great Britain. As just credit is given to the purity of your motives, I can assure you both for lord North and myself, that your representations will be received with the most friendly attention; and if, in pursuing the bent of your wishes, you shall be warranted to convey to us any opening or overture on the part of Spain, towards a pacification so essential to the interests of both king-

doms, I can with the same truth assure you it will be entertained here with all possible sincerity and good faith."

We shall present the progress of this negotiation in the lively description of Mr. Cumberland, interspersing such remarks as may serve to develope the transaction.*

"On the 5th of December, 1779, Mr. Hussey took his departure, and reached Madrid on the 29th; his character and situation at that court gave him instant admission to the minister Florida Blanca. He exhibited to him the letter of lord George Germaine, and he supported it with such professions on his own part as should best inforce the authority of his errand and the friendly disposition of this court. He found the minister under the unfavourable impressions which he had received from Almodovar, all which he combated with arguments, as well from his own observations as from lord George's instructions and conversation before his departure. In repeated interviews, those unfriendly impressions abated; but it was objected to him that indis-

* From a curious memorandum written by Mr. Cumberland himself, which I found among the papers of sir S. Porten. As the composition itself does honour to his abilities and discretion; and as his recent loss removes the restraint which would otherwise have prevented me from giving it to the public, it will prove an acceptable addition to the account of this singular transaction which he has given in his own Memoirs.

creet and undigested overtures for the cession of Gibraltar, had come from commodore Johnstone through the channel of a messenger from Lisbon, where he was stationed; the concealed design of which was supposed to cover an attempt to create a suspicion and misunderstanding between that court and France.

"Notwithstanding this impediment, Mr. Hussey faithfully persisted in the purposes of his undertaking, and in the course of a conversation with Florida Blanca took occasion to probe him upon the supposed engagement of Spain with France, not to make peace without her participation and concurrence. The train took fire as was intended. Piqued at the suggestion, the minister rushed to his cabinet, took out his papers, put them into Mr. Hussey's hands; declaring on his honour, that those engagements contained the whole of what had been stipulated between the two allied courts, and that no part of those could, or ever should, bind Spain in the manner he suggested. She was free to make peace with England independently; but he doubted the sincerity of the british cabinet, and added, with emphasis, that Gibraltar must be the indispensable basis of the negotiation. Equivalents were suggested, though without precision; large pecuniary allowances for stores and artillery in the fort; privileges in trade; accommo-

dation with respect to America, and reciprocal cession of territory, were thrown out in conversation. In fine, a letter was written to Mr. Hussey in count Florida Blanca's own hand, expressive of the like general pacific disposition with that from lord George Germaine. At the same time private instructions were given to Mr. Hussey, on which he was to found his report to the british ministers, and he was dismissed with the stipulation that he should send back an answer, or return himself, before the expiration of February. All these proceedings his catholic majesty sanctioned with his entire approbation, and at parting gave his benediction to Mr. Hussey, charging him to return with peace.

"On the 9th of January, 1780, Mr. Hussey left Madrid, and reached London on the 29th. I saw him the very night of his arrival, and received from him the most candid and favourable communication of the various events of his visit to Madrid, with every minute circumstance relative to the situation of the court, the temper of the nation, and their disposition towards France. No proof of his sincerity was on this occasion with-held; and I must have been insensible to truth, if I had not yielded to the evidence of so much candour. With the same sincerity he imparted to lord George Germaine the subject of his several conferences with the spanish

1780.

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minister, and exposed to him the instructions with which he was furnished."

The negotiation was now thrown into the cabinet, and four successive councils were dedicated to the discussion. On this occasion, a series of conditions appears to have been brought forward, which were intended to form the basis of the proposed accommodation.

"The importance of Gibraltar," it was observed, "is so great, and the national vanity is so interested in keeping so extraordinary a possession, that it seems impossible for any ministry to give it up without stipulating an equivalent. It strikes me on a general view of the subject, that as it would be very advantageous to bring Spain to a separate peace, Gibraltar might be yielded on the following conditions:—First, Spain shall yield and guaranty to Great Britain the island of *Porto Rico*. Secondly, she shall also yield and guaranty to Great Britain the fortress of Omoa, and its territory. In drawing this article, assistance must be got from those acquainted with that country, and the nature of our trade there. Thirdly, she shall likewise yield and guaranty to Great Britain a harbour and territory sufficient for erecting a fortress in the bay near Oran. Fourthly, she shall not only purchase at the full price, all the stores and artillery left at Gibraltar; but shall also pay

before she is put in possession of it, a sum not less than two millions sterling, for what has been laid out on the fortifications since Great Britain first possessed it. Fifthly, she shall make a separate peace with Great Britain, shall renounce all engagements to France, as far as they bind her to take part in this or any other war against Great Britain, shall renew the treaty of Paris in every particular, except such alterations as are made by the above-mentioned articles. Sixthly, she shall engage in the clearest and most solemn manner not to assist the british colonies in America, not to receive any minister or agent from them, nor to suffer their ships to enter any ports in the spanish dominions. She shall agree to assist Great Britain in reducing the colonies to obedience, or if this cannot be obtained, we should at least insist that Spain expressly bind herself not to harbour in her dominions any subjects of the king that are deemed rebels, but compel them to depart in a week's time after the requisition shall have been made by the king's ministers in his majesty's name. This stipulation to be mutual, and the king to make a like engagement with regard to the rebellious subjects of the crown of Spain. A cessation of arms to be agreed upon as soon as the above articles are signed and ratified; but the cession of Gibraltar on our part, and that of Porto Rico on the part

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of Spain not to take place till the american rebellion is ended.*

"In the end," continues Mr. Cumberland, "it was resolved, that the secretaries of state should, in person, jointly communicate to Mr. Hussey the result of those deliberations, and the mind of the british ministry towards the proposed accommodation with Spain. This was done at the earl of Hillsborough's house, lord Stormont† being present. Mr. Hussey was then told, 'he might safely state the sincere disposition of the king and his ministers towards so desirable an object as peace and good understanding with Spain: that the war in which Great Britain found herself engaged, was totally unprovoked on her part, and its conclusion was at all times in the breast of Spain, if she chose to revert to the basis of the treaty of Paris. If she wished for a closer connection, and a more active union with this country by a reciprocal cession of territory, Great Britain was at all times ready to receive her proposals.' With respect to Gibraltar, not a syllable, that could mislead Spain into hopes upon that article, which it was evident she had so much at heart, was suffered to drop.

* It must be confessed, that if it could be deemed policy to relinquish Gibraltar, the framer of these conditions was not deficient in his demand of an equivalent.

† Secretary for the northern department.

On the contrary, lord Stormont (not without some vehemence of speech and action) declared to Mr. Hussey, 'if Spain would lay before him the map of her empire, to take his choice of an equivalent, and three weeks to fix that choice, he should not be able in that period to find in all the dominions of Spain, what, in his judgment, would balance the cession of Gibraltar.' Mr. Hussey was further assured by the secretaries of state, that, with respect to commodore Johnstone's intrigue, and the overtures he had thrown out touching Gibraltar, both lord North and the cabinet jointly and severally disavowed that any authority had been given to him for that or any other purpose, tending towards a negotiation: his duty was simply that of a cruizing captain; and these operations must be imputed solely to his own projecting disposition, not to any powers with which he was vested. Of this, Mr. Hussey was desired to assure the spanish minister, expressing at the same time the surprize of lord North in particular, to find that count Florida Blanca could believe so undigested and crude a proposition, as that held forth by commodore Johnstone, could originate with him.'

"This conference, so dry upon the topic of Gibraltar, broke up to the absolute dissatisfaction of Mr. Hussey, who received no letter, had no written answer or instructions imparted to him,

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no warrant for returning to Madrid, nor was he even encouraged by the noble personages to shew to them the letter he might think proper to write to the minister of Spain. On the contrary, his offer of communication in that case was declined.

"Mr. Hussey now resorted to me in a temper of mind highly inflamed, and little short of distraction. On one thing only he seemed determined, which was, to write forthwith to count Florida Blanca, and implore pardon of him and his catholic majesty, for his endeavours to impress them with notions of a pacific disposition in this ministry. No such principle operated here; on the contrary, he found himself grossly duped in the business, and with shame he acknowledged that count Florida Blanca had foreseen and warned him of the insincerity which pervaded the ruling councils of Great Britain.

"Upon this occasion, I found it highly prudent, though not very easy, to preserve temper with Mr. Hussey; the latitude he took in his discourse, affected persons towards whom I had much respect, and in particular one for whom I had the warmest affection. Having in vain persisted to reason calmly with him, I plainly told him (with an air of more authority than I was intitled to) that he might write his sentiments to the above effect; let them go to Spain; but that

the honour of the british cabinet must not be subjected to misrepresentation. I undertook to pledge myself that counter declarations should go from authority by express commission; that I would myself solicit the honour of that agency; and what would then be his situation in Spain, when it was understood that his want of temper had given a false colouring to a transaction of such consequence? I spoke this to him standing, determined, if this argument failed, to hold no further conversation on the point, but leave him to take his own measures. Whether the earnestness I used on this occasion, or what other reason prevailed, I will not pretend to determine, but he suddenly drew back from his argument, and, resuming the question, spoke with proper temper, and thereby gave me opportunity to urge with due effect the propriety of that principle which had actuated the secretaries of state (and in them the cabinet) through the whole of that conversation, which had given him so great discontent. We parted on better terms than I could have expected, and the next morning brought him again to my door, with apologies for his warmth and intemperance on the preceding evening. He was now in the humour to go farther on the side of qualification, than I thought the sentiments of the cabinet warranted,

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and a difficult part fell upon me to moderate in a case of such delicacy. I knew that an honourable caution in the british cabinet had dictated so dry an answer, and though I verily believed that their wishes cordially inclined to pacification upon liberal terms, I durst not give the full force to that opinion and belief, from an apprehension, that in his letter to the spanish minister, he would press those hopes (particularly with respect to Gibraltar) further than the event would warrant. The manner of lord Stormont had grated him severely. I did not oppose myself to this, because it was merely *manner;* and I had rather his disgust should spend itself upon appearances, than upon facts. The influence, and I may add the ascendancy, which I established over his mind by the manner in which this conversation had passed between us, was henceforward very sensible; and it was strongly confirmed to me by the report of a confidential friend, to whom I had been obliged for innumerable hints through the whole negotiation.

"Mr. Hussey, instead of burning the private and confidential cypher of Florida Blanca, as he had resolved, now determined to use it in writing in very pacific terms to that minister, and declared that he would put the cypher afterwards under my seal and signature, never to be opened

till his messenger returned. The letter he wrote to the spanish prime minister, after some alterations on my part, was settled as follows, viz. CHAP. 72. 1779—1781.

*Mr. Hussey to count Florida Blanca.*

" ' Upon my arrival here, which was fifteen days ago, I reported your excellency's instructions to me to the british cabinet. They considered the matter with assiduity for several days; but the tender of Gibraltar, as a previous and indispensable article of the treaty, is what the cabinet could not be brought to grant. They offer to treat upon the basis of the treaty of Paris; and then Spain may start the subject under the title of Change of Territory. Great Britain will enter into the negotiation in this shape, and will in the issue convince the world of her sincerity in her wishes for an accommodation with Spain. If your excellency thinks this a sufficient ground to open a treaty, Great Britain will appoint a person to transact the affair with secrecy and dispatch; Spain appointing one at the same time. And if your excellency will allow me a conjecture on it, as it stands, I really believe that they will cede Gibraltar upon terms; but for this I have no authority from the british cabinet, neither written nor verbal. The cabinet here disavow having given any commission or instructions to Johnstone, relative to the proposals he made to Spain; and they say that Feb. 13, 1780.

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they hope his imprudence will not obstruct this negotiation.'

"This was the purport of the letter sent by Mr. Hussey. His own servant set out with it for Madrid on the 14th of February, and it must be observed, that it was not officially communicated to any member of the cabinet, though I shewed it, with his permission, both to lord George Germaine, and lord Hillsborough. Soon after this, arrived the news of admiral Rodney's success."

The terms of this letter again deceived the spanish minister on a point peculiarly the object of his desires. An additional motive for continuing the negotiation was, however, derived from the defeat of Langara by Rodney, and the relief of Gibraltar. The communication was therefore maintained through the medium of Mr. Hussey; and such a report was made to the british ministry, that Mr. Cumberland was accredited to conduct this delicate negotiation. He was to repair to the neutral port of Lisbon, and remain while Mr. Hussey proceeded to Madrid, to ascertain whether Spain would make the cession of Gibraltar the indispensable basis of a negotiation. He was to proceed or return, as the answer was affirmative or negative.

January, 1780.

Although the simple resolution of this question formed the sole object of Mr. Hussey's journey,

Florida Blanca avoided giving a direct answer, and continued the negotiation, with the apparent view of drawing at least some advantage from it by exciting the jealousy, and stimulating the zeal, of France. He professed his ardent hope of bringing things to a happy conclusion; and induced the british agent to proceed, under the pretence of passing through Spain into Italy for the restoration of his health. June.

After the arrival of Mr. Cumberland, he held several conferences with the spanish minister; and the outlines of an arrangement were sketched, without any direct reference to Gibraltar. But about the same period news arrived of the tumults in London, excited by lord George Gordon. These tumults being magnified into an actual rebellion, the spanish minister testified his reluctance to enter into a negotiation with the agent of a government whose overthrow was hourly expected, and perhaps hourly desired. In vain Mr. Cumberland endeavoured to counteract the effect of this unfortunate intelligence. His arguments were addressed to men, who were either weak enough to credit the exaggerated tale, or artful enough to assume the appearance of that belief, as a pretext for delaying a business which they were in no hurry to conclude. July.

The plan of accommodation was further traversed by the french government, who dispatched

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a fleet to Cadiz, and deputed admiral d'Estaign to Madrid to give the strongest assurances of their active co-operation in the war, and to demonstrate the certainty of speedily reducing Gibraltar.

Aug. 8.

The subsequent capture of the East and West India convoy, joined to strong proofs of a favourable disposition in the northern powers, contributed still further to strengthen the spanish minister in his resolution of making the cession of Gibraltar the preliminary of a peace. Accordingly his tone was suddenly changed. Gibraltar was again brought into discussion by adverting to the terms which he had originally transmitted by Mr. Hussey, and to which, as he complained, the british ministry had not condescended to give an answer. To this remark Mr. Cumberland replied, that no answer had been returned, because they were grounded on the unauthorised suggestions of commodore Johnstone, and because they comprised the cession of Gibraltar as an indispensable article, while he himself had promised, that it should not be brought forward in the present negotiation. The perseverance of the british agent in his original principle surprised and embarrassed Florida Blanca. After some conversation, at which his first secretary, del Campo, was present, he began a desultory discourse with great marks of agitation, and

hinted at the purpose of d'Estaign's mission. Then suddenly turning the conversation, he exclaimed, "Gibraltar is an object for which the king, my master, will break the family compact, and every other engagement with France;" and, as if to give force to his asseveration, he threw the paper on the floor, and stamped it under foot. Recovering himself, however, he continued, "If you bind me to my promise, I must make no mention of Gibraltar; but if that article is inadmissible, what prevents us from considering the rest?" When Mr. Cumberland rejoined, I have no copy of those propositions; will your excellency again put them down? He evaded the demand, saying, "The abbé Hussey has the original, and I kept no copy."

Finally, to the question, Whether he was acquainted with the disposition of France, or was prepared to transmit any overtures on her part? he made a pause, and finding he had proceeded too far, replied with more than usual deliberation, "We have no overtures to make on her part. France, as well as the other courts which have representatives here resident, has been very inquisitive on the object of your journey. The only answer given by us has been, that the catholic king is an honourable monarch, and will punctually observe all his engagements

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On the faith of this single assertion the whole matter rests. If England be sincere for peace, let her now pursue that object, which must sooner or later be the object of all. We will honestly and ardently second her endeavours. We require nothing at which her dignity may revolt; we acknowledge and conceive the degree of sensibility, or even indignation, which she must entertain against a state in actual alliance with the rebel subjects of her empire. Let her keep in sight that dignity which is her due; but let her meet his catholic majesty in his disposition for terminating a war which can only exhaust all parties; as she best knows what her own interests will admit, let her suggest such terms as she would receive if proposed by France, and couple with them terms for Spain. If these be fair and reasonable on both sides, and such as Spain on her part can honourably accept, the catholic king will conclude with her for himself, and exert all his influence with his ally to render the peace general. This is an arduous and delicate business; let us cordially unite our endeavours to promote it. I shall be at all times ready to confer with you freely and without disguise, and let no difference of opinion affect our personal good understanding."*

* Cumberland's Memoirs, p. 356.

When Florida Blanca found that no exhortations could induce Mr. Cumberland to pass the strict letter of his instructions, he once more dispatched Mr. Hussey to London, with the hope of resuming that subject in a direct discussion with the british government. He instructed Mr. Hussey to make this demand the indispensable basis of a negotiation, and could not refrain from some insulting language, relative to the american contest. But the british government, convinced that it was impossible to detach Spain by any reasonable concession, declined any further negotiation, and after a stay of eight months Mr. Cumberland was recalled.

Meanwhile the negotiation had produced one of the effects expected by the spanish minister. It drew France into an active and zealous co-operation in the attacks meditated against Gibraltar, Minorca, and Jamaica. Accordingly, when Mr. Hussey returned to Lisbon with the same propositions as before from the british ministry, Florida Blanca assumed a decisive tone, refused to receive him, and declared a firm resolution to enter into no negotiation, except in concert with France. This communication, therefore, whatever were the original views of the respective cabinets, only terminated in a more determined resolution to prosecute the contest, and Spain hoped to extort by force that

Feb. 1, 1781.

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acquisition which she had in vain sought to obtain by treaty.*

* The account of this mysterious transaction is drawn from official papers, and from Mr. Cumberland's Memoirs of his own Life.

It is proper to apprise the reader, that this negotiation for the restoration of Gibraltar was at no time a cabinet measure. It was proposed and continued by lord George Germaine alone, with the tacit permission of lord North, whose known pliancy of temper was overborne by the impetuosity of his colleague. The serious form which it at one period assumed, may be attributed to the sanguine dispositions of Mr. Hussey and Mr. Cumberland, who were anxious to figure as the restorers of peace. Mr. Hussey, when on his journey to Spain, triumphantly observed to a friend, from whom I received the anecdote, that "he had Gibraltar in his pocket." In the course of conversation, he however admitted, that although lord George Germaine had decidedly and explicitly expressed his readiness to agree to the cession, as the price of a separate peace, yet the case was far otherwise with lord North, whom Mr. Hussey had only once seen, and then received from him the declaration, that "*Gibraltar* was a forbidden word, which must never pass his lips."

## CHAPTER THE SEVENTY-THIRD.

### 1779—1782.

*Origin and progress of the armed neutrality—Intrigues of the bourbon courts to gain the empress of Russia—Florida Blanca's account of the transaction—Russian declaration, and convention of the neutral maritime powers—War between England and Holland—Invasion and conquest of Minorca by Spain.*



AT the very moment when Spain was carrying on this private negotiation with England, she was no less secretly engaged in another with Russia, for the formation of a confederacy calculated to subvert the maritime power of England. This was the Armed Neutrality, of which the spanish cabinet claimed the merit, and to which they doubtless essentially contributed.

The naval superiority of England, and the almost constant destruction of the french marine at the commencement of a war, naturally rendered France desirous to deprive her rival of the command of the ocean. Hence she had laboured to introduce the principle, that neutral ships might carry on the trade, both coasting and general, of hostile nations, except warlike stores, and the few articles by common consent

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deemed contraband, and obtained a considerable support among nations who were jealous of England, or eager to share the spoils of her lucrative commerce. But hitherto, the dread of the english power, or temporary interests, had prevented the maritime nations of Europe from embracing this new species of naval code. In particular, an application had been made to Spain, during the reign of Ferdinand, but it was frustrated by his pacific views; and the war in the commencement of the reign of Charles was too short to bring this measure into execution.

The present juncture, however, appeared favourable for its attainment. The united fleets of the House of Bourbon were numerically superior to that of England, and dissipated the dread hitherto prevailing of her naval power. But the circumstance which most forwarded the design, was the influence which the House of Bourbon had recently acquired among the maritime nations of the north. France governed the counsels of Sweden and Holland; and Denmark was wholly subservient to Russia, where the two bourbon courts spared no intrigue to obtain the preponderance.

The share taken by Spain in this memorable transaction, is best related by Florida Blanca himself.

"To deprive our enemies of every maritime

alliance which might incommode us in case of a rupture, by the order of your majesty, I cultivated a good correspondence with the court of Russia, with which some causes of coldness and want of confidence had arisen, in regard to the etiquette and treatment of an imperial crown, and to the ceremonies and pretensions of that court.

"France entered into similar ideas, and we not only prevented Russia from uniting with England during the war, but even prevailed on her to send us *purposely two of her frigates*, charged with naval stores, at the time when the war prevented the transport of them for the equipment of our fleet.

"We also succeeded in inducing the empress of Russia to place herself at the head of almost all the neutral nations, to support the honour of her flag, a confederacy which has been called the 'armed neutrality.' Thus was England deprived of the resources she might have drawn from the maritime powers, not excepting even Holland, her ancient ally. Permit me, sire, here to touch on an intrigue employed to strike this blow, which, although attributed to Russia, and firmly supported by her, took its rise in the political cabinet of your majesty, and in the maxims you adopted.

"The acknowledged rule in the treaties of

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almost all nations, that the friendly and neutral flag should free the effects and merchandise of enemies from confiscation, had never been observed by the english marine, which was directed by the haughty maxims of its dominion over the sea, or by the particular laws of its admiralty.

"When your majesty published the new orders for cruizing, it was settled that vessels, with a neutral or friendly flag, which carried enemies' effects, should be detained, or conducted to our ports, in order to execute against them the same law as was executed by the english against those which were charged with spanish property, or that of our allies. By this regulation, we hoped to attain one of two things, to restrain the conduct of the english towards the neutral flag, or by the way of reprisals to compensate for the loss we incurred, by exposing to a greater loss the english commerce, which was in the hands of our enemies.

"The execution of this article, and the facility which we possessed by the blockade of Gibraltar, to detain all vessels conveying english property, at the passage of the Straits, excited universal clamour among the maritime neutral nations. I was attacked by the ministers of Sweden, Denmark, Holland, Russia, Prussia, Venice, Genoa, and others, to put a stop to the injuries which

their commerce suffered by the detention of so many vessels.

"To these clamours, we constantly answered, that if the neutral powers would defend their flag against the english, when conveying spanish effects, then we would respect that flag, even if conveying english. But we could not suffer neutrals to submit to the abuse of the english power; and if they allowed the english marine to detain and confiscate our effects, when under a friendly or neutral flag, they must not persuade themselves that Spain would fail to imitate the example.

"The matter being thus prepared to throw the odium, as was just, on the english, and to incite the neutral powers to the defence of their flag, Russia brought forward an idea of which we dexterously profited.

"The chancellor of the empire insinuated to us, how much it would conduce to the tranquillity and good correspondence of the trading nations, if a general maritime code could be formed, which would embrace the most necessary points of this matter, to avoid doubts and controversies, and if it could be adopted by those nations; for which purpose the empress would gladly employ her influence and authority.

"I instantly perceived the desire of Russia to acquire the glory of giving maritime laws to the

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trading part of Europe, and answered, that such a code would experience many difficulties before it could be adopted; but it was less difficult to persuade the neutral maritime powers to defend their flag against those who might desire to insult it, by establishing rules for that purpose, founded on treaties. I added, that Russia beginning in this manner to incite the neutral powers, who were insulted and desirous to sustain the indemnity of their flag, and consequently of their commercial prosperity during the war, a species of maritime code would be insensibly formed. The empress, placing herself in the front of this sort of alliance, or foundation of a neutrality, would have the honour of being protectress of the rights belonging to maritime nations.

"The late king of Prussia, who desired to restrain the abuses of the english admiralty, supported this thought, and it was consequently well received by the russian ministry, as I had given assurances that Spain and France would conform to these principles, though England might refuse them. And in effect, the czarina thus began the celebrated Armed Neutrality, which took its rise, as I have said, in the cabinet of your majesty."*

This important object was not, however,

* Statement of count Florida Blanca, No. 4.

attained without an animated struggle at the court of St. Petersburgh. England opposed representations to representations, and cabals to cabals; and flattered the ruling passion of Catherine for acquiring naval power, by luring her with the cession of Minorca, which would have essentially favoured her projects on the side of the Dardanelles. On the other hand, all the resources of the bourbon courts were called forth to turn the scale, and their views were ably seconded by the chancellor Panin, and a numerous train of inferior agents in the very cabinet and houshold of the empress.

From the habits of long intercourse, a consciousness of the commercial advantages attending a connection with England, and a suspicion of french duplicity, Catherine long wavered between the contending parties. In fitting out a fleet she even testified a disposition to unite with England. At length, however, two events contributed to fix her resolution. The first was the detention of several dutch ships, under the protection of admiral Beyland, who was compelled by a british squadron to strike his flag, and permit his convoy to be searched. This decisive measure deeply affected all the maritime powers, but more particularly the empress, whose subjects were interested in the cargoes of

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the vessels detained. The second was the concerted opposition of the spanish fleet to the passage of the Straits, by some russian ships, not laden with prohibited articles.*

Feb. 26, 1780.

Neither address nor activity were wanting to profit by the first impulse of the resentment which the empress felt on this occasion. Accordingly, she published her celebrated declaration, which gave rise to the Armed Neutrality. This manifesto contained three principles, which, with professions of great impartiality towards all the belligerent powers, she called on other nations to respect and maintain, as the basis of maritime law. Neutral ships might freely navigate between the ports, and on the coasts of nations at war. They might convey all effects, except those specified as contraband in the tenth and eleventh articles of the commercial treaty with Great Britain. Lastly, as the only exception to these rules, the power of hostile nations over a blockaded port, was only to be understood of a port so completely straitened by ships of war, as to render the entrance dangerous. She concluded with announcing the equipment of her navy, and declaring her resolution to protect the honour of her flag, and the commerce of her subjects.

* Florida Blanca's Statement, No. 4.

The king of Spain, in conformity with his previous promise, and the principle of throwing the public odium on England, was the first sovereign who acquiesced in the new code. After expatiating on the injuries sustained by neutrals in the prosecution of their trade, he praises the justice and moderation of the russian manifesto, and vindicates his own conduct. He triumphantly concludes:

"The king, nevertheless, not content with these proofs of his justification, will have this day the glory of being the first to set the example, in respecting the neutral flag of all the courts who will agree to defend it against the insults of the english corsairs, until he sees the conduct of the english navy, and whether their men of war and privateers will keep within due bounds. To convince neutral powers of his earnest desire to observe the same rules in time of war, which he followed while neuter, his majesty conforms to all the points contained in the declaration of Russia. It is, however, to be understood, that with regard to the blockade of Gibraltar, the danger of entering subsists, as determined by the fourth article of the said declaration. This danger may yet be avoided by neutral powers, if they conform to the rules of prevention established by his majesty's declaration of the 13th of March last, as has been

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communicated to the court of Russia by his minister."*

April 25, 1780.

France followed the example of Spain in declaring the principles of the russian manifesto conformable to those prescribed to the french marine, which Louis the sixteenth had made war to maintain.

The king of England did not delay noticing the russian declaration. He justified his conduct towards neutrals, without relinquishing the principles which form the basis of our naval power. He expressed his desire to prevent violations of public law, and to render justice to those who carried on a commerce strictly neutral.

July 8.

Denmark re-echoed the terms of the russian declaration; but Sweden, at the instigation of France, brought forward a demand of certain explanations, which drew from the court of St. Petersburgh a proposal to combine their respective manifestoes in a general convention for the support of the new system.

July 5, 1781.

A treaty was accordingly concluded by the three northern powers, engaging to defend the principles of the russian declaration with their whole force; to which Holland afterwards acceded.

July 13, 1782.

This example was followed even by Portugal, which was too closely united with Spain to recollect her obligations to England.

* Aranjuez, April 18, 1780.

Although the two bourbon courts had thus succeeded in organising the armed neutrality, and placing the empress of Russia at its head; yet few advantages resulted from a measure which was expected to produce a decisive effect. Notwithstanding the arrangement made for its support, the design was frustrated by the discordant interests of the northern powers. The empress of Russia, in particular, had scarcely signed the convention, before she discovered the erroneous policy into which she had been precipitated in a moment of resentment; she regretted that she had risked the commercial prosperity of her own subjects to forward the ambitious designs of France and Spain. She began to cool in her admiration of the king of Prussia; though too proud to give a public proof of her change of system, she treated her own project with contempt, ludicrously termed it the *armed nullity*, and took no measures to carry it into execution.

Still, however, the king of Prussia, consulting only his rooted enmity against England, by repeated importunities, obtained permission to be comprised in this celebrated confederacy. After the death of Maria Theresa, the emperor Joseph followed the example. But the accession of two powers without a marine, and almost without commerce, added only names to a combination

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already inefficient, and contemned even by the sovereign to whom it owed its origin.*

The conduct of the dutch during the formation of the armed neutrality, their secret encouragement, and finally their public support of the insurgent colonies, and devotion to the bourbon courts, awakened the indignation of England. Although overwhelmed by a host of foes, the british government preferred open hostilities to insidious neutrality, and by a declaration of war added Holland to the number of its enemies.

The rupture was followed by a prompt and successful attack against the dutch settlements in the West Indies, which had formed the magazines of America, as well as of France and Spain; and similar attacks were prepared against their settlements in Africa and the East. In the channel, the severe but indecisive engagement off the Dogger bank, deterred the republic from again measuring its naval force with that of England.

One of the most important events connected with the armed neutrality was the reduction of Minorca.

During the campaign of 1780, and the summer

* This account of the origin and progress of the armed neutrality is drawn from lord Malmesbury's communication, as well as from Florida Blanca's Statement, and the official papers published on the occasion.——See also House of Austria, v. 2, ch. 43.

of 1781, Spain was rather a witness than a party in the contest between her allies and England. Fully occupied in defending her colonies, and repressing the tumults with which they were agitated, she confined her operations in Europe to the junction of her fleet with that of France, and an expedition to the british channel, rather for the purpose of parade than with any design of serious aggression.

Towards the middle of 1781, she however suddenly assumed an offensive attitude, and made preparations for the recovery of Minorca, to which her attention was drawn by a particular incident during the recent contest for superiority at the court of St. Petersburgh. Nov. 29, 1780.

Deserted and depressed, England had made various efforts to awaken the sympathy, or obtain the mediation, of the great european powers. She appealed to the court of Vienna, and not only induced the empress queen to discountenance the insurgent colonies, but prevented her from entering into the armed neutrality, and even secured her support in counteracting the prussian interest at St. Petersburgh. It was hoped that the antient and national partiality might again be revived; and though effectual assistance was not expected from Austria, yet her powerful mediation was courted as the means of obtaining more favourable conditions of peace. But the

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death of the empress dissipated these expectations. Joseph, her successor, after a temporary alienation, evinced an additional partiality to the court of Versailles; and forgot the principle which dictated his memorable reply to those who pressed him to acknowledge the independence of America, "I am a *royalist* by profession." He tendered indeed an illusory mediation to England, but proved his real views by acceding to the armed neutrality, and testifying the most lively satisfaction at the successes of the bourbon courts.*

England was not yet sufficiently humbled to accept a mediation proffered under such inauspicious circumstances. But she directed her efforts to regain the friendship of the empress Catherine, and flattered her pride by soliciting her mediation to restore peace to Europe.

In the course of this negotiation, a project was conceived by the chimerical genius of Potemkin,† which was calculated to lead the empress to adopt a decisive part, by flattering her darling passion for the increase of her naval and commercial power. This was no less than the cession of Minorca to Russia as the price of a peace obtained by her assistance. The british

* House of Austria, v. 2, ch. 44, 46.

† For an account of the character and influence of this singular man, see House of Austria, v. 2, p. 551.——Travels in Sweden, Russia, Poland, and Denmark, v. 2, p. 363, 367.

government acquiesced in the project, and as a reward for the interference of Potemkin, he was to be gratified with the compensation allowed for the stores and artillery, which were valued at £.2,000,000 sterling.

The conditions demanded were, a peace on the basis of that of Paris; the respective parties to remain as at that era, either by restitution of conquests, or suitable exchanges. The french were to withdraw all assistance whatsoever from the americans, who were not to be permitted to treat through the intervention of any foreign power. The transfer of Minorca to depend on the acquisition of these terms, and the treaty of cession to be signed on the same day as the preliminaries. Finally, the two powers were to unite in a defensive alliance. British ships of war or merchant vessels were to be received in the harbours of Minorca on the same footing as when it was under the crown of England; and in the meanwhile, the russian fleet in the Mediterranean was to co-operate in its defence.*

Either this proposal failed from the high demands of the english government, or what is more probable, it was one of the chimerical schemes conceived by the fertile genius of Potemkin in a moment of enthusiasm, and abandoned on serious reflection; or, finally, it was counteracted by a

* From lord Malmesbury's communication.

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more alluring offer from the court of Versailles through the medium of the emperor and the king of Prussia, the first of whom tempted him with the duchy of Courland, and the other with the crown of Poland.

The project, however secret, could not be concealed from the vigilance of the spanish minister, and became a pressing motive for an attack on Minorca.

The king of Spain having formed the resolution not to waste and divert his naval force on the coast of England, or to co-operate with the french in any distant expedition, except to the West Indies, count Florida Blanca obtained his consent to attempt the reduction of Minorca, which afforded an asylum to swarms of privateers, and, since the blockade of Gibraltar, was the great, or rather the only shelter for the english ships in the Mediterranean.

To evade suspicion, many precautions were taken. Instead of the usual and natural points of embarkation on the coasts of Catalonia and Murcia, the preparations were made at Cadiz, as if destined against Gibraltar or the West Indies.

At the same time, as an explicit communication to the court of Versailles would have occasioned delays, or led to a disclosure of the design, the utmost secrecy was maintained till the pre-

parations were matured. Meanwhile the agency of the marquis of Sollerich was employed to gain the principal inhabitants of the island; and from their assistance, and the precautions adopted in the equipment of the expedition, it was confidently hoped that the british forces would be taken by surprise.

The united fleets of France and Spain, amounting to fifty-two sail, quitted Cadiz with the expedition. While the fleet stretched out into the ocean, the transports, conveying 8,000 men, commanded by the duke of Crillon, directed their course through the straits, under the escort of two men of war, several frigates, and other armed vessels. This armament, appearing unexpectedly on the coast of Minorca, effected a landing without opposition. One division, commanded by the marquis of Aviles, took possession of Citadella; and a second, under the marquis of Peñafiel, the fort of Fornella. The principal body occupied the posts in the vicinity of Port Mahon, seized the arsenal and marine magazines, and compelled the british governor, general Murray, to withdraw his forces into Fort St. Philippe. So sudden and well-combined was the attack, that according to the account of Florida Blanca,* nothing but the delay occasioned by the uncertainty of the wind, prevented

July 22.

Aug. 19.

* Florida Blanca's Statement, No. 8.

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the surprise of that fortress itself. From the previous intrigues with the islanders, neither opposition nor obstruction occurred on their part, and Crillon secured their support by proclaiming, in the name of the catholic king, the restoration of all their privileges.

From the nature of the armament, and the mode of its equipment, the invaders were unprepared for a siege, and having failed in their design of surprising St. Philippe, were reduced to the operation of a blockade.

With the hope of avoiding the difficulties of a tedious siege, Crillon was ordered by the court of Madrid to tempt the fidelity of general Murray, by offering to purchase the surrender of the place with the enormous bribe of 100,000*l.* and a promise of the most lucrative employment in the french or spanish service. This unworthy attempt against the honour of a british officer, equally distinguished for his rank and integrity, was repelled with merited indignation.

"When your brave ancestor," replied general Murray, "was desired by his sovereign to assassinate the duke of Guise, he returned the answer which you should have done when the king of Spain charged you to assassinate the character of a man whose birth is as illustrious as your own, or that of the duke of Guise. I can have no other communication with you but in arms. If

you have any humanity, pray send clothing to your unfortunate prisoners in my possession. Leave it at a distance, to be taken up for them; because I will admit of no contact for the future, but such as is hostile in the most inveterate degree."

This noble reproof drew from Crillon a reply more consonant to the honour of a nobleman and a soldier, than the insidious and degrading offer of a bribe.

"Your letter places us each in our proper stations. It confirms me in the esteem I have always had for you. I accept with pleasure your last proposition." Oct. 16.

Although the court of Versailles felt, or affected to feel, some resentment for the secrecy hitherto preserved, yet they were speedily appeased, and entered cordially into the undertaking. A reinforcement of 4,000 men was dispatched from Toulon, and requisites for a siege being transported to the island, a regular attack was commenced. On the dawn of the 6th of January, the birth-day of the dauphin, a tremendous fire was opened on the works from 150 pieces of heavy artillery. The place was, however, defended with uncommon spirit, and for a time the determined resistance of the garrison, though unequal even to guard the extensive works, balanced the vast superiority and local advantages

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of the assailants. But in the midst of this arduous and manly contest, their strength was rapidly diminished by the ravages of an inveterate scurvy, derived from the unwholesome air of their casemates, and the total want of vegetable aliment during a long and rigorous blockade. Accident contributed to aggravate their distresses. A shell from the besieging batteries set fire to their principal magazine, which contained the medical stores. After protracting their defence till the effective force was inadequate to furnish the ordinary guards, they were reduced to offer a capitulation.

Crillon treated the garrison with a generosity due to their bravery and firmness. Though restricted by particular orders from the king of Spain to receive them only as prisoners of war, he softened this hard condition by granting them military honours, released a number equivalent to that of his own soldiers taken during the siege, and permitted the rest of the garrison to return to England, on the condition of not serving till they were exchanged. He acceded also to every other indulgence demanded by their chief; and when they quitted the works to pile their arms, they experienced both from the french and spanish troops the sympathy due to the brave from a generous enemy.

Feb. 16. "Perhaps," observes general Murray, in an

interesting and pathetic account of the surrender, "a more noble, nor a more tragical scene was never exhibited, than that of the march of the garrison of St. Philippe, through the spanish and french armies. It consisted of no more than six hundred old decrepid soldiers, two hundred seamen, one hundred and twenty of the royal artillery, twenty corsicans, and twenty-five greeks, turks, moors, jews, &c. The two armies were drawn up in two lines, the battalions fronting each other, forming a way for us to march through; they consisted of fourteen thousand men, and reached from the glacis to George Town, where our battalions laid down their arms, declaring they had surrendered them to God alone, having the consolation to know the victors could not plume themselves in taking an hospital.

"Such were the distressing figures of our men, that many of the spanish and french troops are said to have shed tears as they passed them; the duke de Crillon and the baron de Falkenhayn declare it is true. I cannot aver this, but think it was very natural: for my own part, I felt no uneasiness on this occasion, but that which proceeded from the miserable disorder which threatened us with destruction.

"Thanks to the Almighty, my apprehensions are now abated; the humanity of the duke de

Crillon, whose heart was sensibly touched by the misfortunes of such brave men, has gone even beyond my wishes in providing every thing which can contribute to our recovery. The spanish as well as the french surgeons attend our hospitals. We are greatly indebted to the baron de Falkenhayn, who commands the french troops. We owe infinite obligations to the duke de Crillon; they can never be forgot by any of us. I hope this young man never will command an army against my sovereign, for his military talents are as conspicuous as the goodness of his heart."*

* Florida Blanca's Statement.——French and spanish accounts. ——Annual Register and Gentleman's Magazine for 1781, 1782. ——General Murray's letters and capitulation.——Beccatini, p. 323.——Hamburgh Politisches Journal, 1782, v. 1, p. 244.

## CHAPTER THE SEVENTY-FOURTH.

### 1781—1782.

*Plan of a general attack against the british settlements in the East and West Indies—Armaments collected for the expedition against Jamaica—Memorable defeat of the french fleet under admiral de Grasse, by Rodney—Failure of the projected expedition—Capture of the Bahama isles by the spaniards—Siege of Gibraltar—Memorable attack by the floating batteries—Relief of the fortress by lord Howe.*

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ENCOURAGED by the capture of Minorca, Charles was eager to prosecute the design of recovering the possessions which England had wrested from Spain. He therefore continued to press the siege of Gibraltar, and meditated the reduction of Jamaica, which, although long united to England, had never ceased to be considered as the antient patrimony of the spanish crown. He obtained the hearty co-operation of France, who was no less anxious to dismember the british colonies. A grand expedition was planned to unite the french and spanish force in reducing the West India islands, while France profited by the aid of the dutch to attack the british establishments in the east, and co-operate with

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Hyder Ally, who, at this period, was ravaging the Carnatic.

For the accomplishment of this design, the bourbon courts made adequate preparations. A fleet of eleven sail, and 20,000 spaniards, under Galvez, the conqueror of Florida, was collected at St. Domingo; de Grasse returned from America to Martinico, to await the junction of an armament which was preparing in Europe. This whole force, when united, was justly deemed sufficient to subjugate the british colonies, exhausted by repeated disasters, and still more afflicted by the most dreadful visitation of the elements. The capture of Dominica, St. Vincent, and Grenada, had already prepared the way, and the whole chain of the Antilles being secured, the enterprise was to be consummated by the reduction of Jamaica. A correspondence was even opened with the disaffected and revolted negroes in the interior of the island, who waited only the signal to spread rapine and devastation throughout the colony.

The british government had not witnessed the gathering of this storm without adopting precautions to avert its violence. Admiral Hood, with ten sail, followed de Grasse from America, and united with the squadron stationed at Barbadoes; and Rodney, who had returned to Europe, was preparing to lead a new reinforcement to the

West Indies. Meanwhile a squadron, under admiral Kempenfeldt, cruised off Brest to intercept the french armaments on their passage.

At length, the expedition quitted Brest, consisting of nineteen sail of the line, and a fleet of transports conveying 9,000 men, with every requisite for the projected enterprise. Of these, part, under Vaudreuil, were to convoy the forces destined for the West Indies, others to proceed to the East, and the remainder, under de Guichen, after accompanying the whole convoy to the usual point of separation, were to return and assist in the blockade of Gibraltar.

Kempenfeldt fell in with this vast armament at the moment when the convoy was separated from the fleet by a gale of wind. Though far inferior in force, he captured twenty of the transports, and the remainder were only saved by the manœuvres of the french admiral. Although the effect of this attack, joined with the damages occasioned by the weather, delayed the progress of the armament, yet it again put to sea, and dividing at the destined point, the expedition under Vaudreuil proceeded to the West Indies, the principal theatre of hostilities. Dec. 12, 1781.

Before his arrival, active operations had already commenced. Tobago was added to the french conquests. Bouillé and de Grasse, after recovering the dutch settlements in the face of a May 10, 1781. Feb. 12, 1782.

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british squadron, and reducing St. Christopher's, Nevis, and Montserrat, concentrated their force at Martinico. Here they were joined by Vaudreuil, preparatory to the grand attack against Jamaica. The whole armament amounted to 36 sail of the line, and a convoy of 150 transports.

February.

In the interval, Rodney arrived, and joining with Hood, the british fleet, of 36 sail, took its station at St. Lucie, to watch the motions of the enemy. Scarcely, however, had this junction been effected, before the french expedition was in motion to unite with the spaniards at St. Domingo. Had they succeeded, no human force could have prevented the utter expulsion of the british from the West Indies; and hence de Grasse was enjoined to sacrifice every other consideration for the attainment of this great object.

April.

The movement of the french did not escape the vigilance of Rodney. In a few hours, they were followed by the english fleet; and some of the best sailers being considerably advanced in the pursuit, a partial action took place off the isle of Dominica, while the convoy pursued its course under the escort of two men of war and several frigates.

April 9, 10.

Though some ships, on both sides, suffered damage in this encounter, the french continued to gain on the english during the succeeding day.

But the Caton having fallen astern, and in the following night the Zélé having suffered considerable damage by running foul of the Ville de Paris, de Grasse shortened sail to save these two disabled ships. This delay enabled the british admiral to bring on an engagement.

April 12, 1782.

As de Grasse was weakened by the detachments employed to protect his convoy, his fleet was inferior to the english in number, though not in force. While he drew up in a line of battle, expecting to avoid a decisive engagement, according to the ordinary mode of attack, he was confounded by a new and daring manœuvre, the adoption of which forms an epoch in naval tactics. His line was separated, and the central division being placed between two fires, was overwhelmed with a superior force. The firmest courage was unavailing, and after a desperate defence of eleven hours, in which the admiral was particularly distinguished, his defeat was complete. Five sail were taken or destroyed, and the engagement was closed by the capture of de Grasse himself, whose ship, the Ville de Paris, was the largest launched in the docks of France, and the first of her rate which had ever struck her flag. Night alone prevented the utter ruin of the fleet. Five sail took refuge at St. Eustatius; and Vaudreuil, with the main body, amounting to nineteen, proceeded to St.

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Domingo, where his appearance spread consternation at the moment when it was anxiously expected as the harbinger of victory. The losses of this eventful conflict were increased by the capture of the Caton and the Jason, which, after repairing at Guadaloupe, were hastening to rejoin the fleet.

Vaudreuil was soon afterwards strengthened by the arrival of the five sail from St. Eustatius; but the fatal blow which the bourbon commanders had just suffered, deterred them from resuming their schemes of conquest. The spanish fleet and troops returned to the Havannah, and a part of the french ships were detached to convoy the trade to Europe. After a short cruize on the american coast, Vaudreuil returned to the West Indies, to protect the french colonies.

Instead of the extensive enterprise, which was to have decided the fate of the war, the efforts of the bourbon courts were confined to humble conquests, of little detriment to England, and less advantage to themselves. La Peyrouse was detached by Vaudreuil with a small squadron to destroy the british settlements in Hudson's Bay, and the spaniards effected the reduction of the Bahama isles without difficulty, and without loss.*

* Beccatini, p. 326.——Continuation of Henault for 1781 and 1782.——Des Odouards Fautin Histoire de France, t. 8, Ann. 1781—1782.——Adolphus, v. 3, ch. 42.——Official accounts, english and foreign.

The most memorable feature of this eventful war, was the siege of Gibraltar, which, for a period of four years, arrested the attention of Europe.

Notwithstanding the advantages which the spanish court derived from their alliances, and the great superiority of the bourbon fleets, the experience of three years had sufficed to prove, that the reduction of this fortress by a blockade was an impracticable, or at best an uncertain enterprise. From the want of regular supplies, the garrison had indeed been occasionally reduced to great straits; but the skill and promptitude of the british admirals had rendered vain the advantages of strength and position. By a series of occasional succours, the fortress was better provided, and in a higher state of defence, than at the commencement of the blockade. The works were not unjustly deemed impregnable: the garrison consisted of 7,000 veterans inured to service, all, from the skilful and intrepid governor Elliot, to the meanest private, devoted to the cause, and ready to shed their blood in defence of a place, on which the honour of Great Britain, and the event of the war, seemed to depend.

Indignant at repeated failures, the spanish court relinquished their system, and prepared the means for reducing the fortress by a regular

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siege. The army in the lines of San Roque was considerably augmented; the most skilful engineers invited into the service, and the requisites for an attack collected to an unusual extent. Trenches were opened, and the approaches pushed toward the works, with all the rapidity which the nature of the site, and the scanty soil permitted.

But, though the besiegers succeeded in raising batteries of extraordinary force, their attack was still inferior to the defence. Confined to a low and narrow neck of land, at the foot of a stupendous height, armed with a powerful artillery, no efforts could effectually diminish the fire of the besieged: as the assailants pushed their works, their dangers and difficulties increased. Although the labour of successive days was frequently ruined in a single hour, they were only stimulated to exertions of greater skill and resolution; and at length, a fourth line, or parallel, of sufficient solidity to resist the fire of artillery, was advanced within a thousand yards of the fortress.

The spirit, resources, and activity of the garrison, augmented in proportion to the vigour of the attack; and the present moment was seized by the intrepid governor to chastise the temerity of his assailants. Lulling them into security by an apparent calmness, he secretly prepared the

means of aggression. Before the dawn of the 27th of November, a *sortie,* led by general Ross, under the personal superintendence of Elliot himself, was directed in three columns against the hostile works. The enemy were surprised; the advanced trenches were carried without opposition; the artillery spiked; in an hour, a heap of smoking ruins alone remained. This enterprise was crowned with a good fortune worthy of the skill with which it had been planned, and the intrepidity with which it had been executed: only four were killed, and twenty-five wounded, a loss occasioned rather by the unavoidable casualties of a nocturnal attack, than by the efforts of the enemy.

Indignant at this insult to their arms, the besiegers resumed their hitherto unavailing labours with redoubled ardour, and called forth all the resources of art to devise new modes of annoyance. Encouraged by the brilliant prospect of reward, plans poured in from all quarters; some bold to extravagance, others too ludicrous to deserve serious attention: it seemed as if all the ingenuity of Europe was combined against the brave defenders of this barren rock. The project which obtained approbation was formed by the chevalier d'Arçon, a french engineer of great talents and celebrity. Convinced that all

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efforts by land alone were fruitless, and reflecting on the means by which the british forces had first reduced the place, he projected the design of combining with the attack by land, another of equal consistency and force by sea. This was a squadron of floating batteries, of such fabric and solidity, that, to use his own expression, "they were at once incombustible and insubmergible." Ten ships, from 600 to 1,400 tons burthen, were cut down, and 200,000 cubic feet of timber employed in their construction. The front of the battery was covered by three successive layers of squared timber, to the thickness of three feet; above was a shelving roof, to throw off shells and grape shot. To counteract the effects of artificial fire, the exterior was covered with cordage and wet hides; and to prevent combustion by red-hot balls, a skilful apparatus was contrived. It consisted of a reservoir beneath the shelving roof of the battery, from which water, raised by pumps, was to circulate by channels, formed of a spungy medium, distributed through every part of the fabric, like the veins and arteries of the human body, and to keep the wood in a constant state of saturation. Each of these batteries was to be armed with from eight to twenty pieces of artillery, amounting in the whole to 142, and nearly half the number were to be kept in re-

serve.* They were set in motion by means of a single sail, and were to be provided with anchors and cables, to withdraw in case of necessity. The number of men destined for the service of the whole armament exceeded 5,000. After various changes, relative to the point of attack, the final project was to concentrate the fire of these machines, at the distance of 400 yards, on the space between the old mole and the royal bastion. To distract the attention, and increase the danger, of the garrison, the front attacked was to be swept by the shot and shells from the land batteries, as well as by the fire of numerous bomb vessels, and gun boats; and ten ships of the line were to co-operate in the tremendous cannonade. After an attack thus vigorously kept up for several days, had razed the wall, and

* *List of the Batteries employed in the celebrated Attack against Gibraltar.*

| | Guns in use | Guns in reserve | Men | Commanders |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Pastora | 21 | 10 | 760 | Rear Adm. B. Morena. |
| Talla Piedra | 21 | 10 | 760 | Prince of Nassau. |
| Paula Prima | 21 | 10 | 760 | Don Cayetan Langara. |
| El Rosario | 19 | 10 | 700 | D. Fran. Xavier Munōz. |
| St. Christoval | 18 | 10 | 650 | D. Frederico Gravina. |
| Principe Carlos | 11 | 4 | 400 | D. Antonio Basurta. |
| San Juan | 9 | 4 | 340 | D. Josef Angeles. |
| Paula Secunda | 9 | 4 | 340 | D. Pablo de Cosa. |
| Sta. Anna | 7 | 4 | 300 | D. Josef Goicochea. |
| Los Dolores | 6 | 6 | 250 | D. Pedro Sanchez. |

Thirty-six men allowed to each gun in use, besides the sailors, &c. to work the batteries.

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exhausted the strength of the garrison, a numerous body of troops was to be embarked on rafts and light vessels, and carry the place by assault. The enterprise was to be favoured by a similar attempt on the land side, for which, a new sap was rapidly pushed towards the foot of the exterior works. In the interval, the main body of the fleet was to cruize before the mouth of the straits, and intercept the armament expected from England.

The plan being approved by Florida Blanca, and submitted to the king, the adroit engineer adopted various improvements at the suggestion of the monarch. The equipment was carried on in the port of Algesiras, and the labour pushed with incredible activity.

The duke of Crillon, the conqueror of Minorca, was destined to direct the enterprise; and his victorious troops, flushed with their recent conquest of a fortress regarded as a second Gibraltar, joyfully sailed to share the honours of the expected success, and add another laurel to the wreath they had already won. By their junction, the besieging army amounted to 40,000 men. From such a combination of power, and such an accumulation of force, the most glorious result was confidently anticipated. As the eventful hour approached, hope was inflamed into enthusiasm. Even the sedate temper of the

monarch caught the general ardour: his first question, in the morning, was "Is it taken?" and to the negative, he never failed to reply, "It will soon be ours." In the allied fleets and armies, the ferment and exultation were still greater than in the court and nation: the faintest doubt of success was not merely subjected to the keenest ridicule, but treated as criminal. An amazing concourse of spectators filled the camp, and covered the adjacent hills; the first nobility of Spain; the most distinguished military officers, even the count of Artois and the duke of Bourbon, repaired from Paris to witness the triumph of Spain, the defeat of the english, and the capture of a fortress which had hitherto baffled all the efforts of art and valour.

But it was easier to arrange a splendid design, and to calculate on the combination of inert masses of matter, than to foresee the effect of events and accident, to estimate the variations of the elements, or the equally varied operation of human passions. As the decisive moment approached, french impatience, national jealousy, the intrigues of rivals, the alarms and suspicions of authority, the presumption of some, and the apprehensions of others, were all at once called into action.* The attack was precipitated by the advance of the season, the expected arrival

* Burgoing, v. 3, p. 209.

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of a british squadron, and above all by the apprehension lest a successful essay of the red-hot balls, which, contrary to expectation, had destroyed one of the land batteries and the connecting works, should diminish the confidence inspired by these mighty preparations.

Crillon himself did not regard, with a favourable eye, the project of an inferior, who was likely to share the glory of the enterprise. To the representations of the engineer, against a change in the dispositions, he exclaimed, "You have a fatherly love for your batteries, and are only anxious for their preservation. Should the enemy attempt to take possession of them, I will burn them before his face." On another occasion, he tauntingly observed, "You were summoned into Spain to execute *my* plan for the attack of Gibraltar by floating batteries. *Your* commission is performed, the rest belongs to *me*." And to the admiral, Don Buenaventura Morena, who required a delay, he wrote, "If you do not proceed to an instant attack, you are a man devoid of honour!"

When the vast machinery was at length set in motion, the most material part of the project proved defective. The intended circulation occasioned such a flow of water into the interior of the vessels, that the commanders of the batteries became apprehensive, lest their powder should

be rendered useless, and contented themselves with a superficial irrigation. Other precautions of inferior moment were likewise omitted, particularly the preparation of anchors and cables to facilitate a retreat.

The attack commenced with a tremendous cannonade from the artillery of the trenches. On the morning of the 13th of September, the signal was given; the floating batteries proceeded towards their destined points, and before ten o'clock were anchored at regular distances, within six hundred yards of the works. Although the garrison made no effort to obstruct this manœuvre, the batteries were unable to gain the projected position, but formed a line where their fire was less concentrated, while they were exposed to a superior weight of artillery. The wind, and roughness of the sea, rendered also the action of the bomb-ketches and gun-boats of little avail, and prevented the co-operation of the squadron; while the fire of the trenches was found too distant and uncertain to produce the expected effect.

The batteries were no sooner moored than a heavy cannonade began, supported by all the artillery and mortars from the trenches in every direction, and without the slightest intermission. Almost at the same instant the fire of Gibraltar was opened, and such a tremendous cannonade

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took place as exceeds the power of description. Four hundred pieces of heavy artillery were playing at the same moment, an instance which had never occurred since the invention of gunpowder; and, for once, the efforts of man appeared to emulate the grandest operations of nature.

For several hours the attack and defence were equally supported, and no superiority was perceptible on either side. The floating batteries were found no less formidable than they had been represented: they baffled all the powers of artillery; the heaviest shells rebounded from their tops; for a long and awful period, even red-hot balls thrown with incredible rapidity and precision, seemed to make no impression. During the whole day the conflict continued, and at seven in the evening, the intrepid Elliot himself, with a mixture of surprise and anxiety, asked some spanish sailors who floated into the harbour on a wreck, "What can be the composition of these machines, on which red-hot balls produce no effect?"

The moment of their destruction was, however, gradually approaching. Besides the collateral support both by sea and land, the troops employed on this perilous service were persuaded, that the floating batteries were invulnerable, and that the garrison would be unable to discharge

many rounds of red-hot balls. Great therefore were their surprise, consternation and disappointment, when they found themselves exposed to almost the whole efforts of the enemy; when they perceived the discharge of red-hot balls continued with unabating precision and activity; when several, which had penetrated the sides of the vessels, could not be extinguished. They were seized with a sudden panic; a general confusion took place, which subsided into despair. Not only all efforts to annoy the enemy were suspended; but no attempts were made to effect a retreat.*

* The engineer himself was on board the Talla Piedra during the attack; and, in the first moment of consternation, took on himself the whole blame of the failure. He wrote to Montmorin, the french embassador, "I have burnt the temple of Ephesus; every thing is lost, and through my fault. What comforts me under my misfortune, is, that the honour of the two kings remains untarnished." He afterwards, however, recovered from his despondency, and composed a defence of his conduct and plan, under the title of Memoire pour servir à l'Histoire du Siege de Gibraltar, par l'auteur des batteries flottantes, à Cadiz, 1783. His account of this catastrophe is here given, as the narrative of the person most perfectly master of the details, and most deeply interested in the event.

"The Talla Piedra," he says, "was moored at the same time with the Pastora, before ten. The fire of the two batteries began immediately; that of the enemy, at first extremely brisk and constant, slackened towards noon; but was again continued without intermission till three. Among the number of hot balls which had been extinguished, one alone alarmed us. Our firing began to slacken; the enemy profited by this intermission, re-commenced a still more heavy cannonade, and gained a decided superiority, which frustrated all our efforts to arrest the progress of the flames. Now our apprehensions increased, and an order too

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**In the interval, the fire of the garrison increased in vivacity: at midnight the conflagration of the two principal batteries was inevitable; and on others the red hot balls began to produce an alarming effect.**

precipitately given, to wet the powder, occasioned a total cessation of our cannonade. As we were no longer concealed from view by clouds of smoke, we became too much exposed, and it was impossible to succeed in extinguishing the flames. The only resource remaining was the retreat of the floating batteries.

"The progress of the conflagration was extremely inconsiderable. It was the same ball from which the smoke proceeded, at first from the outside, and afterwards through the interior joints. But this hidden conflagration, which could easily have been suppressed by removing to a distance from the constant fire of the garrison, continued in a smoking state for six hours, and did not become ungovernable till after midnight. The other batteries were yet entire; yet it was determined to involve them in the same fate as the Talla Piedra. They were all abandoned, and as if the red hot balls of the enemy did not do sufficient execution, the resolution was taken to set our own vessels on fire. This order being badly executed, several were absolutely set on fire before the crew had evacuated them; and four were intire at six in the morning, after having equally resisted the attempts to burn them and the red hot balls of the enemy.

"The engineer himself, employed in retarding the progress of the conflagration on board the Talla Piedra, was unacquainted with this resolution; and proposed to send out a warp anchor, by which the vessel might have been removed from her dangerous situation and repaired. The officer charged with this commission could not collect a sufficient number of sailors for the purpose.

"At seven in the evening, admiral Guichen offered the assistance of the french squadron towards preserving the batteries; and although affairs were in no very favourable situation, it was answered that all was well, and no assistance required. Nevertheless, several boats had been sent to declare the state of the Talla Piedra. The nine other batteries, at a much greater distance, and less exposed to the fire of the enemy, were more capable of being removed and repaired. This retreat, the necessity of which had

At this crisis, several rockets being fired as signals of distress, numerous feluccas, boats, and launches, were sent from the fleets to save the crews. But in the midst of this attempt, brigadier Curtis advanced with twelve gun-boats, and swept the line formed by the floating batteries with a continued and vigorous fire, while they were annoyed in front by the artillery of the garrison. The boats were therefore obliged to desist, and leave many of the troops to their fate. At this awful moment, numbers were seen hanging on the sides of the vessels, in vain attempting to escape, others were floating on pieces of timber; numbers shrieking amidst the flames; all expressing by agonising cries the deepest distress, and all imploring assistance.

Of those who remained scarcely a soul could have escaped the complicated horrors of fire, water, and a hostile attack, had not the humanity of the english equalled their bravery. The fate of the enterprise was no sooner decided than the fire of the garrison instantly ceased; and no less alacrity was displayed in rescuing the

been foreseen, which was easy to execute, and was become absolutely indispensable from the failure of the proper position, was not even attempted. The engineer continued on board the Talla Piedra till after midnight, when he repaired to request succour from the admiral. By him he was sent to the general, who had settled the whole plan with the commander of the floating batteries. On his arrival at head quarters, the general was absent; but he was informed of the order given to set the whole on fire."

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wretched victims than had before been shewn in their destruction. The gallant brigadier dragged many wounded from the flames, rescued 250 from impending death, and did not desist till his own life was exposed to the most imminent danger by the explosions around him. Of the 5,000 men employed in this enterprise, 2,000 perished. Even the floating batteries which were not essentially damaged, were consigned to destruction by the spaniards themselves; and before the close of the day, scarcely a vestige remained of this formidable armament, which, to use the words of the engineer himself, dissolved in an instant, and vanished like the clouds of the air.

The enthusiasm which preceded the attack sunk into equal despondency on the failure. The exulting and expectant croud dispersed with chagrin and disappointment; the french princes, who had journeyed to the pillars of Hercules to grace the capture with their presence, impatiently quitted the camp, and on their return experienced a less cordial reception at the Escurial than they had found on their passage.

Notwithstanding this catastrophe, a gleam of hope yet remained. The garrison, exhausted with fatigue, straitened for provisions, and scantily furnished with ammunition, could not continue to hold out without a supply. It was

calculated that Great Britain could not equip a squadron of sufficient force to throw in relief in the face of the combined fleet. In the beginning of October, when lord Howe was descried off Cape St. Vincent with only 30 ships of the line, embarrassed with a convoy of transports, the enterprise was deemed madness, and the whole armament devoted to certain destruction. Nor did this seem an unfounded expectation. Besides the combined fleet of 47 sail, and several frigates, the enemy had armed a multitude of smaller vessels, bomb-ketches and fire ships. After the example of the eng'ish, furnaces were prepared for heating red-hot shot, to destroy the transports and store-ships as they entered the harbour.

As the british fleet approached, the combined fleets, instead of contesting the passage of the straits, took their station before the bay to prevent the introduction of succours. But on the 10th of October, at midnight, a violent hurricane forced them from their anchors; the St. Michael, a 74, ran ashore, and was taken by the garrison; two were driven into the Mediterranean; two with difficulty were brought into Algesiras; above thirty gun-boats and small craft were stranded; and the whole armament was damaged and dispersed. On the following morning, however, it was discovered that the british had passed the straits in admirable order, in two

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lines, the convoy in the rear, towards the African coast. At the close of the day, the van was seen from the rock; and the fleet passed eastward into the Mediterranean, although four transports succeeded in reaching the harbour.

In this crisis, Cordova, the spanish admiral, summoned a council of war, when it was unanimously decided not to attack the enemy before the fleet had repaired its damages. On the same night, several ships again suffered from the tempestuous weather; and it was not till the evening of the 13th that the combined fleet ventured to face the british.

During five successive days, the bourbon commanders had the mortification to see their antagonist keeping the sea in the most trying weather, neither courting nor declining a battle, and exhibiting a series of manœuvres which seemed to baffle the force of the elements. In spite of all their efforts, the transports, except one, reached the harbour; and the garrison was strengthened with a reinforcement of 1,400 men, besides a supply of provisions and ammunition.

They had also the additional mortification to follow the english fleet under an easy sail, when it re-passed the straits, as if to be mere witnesses of the superior skill with which the admiral disposed his course. At length, ashamed of being foiled by an inferior force, they crowded

sail, and, with the wind in their favour, came up with the english off Cadiz. They still, however, avoided a close engagement, and after a cannonade of five hours with little effect, relinquished their pursuit, with the degrading reflection, that a fleet of thirty sail, embarrassed with a convoy, and without a port for shelter, had relieved the fortress in defiance of a fleet of seventy-four sail, close to their own shores, and favoured by every advantage of wind and position.

Notwithstanding these repeated failures, the siege was still continued; and a design, still more extravagant than that of the floating batteries, was formed, to ruin the works by a mine of vast extent, excavated in the rock. But this project seems rather to have been formed to gratify the sanguine hopes of the king of Spain, than with any rational expectation of success; and the besiegers, after considerable labour had been employed, were spared a new mortification by the cessation of hostilities.*

* Drinkwater's Account of the Siege of Gibraltar.——D'Arçon Memoire pour servir à l'Histoire du Siege de Gibraltar.——Beccatini, p. 328—365.——Hamburgh Politisches Journal for 1782, which contains a plan and profile of these floating batteries.——Burgoing, v. 3, and in the Atlas, a plan of the position intended to be occupied, and that really occupied.——Official accounts, english, french, and spanish.——Statement of Florida Blanca, No. 9.

## CHAPTER THE SEVENTY-FIFTH.

### 1781—1783.

*Final event of the american war—Changes of the administration in England—Negotiations for peace—Difficulties arising from the demands of Spain—Discussions on the cession of Gibraltar—Signature of the preliminaries—Conclusion of the definitive treaty.*

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THE attack of Gibraltar was almost the last event of the war.

During the period in which the whole power of the bourbon sovereigns had been united against England, the event of the contest was already decided in America; the insurgents, assisted by the succours of France, had finally succeeded in gaining the ascendancy. While the royal army remained entire, and concentrated their strength on a single object, their efforts were crowned with success. But when separated for the purpose either of aggression or defence, the insurgents succeeded in rendering even victory unprofitable; the divided portions of the army were overwhelmed with superior force, worn out in painful marches, or driven back with considerable loss.

Of these reverses, one of the most memorable

was the surprise of the hessians at Trenton, which roused the spirits of the colonists at the moment of the deepest depression. Others of inferior importance, but equally fatal in effect, had occurred in the progress of the struggle; but the last and most discouraging was the reduction of a body of 6,000 men under lord Cornwallis, who, after subjugating the two Carolinas and invading Virginia, were compelled to surrender to a combined army of french and americans. Although this loss was not intrinsically great, its effect was decisive, by the impulse which it gave to the insurgents, the discouragement which it spread through the british army, and above all, by the sensation it occasioned in England, where the people were impatient for the restoration of peace.

Oct. 19, 1781.

The intelligence of this disaster completed the series of misfortunes which had marked the ministry of lord North, and led to a change in the government. He and his partisans were succeeded by a motley administration, formed by the chiefs of that powerful opposition who had united in decrying the war. The ostensible head was the marquis of Rockingham; but the real minister was Mr. Fox, who filled the office of foreign secretary of state. To them was joined lord Shelburne, who, under the auspices of lord Chatham, had resisted the grant of ame-

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rican independence; but since had receded from his opinion, in conformity with the national voice. The known principles of the new administration increased the national eagerness for peace; and the news of the splendid victory obtained by Rodney arrived too late to counteract the public sentiment, though it cast a solitary gleam of splendour over the close of the late administration.

The first measure of the new ministers was consonant to their past declarations, and to the feelings which they had long and successfully laboured to excite. Before the late action, orders of recal had already been dispatched to Rodney, and to sir Henry Clinton, the military commander in America; and various measures were sanctioned in parliament, preparatory to the dereliction of british supremacy over the colonies. With an anxiety for peace, which, however laudable, was ill calculated to give weight to their negotiations, the ministry declared that the late victory should make no change in their views; and they testified their readiness to accept the mediation of Russia with Holland, and of Austria with France.

Too prudent, however, to rely on the lukewarm interference of powers unfavourable to their cause, they adopted the resolution of applying directly to France. With this view, they

secretly dispatched Mr. Thomas Grenville to Paris. He was authorised to treat with all the hostile powers, and directed to propose as a preliminary the independence of the thirteen united states of America, and to restore all things to the same situation as at the peace of Paris. Admiral Digby and general Carleton, the new naval and military commanders in the West Indies and America, received orders to notify these conditions to the congress, and similar overtures were made to the dutch. But this eagerness to negotiate, produced the usual effect, of increasing the pretensions of the enemy. The dutch declined the offer of a separate peace, and the americans refused to open a negotiation without the concurrence of France. Vergennes, the french minister, produced a plan of pacification essentially differing from the peace of Paris, and tending to ruin the trade and naval power of England. Besides the restoration of the french colonies, and the retention of many of their conquests, he insisted on an acquiescence in the principles of the armed neutrality, as the basis of the treaty.

The king of Spain also, though not directly comprised in the negotiation, contended for the restoration of Gibraltar, and for other concessions which had long been the object of his wishes. At the same time both the bourbon

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courts drew closer the bonds of union, and resumed their plans for overthrowing the british power in the West Indies.

During these transactions, a new change took place in the british ministry. The death of the marquis of Rockingham dissolved the feeble bond which connected the heterogeneous administration. Lord Shelburne became the head of a new ministry, in which he was aided by the rising talents of Mr. Pitt; and the great party which had uniformly and strenuously opposed the american war, rallied under the banner of Mr. Fox, and again entered the lists of opposition.

This change, however, produced little or no abatement in the wish for peace which had been manifested by the former cabinet. And, accordingly, while all Europe was anxiously waiting the event of the siege of Gibraltar, another negotiation was opened by the mission of Mr. Fitzherbert,* who had distinguished his diplomatic talents at Brussels, to replace Mr. Grenville at Paris. Nearly at the same time, separate powers for treating with the american commissioners were entrusted to Mr. Richard Oswald, a considerable merchant and ship-owner, who had had large commercial dealings with America; and who on this account appears to have been

* Now lord St. Helen's.

selected by lord Shelburne for the employment, though not versed in political transactions.

Paris again became the scene of a negotiation which was to pacify Europe, and add another power to the list of nations. It was the view and interest of the french government to combine all the parts of their extensive alliance in one common union, in order by their joint weight to extort more advantageous conditions. They therefore persuaded Holland to decline all separate overtures; they were assured of Spain; they hoped that gratitude and jealousy would continue to bind the americans to their engagements. A frank and dignified conduct might perhaps have contributed to this end; but, in attempting to pursue too refined a policy, the french minister frustrated his own views.

In arranging the dispute between England and the american states, Vergennes indeed affected to mediate; but was more anxious to inflame the existing jealousy than to forward an accommodation; for while he instigated the americans to claim, he secretly urged the british government to withhold, a share in the fishery of Newfoundland. His insidious policy was however detected. The americans were gratified, and the british government did not fail to expose this petty artifice.

Another instance of duplicity contributed to

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widen the breach, and promote an accommodation. Successful in the attempt to sever the americans from the parent state, the french minister became jealous in his turn of the new power which he had contributed to raise, and formed a design to weaken and divide the american republic before it could acquire stability by peace. The dispatches of Marbois, the french agent at Philadelphia, which contained this insidious project, were accidentally intercepted by a

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british cruizer. So fortunate a discovery was not neglected, and a copy was instantly transmitted to the british plenipotentiary at Paris, to be secretly communicated to the american commissioners. The disclosure produced the desired effect. The indignation of Adams and Jay, two of the commissioners, was justly roused; they overbore the prejudiced reluctance of Franklin;

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and in a meeting which was held without the knowledge of Vergennes, signed separate and provisional articles with England. The conditions were, perfect independence, an advantageous arrangement of the boundaries, a share in the Newfoundland fishery; and this agreement was to be incorporated in the future treaty of peace. To obviate all jealousy or misunderstanding, England, with a policy more delicate than liberal, brought forward no claims in favour of those who had adhered to the royal cause.

The artful minister of France was thus caught in his own toils. But, however indignant at the defection of the americans, he was too prudent to incur the risk of re-uniting them in an alliance with the parent state; for which purpose, active measures were employed by the british government. He therefore evinced an inclination to conclude a peace, on terms to which England could accede without the utter dereliction of the national honour and interest.

Still, however, great embarrassments yet remained with regard to the pretensions of Spain. The difficulty was aggravated by the interference of the french minister himself, who recurred to the same artifice as he had already attempted to employ with the americans. He secretly inflamed the mutual jealousy of the two nations; and thwarted the arrangement of such terms as were likely to lead to a perfect reconciliation.

As Charles had entered into the war with the full confidence of recovering all the possessions which had ever formed a part of the patrimony of his crown, his demands were peremptory and extravagant. They comprised the retention of Minorca, Florida, and the Bahama Isles; the evacuation of all the british settlements in the bay of Mexico; a share in the Newfoundland fishery; and, above all, the cession of Gibraltar. In return, he offered the useless possession of

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Oran, with its port of Mazalquiver, and a vague promise to favour the british trade in Spain. Commercial regulations were, however, reserved for future discussion.*

This negotiation was carried on at Paris, between Mr. Fitzherbert and the spanish embassador d'Aranda, who urged the pretensions of his court with that vehemence and antipathy to England, which marked his character. "Oran, and its port," he repeatedly observed, "are more than an equivalent, and therefore ought to be accepted with gratitude. If England desires peace, this is the only means of procuring it; since the king, my master, from personal as well as political motives, is fully determined never to put a period to the present war, till he shall have acquired Gibraltar either by arms or negotiation."

He was strongly supported by the american agent Franklin, who, with no less inveterate hostility against England, contended, that the king of Spain might as justly lay claim to Portsmouth, as England to Gibraltar. Vergennes likewise did not omit to encourage the court of Spain in the demand, and affected to employ language still more decisive and vehement than even d'Aranda himself.

A collateral negotiation was opened in the

* Memoire du comte d'Aranda, Oct. 17, 1782, MS.

interim at London, first through the channel of de Grasse, then a prisoner in England, and afterwards of Reyneval, the confidential secretary of Vergennes, who was dispatched to treat directly with lord Shelburne himself. The high and sanguine hopes entertained with regard to the reduction of Gibraltar, being dissipated by the destruction of the floating batteries, and its subsequent relief, the spanish court adopted a more conciliating style. Though Gibraltar was still made the ultimatum, yet the demand was coupled with the offer of an equivalent more proportioned to its value.

France even made a shew of tendering the restoration of Dominica, and all the conquered islands in the West Indies, with the cession of her own possessions of Martinico and Guadaloupe; as a compensation for which it was understood that she was to receive the spanish part of St. Domingo. This proposal met with a favourable attention from lord Shelburne. But a specific arrangement was frustrated by the insinuations and objections of the french minister himself, whose conduct plainly evinced that he was in reality far from partaking the eager desire felt by Spain for the recovery of Gibraltar; being well aware that the removal of that chief and standing obstacle to a cordial reconciliation between Spain and England, must materially

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diminish the future influence of France over the spanish counsels.

At length, the court of Spain obscurely alluded to the cession of Porto Rico with Oran, and the british minister, hoping to remove a perpetual cause of misunderstanding, appears to have acquiesced in the propasal. The intended exchange was indirectly hinted to parliament by a confidential friend of the minister, but was vehemently censured by Mr. Fox, and the party in opposition; and their disapprobation was re-echoed by the voice of the nation, to whom Gibraltar was doubly endeared by the late gallant defence. The design was in consequence suspended, if not abandoned.

Meanwhile the king of Spain entertained the most sanguine expectations, that he should speedily have the satisfaction of announcing to his subjects the reunion of Gibraltar to the spanish crown, and departed on a short expedition to Aranjuez, in the full expectation that the next courier would bring the joyful intelligence. To his surprise and indignation, therefore, he learnt that no conditions would induce the british nation to acquiesce in the surrender of Gibraltar. Hostile plans were instantly resumed, and arrangements made to dispatch a powerful armament to the West Indies, and in particular to execute, on a still more extensive scale than

before, the intended invasion of Jamaica. France affected to concur; and even the co-operation of Holland was promised. D'Estaing was appointed to command the united forces forming this grand expedition, and dispatched to Spain for the ostensible purpose of forwarding the preparations.

At the same time, however, the french minister recurred to his favourite principle of exciting jealousies without preventing an accommodation. An additional motive for thwarting the arrangement now in agitation, arose from his unwillingness to permit the transfer of Porto Rico to England, which, besides its vicinity to St. Domingo, and its extent and fertility of territory, contained the finest harbour in that quarter of the globe, capable, from position, of being rendered another Gibraltar. Such an acquisition, he foresaw, was likely to produce a far more dangerous augmentation of the british power, than the cession of the french windward islands. He therefore encouraged the british government to decline the exchange, and employed the agency of D'Estaing, in persuading the king of Spain not to make it the absolute condition of a peace. On the other hand, the british government, as on former occasions, held forth the prospect, that the subject might be brought forward on a future occasion, when the prejudices of the

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nation were vanquished. As a partial compensation, the cession of East Florida was voluntarily offered to Spain, in addition to that of West Florida, which had been conquered by Galvez.

The recommendation of the french court was not ineffectual. Spain reluctantly acceded to preliminary articles, but with the hope of reviving her claim to Gibraltar in the negotiation for the definitive treaty.

On the 30th of January, 1783, the preliminaries were signed. By this arrangement, the most honourable and advantageous ever concluded by the crown of Spain since the peace of St. Quintin, Charles obtained the two Floridas, with Minorca, next to Gibraltar, the great object of national ambition. The commercial regulations, as well as the arrangements relative to the british settlements in the bay of Mexico, were reserved for future discussion, though Spain promised not to disturb the english in their occupations. Exclusive of these concessions, all other conquests were to be restored; but Spain had already none to restore; for the Bahama isles had been as easily recovered as they were easily lost. France obtained the right of fishing at Newfoundland, on the same footing as at the peace of Utrecht, with a more accurate definition of the boundaries. Great Britain ceded Tobago and Gorée, on the

coast of Africa; and all other conquests, both in the east and west, were mutually restored.

The spirit of the nation was not yet, however, sufficiently humbled to submit to these conditions. Those who had opposed, and those who had supported the war, concurred in condemning the peace; the preliminaries were disapproved in parliament: and the minister was driven from the helm by a coalition of the opposite parties, headed by lord North and Mr. Fox.

The hopes which Spain yet fostered of recovering Gibraltar, were annihilated by this change of administration; for, one of the first ministerial communications of Mr. Fox, the new secretary for foreign affairs, was a positive declaration that the cession of Gibraltar should not be admitted as a subject of discussion. The negotiation, however, was continued, and the definitive treaty signed at Versailles, on the third of September. It was founded on the basis of the preliminaries respectively concluded with Spain, France, and America, with some additional stipulations. France obtained the abrogation of all the engagements in preceding treaties, relative to the demolition of the fortifications at Dunkirk. Spain had the satisfaction to exclude the english from the greater part of their settlements in the bay of Mexico, by confining them to the district between the rivers

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Hondo and Wallis. To remove all doubts respecting these limits, commissaries were to be appointed, to fix the spots where the british settlers might erect habitations; but an express stipulation was added, to prevent the construction of military works, and to reserve the sovereign rights of the spanish crown. In this treaty, Holland was comprised by articles for the mutual restoration of conquests. No allusion was made to the principles of the armed neutrality.

Such was the conclusion of this memorable and protracted contest. The bourbon courts exulted in the success of their machinations, and confidently anticipated the speedy downfal of the british power; but these boasted advantages, which were never realised, were purchased by sacrifices which ought rather to have awakened sentiments of regret and apprehension. Without carrying our view to more distant consequences, France rendered the disorder in her finances irretrievable; while Spain, besides the loss of twenty-one ships of the line and numbers of smaller force, added an increase of £.10,000,000 sterling to that public debt, which had been accumulating since the reign of Charles the fifth, and which absorbed a great portion of the national revenue.*

* The account of this negotiation is drawn from Florida Blanca's Statement, No. 9.——From the official correspondence of lord Shelburne; other official documents, and authentic information.

## CHAPTER THE SEVENTY-SIXTH.

### 1782—1786.

*Tumults in Spanish America—Rebellion of Tupacamara—Restoration of tranquillity—Transactions with the Porte, and the states of Barbary—Peace with Turkey—Bombardments of Algiers—Treaties with the Barbary powers.*



THE acquisitions of the peace, however splendid and honourable to Spain, but ill repaid the enormous expences and losses of the contest. Though a rooted jealousy of England, and equal zeal for the glory of his house, had precipitated Charles into the war; yet the tumult of arms had no sooner subsided, than he contemplated, with regret and apprehension, the fatal example which he had set, in promoting the rebellion of colonies against the parent state, and contributing to establish a republic on the border of the mexican empire. He was so sensible of his erroneous policy, and so alarmed for the tranquillity of his american dominions, that he did not for some time acknowledge the new republic. When he could no longer delay the acknowledgment, he made it through the medium of the american minister at Madrid; and to the latest

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200 militia, and a body of his partisans, and issued an edict, declaring himself rightful successor of the Incas, and deliverer of the peruvians from the spanish yoke. Having defeated a small body of troops, sent against him by the corregidor of Cusco, his followers speedily increased to 10,000 men. He now summoned the neighbouring caciques to his standard. An ex-jesuit was said to be his first minister; several spaniards deserted to command his troops; and in a short period, his desultory forces did not amount to less than 60,000 men, of whom 20,000 were provided with european arms. The government, engaged in an expensive war, were unable to supply the force requisite to crush the rebellion; and had Great Britain imitated the conduct of Spain, another empire might have been added to the independent states of the new world.

March, 1781.

At length, Don Joseph de Valle marched against the insurgents, who were stationed on a height near a town which Tupac had selected for his capital. He cut off their supplies, destroyed their magazines, and, having compelled them to descend into the plains, defeated them with great slaughter. Tupac himself was betrayed into the hands of the spaniards; his capital was taken, and several pieces of artillery, with considerable supplies of ammunition and money, fell into the hands of the victors. The revolt, however, was

rather inflamed than crushed. The cause of the chief was sustained by his brother and one of his sons, and alarming symptoms broke out in different quarters. Rebellion not only raged in the neighbouring provinces, on the borders of Paraguay, but even extended to the distant kingdoms of new Grenada and Mexico; the insurgents, though occasionally defeated by the royal troops, retired to the fastnesses and mountains, and evaded pursuit. Fortunately, the peace of Paris enabled the spanish monarch to employ his principal efforts in arresting the progress of these commotions; and a force was dispatched to the new world, which gradually succeeded in restoring public tranquillity.

Still, however, the latent spark of liberty, which had been first kindled in the british colonies, was smothered, but not extinguished; and the establishment required for the maintenance of the royal authority, joined to the difficulty of collecting the taxes, absorbed the greater part of the american revenue.*

In the midst of these transactions in America, and while the negotiation for the definitive treaty with England was yet pending, the king of Spain resumed his design of consolidating an amicable connection with the infidel powers, of which he

* From the official and other accounts in the spanish and foreign gazettes.

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had already laid the foundation by the treaty with Morocco.

Applications were accordingly made to effect a similar arrangement with Algiers. But in consequence of the excuse alleged by the regency, that they could not enter into an accommodation with a christian state, without the concurrence of their liege lord, the grand signor, Florida Blanca transferred the negotiation to Constantinople. He employed on this occasion the agency of de Buligny, a french merchant, naturalised at Seville, who, to an acquaintance with the character and habits of the eastern nations, added considerable skill in negotiation.

Here, however, the spanish minister encountered innumerable obstacles; for an accommodation with Spain was strongly opposed by all the christian nations, who were interested in the trade of the Levant. It was thwarted by none more zealously than by the french, who trembled for the prosperity of Marseilles, and whose secret machinations were more dangerous than the public opposition of other powers. The rising contest between the Porte and Russia, which terminated in the loss of the Crimea, contributed, however, to favour the design. The usual modes of application at Constantinople were employed with effect; and within a few months, the other european courts, with surprise and regret, wit-

nessed the conclusion of a treaty which terminated the political and religious rivalry so long subsisting between Spain and the Porte. By this accommodation, which was principally commercial, the spanish crown was admitted to the privileges enjoyed by the most favoured nations; with the power of establishing consuls in the different ports of the Levant, and of maintaining a regular embassador at Constantinople. Similar conditions were granted to the turks in Spain; slaves on both sides were to be reciprocally exchanged or redeemed; and spanish subjects were to enjoy the same security as other christians in their pilgrimages to the Holy Land. This treaty was signed by the king of Spain on the 24th of December, 1782, and solemnly ratified in the ensuing year.

Among the presents with which the spanish envoy signalised his first introduction, were twenty pieces of the exquisite cloth formed from the Vicuña wool, a gift which was calculated to make an impression favourable to the manufactures of Spain. To this was joined the superb tent occupied by Ferdinand the catholic during the campaign which terminated in the reduction of the moorish kingdom of Grenada. Madrid in its turn witnessed, for the first time, the appear- Oct. 17, 1787.
ance of a turkish embassador, Achmet Wasif

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recurred to the more effectual means of negotiation. The instances of the grand signor, and the emperor of Morocco, assisted by liberal presents in money and warlike stores, at length procured a favourable attention from the regency. An accommodation was arranged, which, after various infractions, was consolidated into a treaty of commerce and amity, similar in principle to that already concluded with the Porte, but with such modifications, as were calculated to free the trade and coasts of Spain from piratical depredations; a measure less splendid, but more permanently useful than the capture of Algiers by storm. A treaty had been previously concluded with the bey of Tripoli; and, finally, an arrangement with the regency of Tunis completed the pacific system with the infidel powers.*

June 14, 1786.

Sept. 10, 1784.

"By these means," justly observes Florida Blanca, "your majesty freed the sea from pirates and enemies, from the kingdoms of Morocco and Fez, on the ocean, to the dominions of the turkish emperor, at the furthest extremity of the Mediterranean. The spanish flag is continually seen in the Levant, where it was before unknown; even the very commercial nations which had indirectly persecuted it, now prefer it, to the

* Burgoing, v. 2, p. 126.——Treaties with the Porte, Algiers, and Tripoli, in Martens, v. 2, p. 219—531—665.——Beccatini, p. 341—345.

augmentation of our trade and marine, the improvement of our seamen, and the respect and splendour of Spain, and its august sovereign. At this time ended the slavery of so many thousand persons, and the abandonment of their unfortunate families, from which resulted unspeakable detriment to religion and the state. Now also ceased the export of enormous sums of money, which, in impoverishing us, enriched our enemies, and facilitated their armaments to molest us. Finally, there are now peopling and cultivating, with incredible celerity, about three hundred leagues of the most fertile territory, on the shores of the Mediterranean, which, from the terror of pirates, had been left desert. Whole towns and villages are formed, with capacious ports, to give passage to the productions and manufactures which flourish under the advantages of peace, and your royal protection."*

* Florida Blanca's Statement, No. 14.——Official documents in the Madrid Gazette, and other foreign periodical publications.

## CHAPTER THE SEVENTY-SEVENTH.

### 1783—1789.

*Political and family union with Portugal—State of the principal european powers—Political system of the spanish cabinet—Negotiations with England—Demand of Gibraltar—Convention relative to the limits of the british settlements in the bay of Honduras—Ineffectual attempt to arrange a commercial treaty—Commercial disputes with France and Holland.*

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TRANQUILLITY being restored in the transatlantic dominions, and the spanish coasts delivered from the scourge of moorish piracy, the attention of the monarch was next directed to the court of Portugal, where his influence still continued undiminished, notwithstanding the death of his sister, the queen dowager. He accordingly cemented an union, which was necessary to preserve the peace of his western frontier, by concluding a double marriage between the two royal families. His eldest daughter, Charlotte, espoused John, heir apparent of the portuguese monarchy; and his third son, Don Gabriel, the infanta Maria Victoria.* He succeeded also in entangling Portugal in the political system of the

* Florida Blanca's Statement.

House of Bourbon, and employed his interest with effect in promoting a connection between that country and France, in consequence of which the french were admitted to a share of those commercial privileges, hitherto exclusively enjoyed by England. When this alliance was afterwards endangered by a dispute relative to some portuguese forts on the african coast, which were demolished by the french, he again interposed, and gave a proof of his ascendancy at the court of Lisbon, by promoting an accommodation which reconciled the jarring pretensions of the two nations to the african trade.*

These arrangements, joined to the alliance with France, having secured the tranquillity and safety of the peninsula, the spanish monarch was enabled to promote, with additional effect, the improvement of his own internal œconomy, and to take a share in the general system of european politics. It is, however, honourable to his character and principles to observe, that his interference was employed in securing, not in disturbing public tranquillity, and in preventing Spain from being involved in a new vortex, by those jealousies and troubles which were the natural effect of the animosity engendered during the late war.

England was at first astounded by the unfor-

* Diplomatie Françoise, t. 7, p. 419.

tunate result of the contest, and the triumphant exultation of her enemies. The national despondency was aggravated by the supposed deficiency in the finances, and the predictions of the gloomy, that by the loss of America the sun of Great Britain was set for ever. Party feuds rose to an alarming height; while the agitation which prevailed in every quarter of the empire evinced the mischiefs resulting from incessant attempts to rouse the passions of the people against the government, and to introduce the leaven of american republicanism into the great mass of the nation. The ferment derived new force from the known misunderstanding between the sovereign and the coalition ministry.

But the cloud being dissipated, the nation resumed their wonted energy. A new change took place in the government. The coalition ministry were removed, and the helm of state was confided to the hand of Mr. Pitt, who, at the early age of twenty-four, commenced the most permanent administration which had marked the reign of George the third. Retaining at the same time the favour of the sovereign, and the confidence of the people, the youthful minister displayed superior talents, genius, and eloquence, and effected as important a change in the system of peace, as his father had introduced in that of war.

The hopes of enemies, and the fears of friends,

proved equally groundless. The resources of the nation were called into action, commercial enterprise revived, tranquillity was maintained at home, and a new and efficient system of finance established. A surplus of near a million sterling, after providing for the current expenditure, was appropriated for the gradual redemption of the national debt. The country was not only delivered from the apprehensions of a public bankruptcy, but the foundation of a new system was laid against future troubles, which has since enabled Great Britain to display resources beyond the comprehension of the most sanguine statesman.

In foreign transactions, England had exhibited the same want of energy which marked her domestic policy; and for a time the government, as well as the nation, appeared to sink under the superior ascendancy of the House of Bourbon.

France, elated with having wrested an empire from her rival, and triumphing in the result of the contest, in the first enthusiasm of success, was as little conscious of her inherent weakness, as Britain of her native strength. She profited by the universal respect which the recent exertion of her power inspired. She domineered as before in every court of Europe, and extended her system of alliance and confederation, with a view to complete the humiliation of her antient

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rival. Vergennes, the adroit minister for foreign affairs, pursued the maxims which had been adopted since the union with Austria, by securing her dependence and opposing her aggrandisement, while he cajoled the court of Vienna, by favouring its petty interests.* His profound and dexterous policy also consolidated that influence in Holland which France had employed with such effect during the american troubles; and he stimulated the republican party to those efforts which ended in the downfal of the stadtholderate, and the establishment of a new constitution. He drew closer the connection with the king of Prussia, and indirectly employed his agency to check the designs of Austria, and to divide the german empire.

The character, talents, and principles of the emperor, Joseph the second, had long attracted public attention; and, notwithstanding the calm and prosperity which marked the declining age of Maria Theresa, his accession was anxiously anticipated as the commencement of a new political æra. This long-expected event took place on the 19th of November, 1780. But perhaps never were public hopes so completely disap-

* In his representation to Louis the sixteenth, he observes, "Detruisons la puissance du Roi de Prusse; alors plus de digue contre l'ambition autrichienne." Diplomatie françoise, t. 7, p. 136.

pointed, and seldom have real abilities been exerted with a more mischievous effect. At home, his multiplied regulations exhibited a series of precipitate and injudicious changes, neither suited to the situation of his country, nor to the habits and prejudices of the people; and shaking to the foundation those moral and political institutions, which form the basis of every state. The consequences were rapid and alarming. Discontents and troubles broke forth in every part of his dominions, and the progress of his reforms threatened the utter dissolution of the monarchy.

Abroad, his restless and incroaching spirit gave birth to a succession of ambitious designs, which equally endangered the public tranquillity. First, he shook off the bands which united him with the maritime powers, by dismantling the principal fortresses forming the barrier of the Netherlands, and thus laid open those valuable provinces to the future invasions of France. He then claimed from the dutch the free navigation of the Scheldt, the cession of Maestricht, the extension of his frontier, and the payment of a considerable sum of money. On the refusal of the republic to submit to these demands, a partial warfare took place. But the court of France, faithful to the policy of opposing his aggrandisement, interfered in the dispute; and he was

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compelled to relinquish his pretensions and save his honour, by accepting a pecuniary compensation.

This contest was the prelude to another attempt to exchange the Netherlands for the bavarian succession. But the secret interposition of France, and the open opposition of Prussia, again frustrated his designs, and again led to the compromise of his pretensions by the peace of Teschen. This failure, however, only stimulated him to new efforts. He united still more closely with the empress of Russia, to undertake a joint invasion of the turkish empire, with the hope of compensating on the side of the Danube, for his disappointment in Germany.

1786. At this moment the death of Frederic, king of Prussia, occasioned a revolution in the whole system of european policy, and produced an important change in the views and situation of France. The union between the courts of Versailles and Berlin, which had secured to France the preponderance in Germany, was broken, and the new monarch, Frederic William, adopted a line of conduct diametrically opposite to that of his uncle. Without inveterate prejudice against England, or partiality to France, his political principles, joined to his affection for his sister, the wife of the prince of Orange, led him into an union with England, the result of which was the

overthrow of the french party in Holland, and the re-establishment of the antient government and external connections.

Although the contentions excited by the ambition of Joseph the second, had but weakly affected the court of Spain; Charles could not remain an indifferent spectator of this revolution, which, besides lowering the bourbon interest in general, was calculated to give a new ascendancy to England. Conscious of the indignation which a high-spirited nation must have felt from the insidious interference of the bourbon crowns, in the american troubles, he dreaded lest this success should induce her to retaliate, and attempt the recovery of those cessions to which she had been compelled to submit.

Under this impression, Charles appeared to feel no less resentment than France at the change in the government of Holland. Although, from a dread of renewing the war with England, he had refused to accede to the convention of Fontainbleau between France and the United Provinces, he yet announced his resolution not to permit the degradation of the House of Bourbon, made hostile preparations, and tendered to France both naval and military assistance if attacked by England.* He did not spare his exhortations at the court of London; he urged the

* Memoires de Besenval, t. 3, p. 296.

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british cabinet to enjoy success with moderation, and not to aggravate the mortification of France by acts of triumph and exultation.

When, therefore, England shewed her intention merely to vindicate her own political interests, and confined her interference to the re-establishment of the antient government, the spanish monarch respected and applauded her moderation. He supported, by his influence, the efforts of the pacific party in France; while his vigorous interposition and repeated exhortations essentially contributed to prevent the renewal of war. In consequence, England and France concluded

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a convention, by which they respectively reduced their armaments to the footing of the peace establishment, and agreed not to interfere, by force, in the affairs of Holland.

During these transactions, a series of negotiations had taken place between the courts of London and Madrid, for the final adjustment of the points left undecided in the treaty of peace.

The refusal of Mr. Fox to accede to the cession of Gibraltar, of which the preceding ministry had given hopes, made the deepest impression on the mind of Charles, and irritated the warmer temper of his minister Florida Blanca, who was desirous to signalise his administration by so popular an acquisition. The chagrin arising from this disappointment was aggravated by the

rooted jealousy which Spain had manifested relative to her trade since the accession of a bourbon sovereign. Hence, Gibraltar continued for a long period the theme of discussion; and the appointment of Mr. Pitt, who had taken a share in the administration of lord Shelburne, again revived the hopes of the spanish court that they should ultimately acquire this darling object.

The negotiation relative to the limits of the british settlements on the bay of Honduras, and the arrangement of a commercial treaty, were therefore again coupled with the demand of Gibraltar. For a considerable period, every inducement which could awaken the apprehensions, or allure the hopes, of the british nation, was employed to extort its cession. The spanish court profited by the troubles in Europe which followed the conclusion of the peace, and alternately threatened to join in the designs of France, or held forth the prospect of annulling the family compact. They at the same time tendered commercial advantages, and obstructed the pending arrangements; and they raised continual difficulties relative to the final settlement of limits on the bay of Honduras. On one of these occasions, Florida Blanca observed, "The king has no inclination to make a treaty of commerce, nor will the people see with indifference great commercial advantages lavished on the english.

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Yet the prospect of Gibraltar may have a mighty effect on both the king and people. Such a cession would also afford an apology to other nations for the preference given to Great Britain. Finally," he said, "a medium may be adopted which will counterbalance the family compact, or be equivalent to its dissolution. If we make a treaty with England, containing a reciprocal guaranty of our respective possessions, its operation will be to render the family compact void."

On another occasion he likewise remarked: "I consider Gibraltar as a possession, which though over-rated as to its solid importance and value, is a perpetual thorn in the side of Spain, and a great obstacle to the establishment of a complete cordiality. I have turned the subject long in my mind, and can see many ample equivalents in the eye of national wisdom; but there are *national* prejudices in England, which supersede all other reasonings." After hinting at Porto Rico, the Caraccas, and great commercial privileges, with a general guaranty of all possessions, as one mode of removing objections to the family compact without a breach of faith towards France, he concluded, in a tone of regret and peevishness, "All such representations are a mere waste of time. No british ministry of the present age will have the courage to look the

question fairly in the face, and I will think no more of it."*

In conformity with this conviction, he at length relinquished his fruitless solicitation. But he profited by the anxiety which the british ministry felt to terminate this irritating discussion, and to prevent Spain from joining in the projects of France; and thus extorted considerable advantages in the convention for the arrangement of the limits assigned to the settlers in the bay of Honduras.

To satisfy the british nation with the appearance of an extension of territory, the small island of St. George's key was granted for the purpose of removing the sick from the marshy air of the bay. The english were permitted to refit their ships, and fish in particular places; but in no instance were they to form military works, to station ships of war, to pass their assigned limits, or to cultivate the soil. A spanish commissary was annually empowered to watch over the exact execution of these articles. A vague and indefinite promise was added, that the spaniards should supply England with the woods which are the produce of these regions, in case of a scarcity within the limits assigned to the british settlers.†

* Lord Auckland's communications.

† Copy of the Convention published by authority; and Remarks on the Convention by Mr. William Ryder, a british settler, MS.

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By these regulations, Spain succeeded in rooting out the extensive and lucrative contraband trade, hitherto carried on with the neighbouring colonies; reduced the scanty remains of the british settlers to her mercy, and even prepared the means of monopolizing the trade of mahogany, and dying woods, to the increase of her commerce and naval power. Terms so unfavourable did not escape censure in England, and a motion was made in parliament to condemn this convention; but the government were unwilling to irritate Spain at so critical a juncture, and the arrangement was ratified. Charles was highly gratified with this acquisition, and the sacrifice on the part of England tended to produce additional cordiality in the relations between the two countries. This concession, however, did not facilitate the conclusion of a commercial treaty; for difficult as this species of arrangement had proved in preceding periods, it was now accompanied with still greater difficulties.

1786.

It has already been shewn, that since the accession of the House of Bourbon, and more particularly since the period when Ripperda rose into favour, the spanish sovereigns and ministers had shewn incessant jealousy of the commercial advantages possessed by other nations, especially by England. This jealousy had been first excited, and since fomented, by foreign adventurers

domiciliated in Spain, who appear to have been at once animated by feelings of resentment or prejudice against their native countries, and by a desire of increasing their own importance in the eyes of the sovereign who granted them favour and protection. As Ripperda had awakened this feeling towards England and Holland, and given the tone to the spanish writers, so in a subsequent period the impression was strengthened by other adventurers, among whom we distinguish a naturalised irishman, named Ward. He had repaired to Spain when young, had been patronised by the ministers of Ferdinand the sixth, and was employed as one of those political missionaries, who were selected for foreign travel, to transfer to Spain the knowledge, arts, and improvements of other countries.

In 1762, he composed a work, which was published after his death, under the title of *Proyecto Economico*, the object of which was to suggest plans for the advancement of the national industry. Among many useful ideas, however, the leading principle appears to have been an inveterate hostility against the trade of England. It contains an exaggerated representation of the injuries which Spain received from our commercial and manufacturing superiority; it offers a series of regulations, which are held forth as the infallible means of depriving us of

our advantages, and enabling Spain to rival us as a trading, industrious, and agricultural nation. These regulations were calculated to produce a revolution in the existing system of commercial intercourse; in addition to which, the internal duties on native productions and fabrics were to be lightened, and those of foreigners excluded by heavy imposts and prohibitions.

Such suggestions not only made a deep impression at the moment, when the two nations were animated with sentiments of mutual hostility, but became the maxims of the government, and evidently guided the conduct of Florida Blanca. Indeed, according to his own avowal, in the statement submitted to his sovereigns, the view of effecting this change of system was one of the motives which led to the last rupture with England.

The spanish government gradually prepared the way, by reducing or modifying the internal duties, augmenting those of imports, and reviving the antient laws and prohibitions against such articles as tended to increase what is called the unfavourable balance of trade.* The in-

* List of foreign articles of which the importation into Spain was prohibited. Shirts; under thread-stockings; worsted and thread do.; worsted net-breeches; thread, cotton, and woollen caps; thread-nets for the hair; shoes of all sorts; callicoes; chintz and cotton quilts; thread and woollen do; thread and cotton dimities; printed linens; playing cards; beer; cyder; sealing wax; velverets, and cotton stuffs of all kinds.

structions to the plenipotentiaries, who concluded the peace and subsequent conventions, were framed on the same principle; and when the regulations of commercial intercourse were at length brought into discussion, we find the spanish minister himself animated with that jealousy, and armed with those prejudices, which the representations of such guides as Ripperda and Ward were likely to inspire.

The difficulties arising from these obstacles were aggravated by the unceasing representations of the french court, through the agency of their embassadors, the count de Montmorin and the duke de Vauguyon, both of whom acquired great influence over the mind of Charles. Although the french ministers had themselves recently concluded a commercial treaty with England, on the principle of mutual accommodation, they omitted no effort to obstruct the pending discussion. They did not fail to represent their 1787.
own conduct as an example not to be imitated, but avoided. They deplored the fatal necessity which had rendered them the dupes of british art; they lamented that they had been reduced to enter into a disadvantageous arrangement by their public distresses, and the necessity of obviating the danger of a new war; and they held forth the prospect, that future events, with the

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assistance of Spain, might yet enable them to remedy this unfortunate defect in their policy.

In such unfavourable circumstances, the important negotiation for the re-establishment of commercial intercourse, was confided first to Mr. Liston, and afterwards to Mr. Eden,* who had successfully concluded the treaty with France. The british government, faithful to those liberal principles of trading policy which had been recently diffused by our œconomists, proposed the arrangement of a treaty, on a basis similar to that with France, establishing such rules and duties as should facilitate to both countries the mutual interchange of commodities and productions, without detriment to peculiar and standard branches of national industry and traffic. They demanded for the english trader the same advantages as were enjoyed by the most favoured nations in Spain; they required a security against those sudden and capricious prohibitions, to which the government frequently recurred, for the gratification of personal or local interests, and the establishment of such rates in the duties of importation as should open a fair course to the articles of british industry. In return, they tendered similar advantages with respect to the fabrics and native productions of Spain and her

* Lord Auckland.

colonies, particularly cocoa and tobacco; and they even set the example, by reducing the duties on spanish wines and brandies.*

The diplomatic talents and commercial knowledge of Mr. Eden were however employed without effect. Florida Blanca, though frequently obliged to yield to the force of truth and reason, still clung to the leading tenets of his restrictive system. He endeavoured to obtain the indulgences offered by England without granting an equivalent indulgence; affected to make a distinction between the circumstances of Spain and France; and contended for the maintenance of the existing duties, and the right of imposing others as circumstances should dictate. Accordingly, after a variety of discussions, and the customary interchange of projects and counter-projects, a matter of such high importance to the welfare and good understanding of both nations, was left on the same uncertain footing as at the conclusion of the peace.

It is, however, but justice to the spanish minister to observe, that the principles on which he acted, even if erroneous, were not derived

* The effect of this reduction ought to have opened the eyes of the spanish minister to the true interests of his country. For, within the space of only six months, the export of wines from Valencia into England rose from 6,000 to 11,000 pipes, and of brandy from 400 to above 1,100.—Lord Auckland's communications.

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from personal or national partiality. He equally resisted the repeated importunities of the french for the enjoyment of the privileges to which they were entitled by the family compact. "The french," he observed to the english embassador, after a discussion on this subject, "are siill more unreasonable than the english. In virtue of the family compact, they claim for their navigation the same privileges as the natives of Spain; and they have had the impertinence to insist on these favours, even in regard to the coasting trade, while they refuse to contribute to the public burthens, and to submit to the search of their vessels, from which the spaniards themselves are not exempted. I have hitherto repelled these incroachments, and shall continue to oppose demands so inconsistent and unreasonable.

He was not more conciliating towards the dutch. On the foundation of the new Philippine company, their vessels naturally took the more commodious route to Manilla, round the Cape of Good Hope, instead of doubling the southern promontory of America. This innovation revived a dispute which had arisen between Spain and Holland in 1732 and 1768, when the dutch government resisted the attempts of the spaniards to pursue this navigation, in virtue of a clause in the treaty of Munster, confirmed in that of Utrecht, which confined the spanish trade to the

east to the course then followed round Cape Horn. The question created a war of memorials and counter-memorials, and hostile preparations were made on both sides. But the firmness of the spanish government, and the inability of the dutch to support their pretensions, led to a compromise, by which the question was finally decided in favour of Spain.*

* Abstract of the spanish memorial, composed by Florida Blanca, in the Hamburgh Politisches Journal for 1787.——Statement of Florida Blanca, Appendix.——And lord Auckland's collection of manuscripts.

## CHAPTER THE SEVENTY-EIGHTH.

### 1786—1788.

*System of foreign policy adopted by Spain—Embarrassed state of France, and rise of the troubles which preceded the revolution—State of the contest between the imperial courts, Turkey and Sweden—The spanish monarch rejects the overtures of France, for the formation of a new quadruple alliance against England—Change of principle with regard to the family compact, and the relations with England.*

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WHILE Charles was thus engaged in internal arrangements and projected improvements, he did not cease to regard the convulsed state of Europe with an anxious eye; he omitted no preparation which might give weight to his interference in the troubles raised by the ambitious projects of the contemporary sovereigns. Hence, no period, since the accession of the House of Bourbon, was marked by a more rapid amelioration of the naval and military system, than that which intervened between the peace of Paris and the death of Charles. These exertions, at a moment of such embarrassment, and at the issue of a ruinous war, reflect high credit on the spirit and resources of the minister; while the dexterity with which he avoided entanglements with other

powers, evinces no less wisdom and address than vigilance and firmness.

No part of foreign transactions required more self-denial and foresight, than the relations with the elder branch of the House of Bourbon. The family compact, and the bourbon prejudices of the king, appeared to identify not merely the interests, but even the existence of the two monarchies; while the domestic embarrassments of the french court, and their unceasing attempts to divert the discontents which agitated the country within, by exciting new troubles abroad, presented the most alarming perspective to a sovereign who was desirous of maintaining tranquillity, or of avoiding the contagion of principles which threatened the downfal of all antient institutions.

France was now doomed to pay the price of her endless projects to domineer over Europe, and in particular of her impolitic interference in the contest between the american colonies and the mother country. The revenue, before scarcely adequate to the current expenditure, was rapidly absorbed by the charges of war; the deficit was rendered permanent by the boasted system of Neckar, minister of finance, who, by accumulating loans on loans, affected to support the public burthens without additional taxes. Unfortunately for France, he was not removed

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till after the restoration of peace; when the evil, which had been little felt amidst the preceding exertions, became deep and alarming.

The union of the french troops with the american insurgents, and the interest taken by the country at large in the cause of a people, who were instigated to combat against a legal and established government, made a deep impression on a nation fond of novelty; where the vices of antiquated institutions, the misconduct of rulers, and the abuses of authority, had long been the objects of ridicule, complaint, and invective. The profligacy of the preceding court had weakened respect for royalty and rank; while the wavering character of the reigning monarch, and his benevolent but imprudent partiality to every innovation bearing the appearance of improvement, had removed the only barriers which were competent to resist the shock of popular opinion. The mischief was aggravated by divisions in the court and royal family, particularly by the misconduct of the duke of Orleans, who lent the weight of his ample fortune, and the influence of his high station, to increase the difficulties of the government.

The fatal deficiency in the finances, which could not be long palliated or concealed, brought all the latent principles of commotion into activity. To remedy the evil, it was necessary to

outstep the ordinary rules of administration. Calonne, the new minister of finance, suggested the expedient of inducing the clergy and nobles to sacrifice part of their exclusive privileges, by the establishment of a general territorial imposition, and a stamp tax. At the same time, he proposed to abolish those burthens which were peculiarly oppressive to the lower orders. His plan was approved by Vergennes, and an assembly of the most distinguished members of the state, known by the appellation of Notables, was convened to confirm it by their sanction. CHAP. 78. 1786—1788. Feb. 22, 1786.

At this arduous moment, Vergennes died, and the ministry of foreign affairs was filled by the count de Montmorin, recently embassador in Spain, who neither possessed his energy of character, nor obtained equal influence over the vacillating mind of the king. Calonne was left alone to struggle with the irresolution of the sovereign, the prejudices of the privileged orders, and the machinations of political rivals. His proposals, however just and reasonable, were rejected, and the failure led to his resignation. He was succeeded by his principal opponent, Lomenie de Brienne, archbishop of Toulouse, who, after calumniating his plan, found no other resource than to adopt it, with partial modifications, and under a new name. But the opposition which the archbishop had fomented, was 1788.

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next turned against himself, and he shared the mortification of his predecessor. He therefore dissolved the notables, and recurred to the antient system of registration in the parliaments. But the example of the notables becoming contagious, the parliament of Paris was found no less refractory than the other assembly. All attempts to impose taxes or raise a temporary supply were fruitless: the government was reduced to the most alarming straits; the royal treasury contained no more than 400,000 francs; even a trifling sum raised by lottery for the succour of the districts which had been recently visited by dreadful hurricanes, was appropriated to relieve the necessities of the court.*

Nov. 21, 1788.

In vain the minister recurred to intimidation, by removing the parliament from the capital, and banishing the refractory members. These acts of authority, which had failed even in firmer hands, and during more tranquil times, raised a ferment of the most dangerous kind. The king was terrified; and de Brienne, who had pledged himself for the convocation of the states general, withdrew from his irksome situation, after setting the seal to the public calamities, by recommending the king to replace Neckar at the head of the finances. In spite of the reluctance of the monarch to recur to the states general, no other

Aug. 25.

* Memoires de Besenval, t. 3, p. 360.

alternative remained; the notables were again convoked to arrange the requisite formalities and regulations. The republican maxims of Neckar, and his endeavours to conciliate that popular favour to which he owed his restoration, aggravated the ferment which the preceding discussions had raised. The approach of the important æra, which was fixed for the assembly of the states, was accompanied with the portents of a political tempest: gloom, jealousy, and despondency in the court; frantic enthusiasm, wild hopes, and extravagant designs, among those who saw a new career opening to their ambition.

Even in the midst of these rising commotions, the strength of the monarchy was still further exhausted by the convulsive efforts of the court to divert the public mind, and to hide internal distress by forming new confederacies, and exciting new troubles abroad.

Foiled in the attempt to maintain the ascendancy in Holland, and mortified by the exposure of their weakness, the predominant party in the french cabinet profited by the ambitious views which actuated the two imperial courts, and laboured to consolidate a new confederacy, as a counterpoise to the recent union between England, Prussia, and Holland. Notwithstanding the long and intimate connection with the Porte,

CHAP. 78. 1786—1788. they acquiesced in the projects of Austria and Russia, in order to combine their strength against their rivals. Contrary perhaps to their expectations, the turks took the alarm, and becoming the aggressors, accelerated a war, which it was not the interest of the french to provoke. Plunged into a dilemma of their own creation, they had no other resource than to connive at designs which ought to have awakened their alarms. They secretly furnished money to the emperor Joseph, overthrew the british interest at St. Petersburgh, and lured the empress of Russia into a commercial engagement which superseded that with England. They even endeavoured to entangle Charles the third in their new system, by forming the plan of a quadruple alliance, to unite the two imperial courts, France and Spain. It comprised the renewal of all compacts between the sovereigns of the House of Bourbon; the confirmation of the commercial treaty between France and Russia; the arrangement of a similar treaty with Spain; and, under the name of neutrality, laid down such engagements with regard to the powers at war, as were calculated to favour the projects of the imperial courts, and to prevent any attack which might divert their forces. To this alliance, Denmark was to be invited to accede. As an additional lure to the king of Spain, it was accompanied

Aug. 1787.

1787.

with a proposal to appropriate a part of the provinces which were to be dismembered from the turkish empire, to form an establishment for one of his grandsons.*

Dec. 1787.

During the time spent in these political arrangements, the two imperial courts had obtained vast advantages both by sea and land. After an insidious attempt to surprise Belgrade before the declaration of war, Joseph the second reduced Szabach and Dubitzin, and appeared likely to effect the conquest of the ultra-danubian provinces. A combined austrian and russian force overran Moldavia; while the main army of Russia captured Otchakof, the key of the ottoman dominions on the side of the Dnieper. Finally, the russian fleet totally routed that of the turks in the Black Sea, and the vast exertions of the empress seemed likely to accelerate the accomplishment of those extensive designs, which had been formed to establish her naval power at the two extremities of Europe, and to domineer at the same time in the Baltic and the Mediterranean.

1788.

The imperial courts were not, however, suffered to proceed in their victorious career without molestation. When the northern regions of

* Diplomatie françoise, t. 7, p. 458.——This alliance is erroneously mentioned in several publications as having been actually signed by Spain. See particularly the Annual Register for 1788.

CHAP. 78. 1786—1788. Russia were denuded of troops to prosecute the turkish war, the romantic spirit of Gustavus the third, king of Sweden, prompted him to seize so favourable a juncture, to crush her naval power in the Baltic, and recover the provinces wrested from his dominions. He fitted out a fleet of twelve sail, and landing with an army on the coast of Finland, assailed the russian frontier.

July 17, 1788. The two fleets encountered off Sweaborg, and after a desperate engagement, separated with equal loss. The invasion by land, however, appeared likely to be crowned with the most decisive success; but the progress of Gustavus was arrested by a mutiny of his troops, and the refusal of his officers to assist in an offensive war beyond their own limits, without the consent of the diet. Mortified and disappointed, he returned to his capital to check the spirit of revolt, which had manifested itself in different quarters. As a last resource, he imitated the conduct of Gustavus Vasa, and hastened into Dalecarlia to rouse the hardy and loyal natives; when he was surprised with the intelligence that a danish army had penetrated into Norway, and threatened Gothenborg.

In this alarming predicament, he owed his safety to the intervention of England, Prussia, and Holland. By their powerful mediation the

Aug. 1788. danish invasion was suspended, and an armistice concluded. The reluctance of both parties to

consent to a definitive accommodation was overruled by the mediators; and at length a convention was signed at Uddevalla,* by which Gustavus was left at liberty to crush the cabals of the nobles, and to prepare against that retaliation which his attack on Russia had provoked.

The part which England and Prussia had taken to avert the impending ruin of Sweden, sufficiently proved that they did not regard with indifference the secret machinations of France, and the public attempts of the imperial courts, to obtain a dangerous accession of power and territory. For a short period, the internal occupations of the british government retarded the moment of active interposition; but the menaces and preparations of Prussia alarmed the imperial courts, and at least divided the attention, and shackled the efforts of the emperor.

The spanish monarch acted on this occasion with a laudable degree of circumspection and integrity. Notwithstanding the amelioration which had been gradually made in the system of the revenue, the indulgences conceded to the industrious classes, the expences incurred in multiplied projects of improvement, the augmentation of the navy, the charges of the american government, and the interest of the public debt, had rendered the income of the crown so far

* Travels in Poland, Russia, Sweden, and Denmark, b. 7, c. 10.

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inadequate to its disbursements, that for the four last years an annual deficit had been discovered, to a considerable amount. Such a discovery, at the very moment when the french throne was shaken by the effects of a similar embarrassment, awakened the most serious reflections: it rendered Charles doubly anxious, not only for the preservation of domestic tranquillity, but for the termination of those troubles which threatened the public peace. Hence, he strongly disapproved the insidious attempt of the emperor to surprise Belgrade, and his declaration of hostility without even the plea of provocation. His language was equally just and manly in reprobating the plea alleged by the austrian court, that their sole object was the extension of their frontier for the sake of security and future peace. "If," he said, "it should become the rule for sovereigns to avow such projects, even so qualified, the consequences must be endless jealousies, and a constant risk of that peace which they profess to seek."

But it was against the maritime projects of the empress Catherine, and her attempts to extend her dominion and influence to the Archipelago, that he conceived the strongest alarm. He was justly apprehensive of designs which threatened to rob him of the advantages expected from his recent treaty with the turks; and his

feelings, as a father and a sovereign, were deeply wounded by the attempt of the empress, at this period, to obtain the use of a port on the neapolitan coast, and to lure the king of Naples into a connection detrimental to Spain. The consequence was a serious misunderstanding with his darling son, which embittered the concluding year of his life.

Actuated by these motives, Charles not only spurned at the proposal to lure him into the new quadruple alliance, and the offer of an establishment for his grandson; but even made overtures to England to concur in excluding the russian fleet from the Mediterranean. He witnessed with satisfaction the rising misunderstanding between Russia and England, and warmly approved the conduct of the british court, in refusing to assist the russians with provisions or seamen. With equal complacency he observed the check which the empress experienced from the sudden attack of Gustavus the third; and the armed mediation of England and Prussia, which saved Sweden, obstructed the hostile designs against the turkish empire, and delivered Europe from a general war.

But the most striking proof of a change in his political maxims, was the conduct he observed towards France. Although of too tenacious a character to shake off his bourbon partialities;

CHAP. 78. 1786—1788.

and although too punctilious in his engagements to announce a public secession from the family compact; yet his own reflections, and the representations of his minister, induced him to regard it in a new and different light. He now spoke of it as an alliance merely defensive, to resist such unprovoked aggressions as might tend to humble the House of Bourbon, but not as extending to views of aggrandisement or hostility. In conformity with these principles, Florida Blanca even testified his jealousy lest the french court should provoke a new war to divert the internal discontents; and he firmly repelled all overtures to interpose the mediation of Spain, as artifices to entangle his sovereign in the existing troubles. He as frequently and publicly expressed his unwillingness to trust to a government, which was urged by embarrassments to the most desperate measures, but without the means of supporting a contest. "It is not sufficient," he observed, "that I am assured of the pacific principles maintained by Montmorin and some of his colleagues, when I am aware that they are themselves the dupes of others, and that their exertions are counteracted in the private apartments of Versailles." Appreciating also the danger of a connection with a country, which swarmed with projectors and innovators, it was his frequent expression, that every established

government should build up a wall of brass, to secure itself from the contagion of french principles.

He highly applauded the firm and moderate conduct of England after the peace of Paris. "Spain and England," he said, "stand on high and enviable ground. Without internal embarrassments, without fears of aggression, or views of aggrandisement, it is the interest of both to avoid foreign troubles, and unite their efforts in preventing a change in the political system of Europe, and in restoring peace to other nations." Hence a more confidential and friendly intercourse took place between the courts of London and Madrid, than had existed at any preceding period since the death of Ferdinand the sixth; and Spain appeared to be gradually returning to the antient maxims of her policy, before the accession of a bourbon prince was employed to render her dependent on France, and hostile to England.*

* The contents of this chapter are drawn from the various works relative to the commencement of the french revolution. ——Diplomatie françoise, t. 7.——House of Austria, v. 2, ch. 49; and the part concerning Spain from lord Auckland's collections, and from other official and oral information.

## CHAPTER THE SEVENTY-NINTH.

### 1778—1788.

*Political and commercial system of Florida Blanca—Beneficial changes in the colonial trade—Improvements in the internal administration—Modification of onerous taxes, and measures for the improvement of trade, commerce, and agriculture—Ecclesiastical regulations; and, in particular, diminution of the power of the inquisition.*

CHAP. 79. 1778—1788.

AFTER this review of foreign transactions, our attention naturally reverts to the internal measures of the minister who directed the counsels of Spain. Under him we trace the gradual progress of that system which owed its origin to Patiño, was extended under Campillo and Ensenada; and of which the leading principles were, to relieve the national trade, manufactures, and agriculture, from the shackles imposed by interest or ignorance, to meliorate the condition of the industrious classes, to renovate the army and marine, and to introduce more lenient and equitable maxims of government both ecclesiastical and civil. If he was occasionally led into error by the prejudices of his country and education, he at least manifested more liberal views than

his predecessors, and displayed superior courage and perseverance in the execution of his laudable designs. CHAP. 79. 1778—1788.

He was aided by the talents and information of Don Joseph de Galvez, marquis of Sonora, who, by a long residence in America, had acquired an accurate knowledge of the situation, circumstances, and resources of the colonies, and the character of the people; and who, in 1776, was intrusted with the department of the Indies: by Cabarrus, a frenchman, distinguished for his acquaintance with the principles of commerce and finance; and above all, by Campomanes, who, like another Adam Smith, diffused new lights on the most important branches of political œconomy.

The first feature in the administration of Florida Blanca was the change in the system of intercourse with the colonies. Early in the reign of Charles, some timid essays were made towards the adoption of more liberal principles in the commerce with America; but it was not till 1778, that a complete and radical change was introduced. At that period the advantage of a free trade with all the american colonies, except Mexico, was first granted to seven of the principal ports; and afterwards to twelve, comprising Palma and Teneriff in the Canaries. Finally, all the spanish provinces were admitted to the

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benefits of this traffic, except Biscay and its dependencies, the people of which preferred their privileges and contraband trade to the profits of regular commerce. The consequences of this beneficial regulation were rapid and satisfactory. Within less than ten years, every port, to which the concession was imparted, had taken its share; the export of foreign goods was tripled, of home produce quintupled, and the returns from America augmented in the astonishing proportion of nine to one. The produce of the customs increased with equal rapidity. In 1786, these advantages were partially extended to Mexico.

Collaterally with these important innovations, considerable improvements were made in the colonies themselves. The people of Louisiana were gratified with greater indulgences than they had reason to expect from the first measures of the spanish government. The two Floridas were conciliated by similar favours. The island of Trinidad was almost re-peopled by the encouragement offered to colonists and settlers. In Mexico, new energy was given to industry, by the introduction of the tobacco plant, and the cultivation of corn and sugar. From Buenos Ayres also, we find among the articles of import in 1786 corn and salt-fish, two branches of external trade, which the spanish government had

always regarded with peculiar jealousy, and considered as the most humiliating proofs of dependence on foreigners.

The revenue of the colonies was augmented by the improvement, which the progress of science introduced, in working the mines. Hitherto the supply of quicksilver, which is necessary for smelting the precious metals, had been inadequate to the demand; and, in consequence, the mines were never sufficiently worked. To this object, therefore, the spanish government had turned an early and serious attention. They invited Bowles,* an english naturalist, to examine the mines in the peninsula, which had been wrought by the romans and moors, and in particular to devise means for improving the celebrated mine of cinnabar at Almaden. By the invention of new processes the produce was more than doubled, and the price of quicksilver reduced one half. A temporary accident having suspended the operations, a contract was formed in 1784 with the austrian government, by which the requisite supply was kept up at a trifling increase of expence.

In consequence of these judicious arrangements the produce of the spanish mines in the new world increased in proportion to the other

* Bowles Introduccion a la Historia natural y a la Geografia de España.

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sources of national wealth. The intelligent traveller, Humboldt, has given a comparative table of this augmentation. Besides the quantity of the precious metals drawn out by contraband, it appears that from 1750 to 1785 it was nearly doubled, and that the increase has been still more rapid to the present time.*

The same energy, zeal, and public spirit, which distinguished the colonial administration, was afterwards displayed in the regulations for the improvement of the mother country. To check the influx of foreign, and to give a new impulse to the native manufactures, the old laws of Philip the fourth against foreign fabrics were partially revived; and in 1783, a new tariff of import duties was arranged, with the view of preventing foreign articles from entering into competition with those of Spain. At the same time the introduction of raw materials was facilitated by a reduction of the duties; models of machines were procured from abroad, and skilful workmen invited from manufacturing countries.

In establishing this regulation, the spanish government certainly rose superior to national partialities, and enforced the restrictions no less

* In 1700, the average produce 5 millions of piastres.

| | |
|---|---|
| 1750 | 10 |
| 1785 | 19 |
| 1796 | 25 |
| 1804 | 35 |

rigorously against the trade of France, than against that of England, which, since the accession of Philip the fifth, had appeared almost the peculiar object of envy and jealousy. It is needless to particularise the different articles of this tariff; but the increase of the duties on ribbands, gauzes, stuffs, and different articles from Lyons, as well as on british cottons, sufficiently shews the solicitude of the minister to favour the silk, and other fabrics of Valencia.

Preparatory to this new system of duties, many oppressive taxes were abrogated, and others modified or changed, in such a manner as to bear less heavily on the industrious classes. Such were the abolition of the bolla* and plomos de ramos in Catalonia; the diminution of the alcavala and milliones, and the substitution of a moderate tax on income.

Still, however, one of the greatest obstructions to industry was the want of internal communications, which prevented the transport of corn and other commodities, even between provinces contiguous to each other. Attempts had been indeed made in preceding periods to remedy this defect; but these were short and imperfect essays, hastily begun, and often as capriciously abandoned. For the first time, in 1760, a regular fund was established for this purpose, by a tax

* For an account of these odious taxes, see Statement, No. 28.

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on salt. But under the administration of Squilaci and Grimaldi, this important labour had been prosecuted without zeal or method, and in some instances utterly neglected. When, however, it was transferred to Florida Blanca, it felt the impulse of his characteristic activity. The fund was increased by the produce of the posts, as well as by other resources; and the minute description contained in his Statement, presents a picture of rapid improvement, in a country where the roads and passes were the terror of travellers, and where internal circulation was cramped in all its branches.

Equal attention was paid to the improvement of water communications. The canal of Aragon, originally planned and begun under the reign of Charles the fifth, for the purpose of rendering the waters of the Ebro subservient to navigation, is a work not unworthy of the romans.* It served the purposes of transport and irrigation; and was intended, by the help of land carriage over the mountains of Biscay, to form a communication between the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. It passed from Tudela to below Saragossa, and although the original design is no

* Townshend informs us, that where the canal passes the mountain of Torero near Saragossa, the mean depth is forty feet, for above a mile. The general depth is nine feet, the breadth twenty at bottom. v. 1, p. 212.

further completed, it produced the most beneficial effect on the commerce and agriculture of Aragon. From the facility of irrigation, above 100,000 acres have been brought into cultivation, lands which formerly sold at £. 1 10*s*. the acre, have now risen to £. 50, and the country bordering the canal is as much improved in appearance as increased in value. In times of scarcity, when Castile was visited with the horrors of famine, the necessary supply was drawn from Aragon, which, in preceding periods, scarcely produced sufficient for its own consumption. This important work was principally superintended and promoted by Don Ramon Pignatelli, canon of Saragossa.

Another grand project was to open a communication between Madrid and the Tagus. It commenced at the capital, and was carried to the Xarama, which falls into the Tagus; and the project was even formed to render the Tagus navigable from the opening of the canal to the sea, with the concurrence of the portuguese government. A part was finished, and seven locks were constructed; but this useful enterprise was suspended after the disgrace of Florida Blanca.*

To this class of improvements may be added the canal of Guadarrama, and other undertakings

* La Borde, v. 4, p. 440.

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on a less extensive scale, for which we may refer to the statement of the minister.*

Similar exertions were made for the ornament and improvement of the capitals and subordinate towns. The higher orders were stimulated by the example of the sovereign; and numerous societies were formed in various parts of Spain, for the encouragement of agriculture and the useful arts, the promotion of public education, and the cultivation of literature and science. The vigorous hand of government was exerted for the banishment of idleness and voluntary mendicity. The vagabond race of gypsies were compelled to become useful members of society; processions and festivals were diminished; and endeavours made to divert into proper channels that indiscreet and indiscriminate charity, which is too often an encouragement to indolence and vice. Finally, a tax was levied on the revenues of the church, for the purpose of succouring the aged, the infirm, and orphans, and for the establishment of institutions calculated to promote the industry and increase the comforts of the lower classes.

In reviewing these regulations, it must be confessed that we still observe proofs of the same impolitic partiality to manufactures, which we

* Appendix.

have already noticed, and the same injudicious endeavours to force the industry and capital of the nation from their natural course, by prohibitions, privileges, and heavy duties. Many, however, were highly useful, and their operation is marked by a more rapid improvement of trade, agriculture, and manufactures, than at any preceding period. It is but justice also to add, that had the patriotic advice of the minister been followed, the burthens of the poor and industrious would have been still further diminished, and those odious impositions, the alcavala and millones, which may be truly said to have cramped the industry, exhausted the wealth, and hastened the decline of Spain, would have been superseded by taxes less oppressive in their operation.*

To give motion to the vast machine of com-

* For these taxes see the Statistical account at the end. Speaking of the alcavala, Adam Smith observes, "The levying of this tax requires a multitude of revenue officers sufficient to guard the transportation of goods, not only from one province to another, but from one shop to another. It subjects, not only the dealers in some sorts of goods, but those in all sorts, every farmer, every manufacturer, every merchant and shop-keeper, to the continual visits and examination of the tax gatherers. Through the greater part of a country in which a tax of this kind is established, nothing can be produced for distant sale. The produce of every part of the country must be proportioned to the consumption of the neighbourhood. It is to the alcavala accordingly that Uztariz imputes the ruin of the manufactures. He might have imputed to it likewise the declension of agriculture, it being imposed not only upon manufactures, but upon the rude produce of the land." Wealth of Nations, v. 3, p. 380.

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of asylums, which gave encouragement to every species of enormity.

It is difficult to recal the inquisition to mind without the feelings of an englishman and a protestant; but it would be unjust to advert to this subject, without taking into consideration the prejudices and situation of Spain. Even in trembling at the very name of this awful tribunal, and in deploring its oppressions, the great mass of the nation could not regard, without veneration, an institution consecrated by time and religion, for the security of the catholic faith, and considered as the great barrier against the abhorred rites of Mahomet, which were so deeply rooted, and so widely diffused by the establishment of the moorish race in Spain.

Though Charles had long resided in Naples, where this institution is regarded with the same horror as among protestants, he himself was too prudent to trample on the prejudices and opinions of his spanish subjects, or to make a direct attack against this great engine of ecclesiastical authority. He had already witnessed the danger of precipitate reforms, and of shocking national prejudices, in matters however beneficial; and from this motive, he had sacrificed his favourite Squillaci, and suspended the hasty career of d'Aranda. He adopted, indeed, the only maxim which could be pursued with safety; and,

perhaps, the only means to produce the intended effect. He endeavoured to check the oppressions, to soften the rigours, and to circumscribe the authority of the inquisition, and thus prepared the way for time and circumstances to produce its total abolition. In the pursuit of this design, he found in Florida Blanca the energy and liberal principles, without the imprudence, of d'Aranda.

Though the minister could not prevent the disgraceful process of Olavide, yet he softened his sentence, soothed his imprisonment, and connived at his escape. He gradually revived the principal restrictions of d'Aranda; and in 1784, the celebrated decree was issued which partially subjected the proceedings of the holy office to the cognizance of the sovereign. It was ordered that no grandee, minister, or any person in the civil or military service of the crown should be subjected to a process without the approbation of the king. Indeed, since the arrest and trial of Olavide, with the exception of a solitary instance, this formidable tribunal was shackled in its operations, and suffered only to give such displays of its authority as were calculated to weaken the public veneration. Under the new reign it received a still heavier shock, and before the late revolution, was become almost

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a mere tribunal of police, to arrest the progress of political rather than of religious heresy.

It would be tedious to extend our examination to the numerous and varied changes which distinguish the administration of Florida Blanca; we shall therefore refer the reader, who wishes for a further detail, to the minute and particular Statement of the minister himself.*

* The contents of this chapter have been principally drawn from the Statement of the minister, with collateral aids and explanations from official documents, particularly lord Auckland's MSS. Also from Beccatini, Townshend, Burgoing, and Laborde; the Hamburgh Politisches Journal, which contains numerous documents and notices, relating to the latter years of Charles the third, and other foreign periodical publications.

## CHAPTER THE EIGHTIETH.

### 1788.

*Cabals against the minister Florida Blanca—Disgrace of his opponents—Statement of his administration presented to the king—Sudden illness and death of Charles the third—His character, habits, and person—His will and family.*

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AT the time when Spain began to prosper under the advantages of peace, and when the exertions of Florida Blanca were laudably employed in promoting improvements at home, even the confidence and esteem of the sovereign were not sufficient to shield him from that enmity which is the constant attendant of power and high station. The death of the marquis of Sonora, and the appointment of his friend and dependent, the marquis of Lerena,* to the depart-

* The appointment of Don Pedro Lerena to the office of minister of finance, was solely owing to the gratitude of Florida Blanca. He was the son of a publican at Valdemoro, and apprenticed to a blacksmith. But having espoused a rich widow of Cuença, he obtained the post of a subordinate magistrate. In that situation, he had the good fortune to receive Florida Blanca into his house, and acquire his esteem. Soon after Florida Blanca was raised to the ministry he did not forget his friend, but successively procured him the appointment of agent to the spanish army, employed in the reduction of Minorca and the siege of Gibraltar; and afterwards, of intendant of Andalusia, and

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ment of finance, had indeed increased his influence in the cabinet; but he had at the same time found a formidable opponent in d'Aranda, who, after being recalled from the embassy of Paris, had fixed his residence at Madrid. Though in a state of seclusion from the court, the ex-minister had employed with effect that influence which hastened the retreat of Grimaldi, and by the aid of his numerous party succeeded in introducing several of his adherents into important posts, among whom were the marquis of Rubi, governor of Madrid, and general O'Reilly, the perpetual advocate for war.

The situation and character of Florida Blanca afforded ample scope for the machinations of his able rival. His measures for extending the freedom of colonial trade, and for favouring the poor and industrious, by diminishing the privileges of the higher classes, excited against him a host of foes, among the interested and the

assistente of Seville, a post of high importance in the financial department. On the death of Musquiz, he procured for him the ministry of finance, and speaks highly of his merit and abilities in that department. Townshend, v. 2, p. 243.

Another instance of his gratitude was shewn to del Campo, by whom he obtained the recommendation of Grimaldi. As the most agreeable and honourable appointment at his disposal, he obtained for del Campo the post of envoy to the court of London, and deferred the nomination of an embassador till his length of service and diplomatic abilities gave him a claim to that honour.

powerful. His humble birth, and want of family honours, proved an inexhaustible source of censure and obloquy. Though himself the first to acknowledge and excuse a constitutional irascibility, and though respected and esteemed by those to whom he was intimately known, for a frankness and sincerity,* which the habits of political life could never obliterate; yet the unguarded freedom of his manner wounded the pride of a high-spirited nobility, while his bluntness of speech, and rigid adherence to right and justice, offended a large portion of those importunate solicitors by whom a minister is incessantly surrounded. He was of too warm and feeling a temper to regard with indifference the machinations employed to obstruct his measures and hasten his fall, and repeatedly observed to the english embassadors, "Though I have not literally a house of lords and commons to satisfy, and a professed opposition to encounter, yet I have a species of parliament, a public and a discontented party to manage, and it is not in my power to do, in every respect, what my inclination may dictate."

The advance of age, the rapid decline of his health, the weight of business, and the per-

* It was the just remark of a person in the habit of treating with him, "He is as incapable of asserting a direct falsehood, as of explicitly promising what he has no mind to perform." Lord Auckland's communications.

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plexities of his situation, rendered him desirous to retire. He renewed an application which, according to his own account,* he had before repeatedly made, for permission to return to private life. But the king, appreciating his merits and zeal, and dreading lest the formation of a regular opposition should give rise to the same troubles as then agitated France, refused to accede to his demand, and laboured to reconcile him to his situation by increasing marks of regard and confidence. "You will not surely," he observed, "abandon me in my declining age; but remain, that I may bequeath you as a legacy to my successor." To gratify the minister, he dissipated the party which was struggling for the helm of state. He dismissed O'Reilly, and removed the marquis of Ruby from his office, and on his refusing to accept the embassy to Berlin, sent him in a species of honourable exile to Pampeluna.

Florida Blanca was not sufficiently elated by this victory, to despise the murmurs of the discontented, or the accusations employed to prejudice the mind of the king against him. He

* When he made this application, after the conclusion of the peace with England, the king not only refused his request, but obliged him to accept the grand cross of his newly-established order. He over-ruled the delicacy of the minister, by observing, "What will be said of me, if I do not attend to thee, after such great services: take it at least for my sake!" Statement, No. 13.

therefore submitted to his sovereign a *Statement of his administration*, which though in some parts highly coloured, and in others triflingly minute, is yet an interesting picture of his plans and embarrassments, and is highly honourable to his character as a man and a minister. This statement was almost the last of his ministerial occupations under the reign of Charles, and concludes with a new and pathetic appeal for relief from the difficulties of his situation. "If I have laboured," he says, "it is not unknown to your majesty; and if my health suffers, you are apprised of it. Deign then, Sire, to attend to my supplications, and permit me to return to an honourable retreat. If your majesty wishes to employ me in any occupation suited to my profession and experience, I may there perform it, with more tranquillity and leisure, and less risk of error. At least, Sire, free me from the continual disquietude of business; from the care of examining the merits of persons for employments, dignities, favours, and honours; from the frequent hazards of mistake in this and other matters; from the peril of ruining my health, and endangering my life, in the embarrassments which surround me. Do it, I adjure your majesty as a king; by the services I have rendered; by the love I bear, and shall bear to the last

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moment of my existence to your royal person; and above all, by the love of God our Lord, who I sincerely pray may preserve your precious life for many and happy years."

This demand only procured new proofs of confidence and favour; and the solemn approbation with which the monarch sanctioned this elaborate statement, proves that the minister possessed to the last moment his regard and esteem.*

Charles the third had attained an advanced age with few bodily infirmities, and still possessed uncommon strength of constitution, at a period which generally marks the decline of human life. But his sound and vigorous health was at length broken by a concurrence of melancholy events. The anxiety which he naturally felt for the humbled situation of his royal relatives in France, was aggravated by domestic losses. Donna Maria, the wife of his son Don
October. Gabriel, died of the small pox, in childbed, and was followed by the infant to whom she had given birth. Her husband, Don Gabriel, caught the fatal disorder, while attending on his beloved
Nov. 23. consort, and fell a victim to his affection, within three weeks after her death.

The loss of a son in the prime of youth, no

* See the Statement, No. 41 and 42.

less distinguished for his talents,* than for his amiable qualities, was a fatal shock to the mind of his father. Charles endeavoured to dissipate his grief, by pursuing, with additional eagerness, his favourite diversion of the chace; but his frame, already weakened by anxiety and sorrow, was no longer proof against excessive fatigue, and the inclemency of the season. In the ensuing month, he was seized with a cold, accompanied with an inflammatory fever, which fell on his lungs, and hurried him to the grave, in the seventy-third year of his age, and the nineteenth of his reign.

After fulfilling the last duties of a christian, he summoned his family to his death-bed. He pathetically exhorted them to continue attached to the religion of their ancestors, and earnestly intreated them to preserve union among themselves. Then addressing the prince of Asturias, he recommended his children and their issue to his protection, besought him to consult the welfare of those who were about to become his subjects, and concluded his dying advice, with a charge to retain Florida Blanca in his service, as an upright, faithful, and able counsellor, to whom the kingdom owed the most beneficial improvements.

* He is known as the author of the translation of Sallust, which was superbly edited at the royal press at Madrid.

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The character of Charles the third has been as incorrectly represented by travellers, as his person by painters and engravers. By no means deficient in abilities, his talents, if properly cultivated, would have done honour to his exalted station. His memory was quick and tenacious; he conversed with ease, good sense, and acuteness, and spoke the italian, french, and spanish languages with fluency. While on the throne of Naples, he displayed an intimate acquaintance with the government and interests of that kingdom; and if he acquired not equal proficiency with regard to those of Spain, it was not owing to a want of talents, or laudable curiosity.

Unlike his father and his brother Ferdinand, who were both strongly affected by trifles, Charles possessed a manly firmness of temper: he was unruffled under the severest trials, and neither elated by success, nor depressed by misfortune. He was impenetrably secret, and so perfectly master of his feelings and countenance, that neither his looks or language ever betrayed the slightest indication of his purposes. Hence, the family compact was divulged at Paris before it was known at Madrid; and the jesuits were already on their way from Spain, even before the design was suspected, by the members of an order, whose jealous curiosity had repeatedly

frustrated the caution of individuals and the mystery of cabinets.

He was irreproachable in his morals and conduct, and in the course of a long widowhood, never gave the slightest encouragement to licentiousness by his own example. Severe to himself, he was equally severe to others. He shewed no indulgence for the foibles of youth, and rigidly exacted from his children the same continence which he observed himself.

He was scrupulously devoted to his religion, but never governed by his confessor, nor subservient to the see of Rome. On the contrary, he spurned at the slightest encroachment on the civil authority; and far surpassed his two predecessors in his exertions to reform the morals, and restrain the power of the clergy.

Though rigid in exacting the most prompt and implicit obedience to his will, and though he retained his ministers, his household, and his subjects in the greatest awe, he yet tempered his authority with equal benevolence and condescension. Respected and feared as a sovereign, he was beloved as a man, and those who attended on his infancy, grew grey or died in his service.

His defects were few, but strongly marked: among them we cannot pass over his love of the chace, or rather of shooting, which degenerated

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into a ruling passion.* It appeared to absorb every feeling, and to supersede all other pursuits; it was the whimsical though not unapt remark of a traveller, that as the roman emperor considered the day lost which was not distinguished by an act of benevolence, so might Charles the third, the day of which part was not devoted to his favourite amusement. So high was the importance which he attached to his exploits as a sportsman, that he kept in a diary, a regular account of the victims to his skill. A short time before his death, he boasted to a foreign embassador, that he had killed with his own hand 539 wolves, and 5,323 foxes; adding with a smile, "you see my diversion is not useless to my country." Another defect was a pertinacious adherence to his own opinions and resolutions. In no instance was this quality more strikingly displayed, than in his conduct towards his ministers. When they had once acquired his confidence, or were become familiar from habit, he trusted them implicitly, and firmly supported them, not merely against popular clamour, but even against well-founded accusations of incapacity or misconduct. Like most men of

* I was informed by the late king of Poland, that Louis the fourteenth strictly enjoined his descendants to use the violent exercise of the chace, in order to conquer the hypochondriac disposition which was hereditary in his family.

this character, he prided himself on his pertinacity, and in addition to the anecdote relative to d'Aranda, we may add another of a similar kind.* When Muniain, minister of war, in consequence of some petty pique, repeatedly absented himself from the palace, under pretence of indisposition, Charles observed, "Don Gregorio Muniain must greatly rely on my known aversion to change, otherwise he would never have ventured to provoke me by these proofs of disrespect."

In the conduct of his government, Charles evinced unceasing anxiety to correct the national indolence of the spaniards. He encouraged trade and agriculture, favoured the fine arts, for which he had acquired a taste in Italy, and is honourably distinguished as a patron and promoter of liberal knowledge. His reign gave birth to more literary and scientific institutions, and produced more cultivators of literature and science, than those of any of his predecessors. Under him the spaniards also proved that the spirit of enterprise was not extinct, which three centuries before had impelled them to traverse unknown seas, and penetrate into new worlds. Before the memorable voyages of the british navigators, they undertook various expeditions to explore the shores and islands washed by the

* See Chapter 67.

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pacific ocean, particularly the northern, western, southern, and south-eastern coasts of the american continent. If the names of Gonzales, de Monte, Ayala, and Maurelle, have not attained similar celebrity to those of Anson, Cook, and Vancouver, Bougainville and La Peyrouse, it was not owing to their deficiency of merit, but to the jealous policy of their government, in every transaction the most distantly connected with the american possessions.*

As a member of the House of Bourbon, Charles the third shewed a strong and natural bias towards France; but as a spaniard and sovereign of a powerful monarchy, he was anxious at least to appear independent, and frequently expressed his apprehension lest his cabinet, like that of his father Philip, should become subservient to french counsels. He entered, however, too little into the detail of business, and was too much wedded to his prejudices, to counteract the perpetual intrigues and persevering policy of France. Hence, if we except the few last years of his reign, the principal operations

* Burgoing, v. 2, p. 96. Vancouver does ample justice to the liberal communications and enterprising spirit of the spanish navigators, who were his precursors. They had already connected their discoveries with those of the russians in the North Pacific ocean, and had ascertained the Mount St. Elias, off Beering, the most singular feature of nature in these distant regions. See Vancouver's Voyage, and my Russian Discoveries.

of his government were directed by foreign views, and foreign maxims, rather than by the real interests of that monarchy of which he was the head.

Charles was of the middle size, and though narrow shouldered, was of a strong and athletic frame. His complexion, originally fair, was bronzed by the effects of his daily exercise; and the part of his face exposed to the weather, formed a striking contrast with that which retained its natural hue. His features were strongly marked by a prominent nose and projecting eyebrows, and became harsher in proportion as they were affected by the advance of age. But his eye was distinguished by an expression of peculiar benignity; and his smile and address were so captivating, that he was universally described with the epithet of the *good* old king.

One of our early travellers has given a characteristic description of the dress adopted by the royal sportsman. "His dress seldom varies from a large hat, grey segovia frock, a buff waistcoat, a small dagger, black breeches, and worsted stockings; his pockets are always stuffed with knives, gloves, and shooting tackle. On gala days, a fine suit is hung upon his shoulders; but as he has an eye to his afternoon sport, and is a great œconomist of his time, the black breeches are worn to all coats. I believe there are but

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three days in the whole year that he spends without going out a shooting; and those are noted with the blackest mark in the calendar.* Were they to occur often, his health would be in danger; and an accident that was to confine him to the house, would infallibly bring on a fit of illness. No storm, heat, or cold, can keep him at home; and when he hears of a wolf, distance is counted for nothing; he would drive over half the kingdom rather than miss an opportunity of firing upon that favourite game. Besides a numerous retinue of persons belonging to the hunting establishment, several times a year all the idle fellows in and about Madrid are hired to beat the country, and drive the wild boars, deer, and hares, into a ring, where they pass before the royal family."†

Charles executed a testament with the usual formalities, on the 13th of December, 1788.

After declaring his religious belief, and intreating the intercession of the Holy Virgin and the saints, he ordered his body to be deposited by the side of his deceased wife, but expressly forbade it to be embalmed. He then recapitulated his legitimate issue, and assigned the guardian-

* Townshend observes, that the only time when his placid temper appeared to be ruffled, was during the two days of passion week, in which he was detained from his usual diversion.

† Swinburne's Travels in Spain.

ship of his grandson Don Pedro, son of the deceased infant Don Gabriel, to the prince of Asturias.

Proceeding to the disposition of his rights, dignities, and property, he adverted to his renunciation of the crowns of Naples and Sicily, and the cession of various rights belonging to the Farnese inheritance, which he declared a full compensation for the paternal and maternal claims of his son Don Ferdinand. A similar declaration was made relative to his daughter the grand duchess of Tuscany, in virtue of the payment of her dower.

His acquisitions of landed property and improvements were enumerated and incorporated with the possessions of the crown. He declared Don Carlos, prince of Asturias, his successor in Spain and the Indies, recommending to his protection the catholic religion, his family and subjects, and particularly the poor.

The performance of masses for himself and his deceased wife was then ordered; various bequests to the poor, and to charitable institutions, were recapitulated; also legacies to his domestics, particularly his favourite valet Pini. They were recommended to the protection of the successor for their zeal, affection, and fidelity.

Afterwards he directed the distribution of part

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of his jewels and other property among his descendants, and confirmed his arrangements for forming an establishment in favour of the second sons of the prince of Asturias, by the appropriation of commanderies in virtue of a papal brief; he concluded by nominating as his executors, the infant Don Antonio, patriarch of the Indies, his nephew the archbishop of Toledo, the bishop of Jaen, inquisitor general, the mayor domo and caballerizo mayor, the sumiller, the confessor father Louis de Consuegra, the dean of the council of Castile, *ad interim*, and the presidents of the Indies and finance. The testament was drawn up by Florida Blanca, and attested by eight of the principal persons at court.*

Charles was only once married, to Amelia, a princess of Saxony, to whose memory he was so invariably attached, that he declined the repeated and pressing offers of the most beautiful and accomplished princesses in Europe. By her he had thirteen children:

Philip Pascal, born in 1747, excluded from the succession for incapacity, died in 1777.

Charles, prince of Asturias, his successor, born in 1748; whose troubled and unfortunate reign was terminated by a forced abdication and imprisonment in France. His son, Ferdinand

* Testament of Charles the third, MS.

the seventh, though perfidiously imprisoned by the french usurper, has, by the late glorious revolution, now resumed the throne.

Ferdinand, king of the two Sicilies, born in 1751.

Gabriel, born in 1752, espoused a princess of Portugal, and died a few days before his father. He left an only son, Don Pedro, now in Brazil, who espoused Mary Anne, infanta of Portugal, by whom he has a son.

Pedro, Antonio, and Francis Saverio, died before their father.

Maria Josepha, born in 1744, who never married.

Maria Louisa, born in 1745, became wife of Leopold, great duke of Tuscany, afterwards emperor, and died in 1792.*

The four remaining children not specified, died in their infancy.

* The contents of this chapter are principally derived from the valuable and interesting MS. collections of lord Auckland; with several hints relative to the character of Charles, from lord Malmesbury's communications. We have likewise consulted Beccatini and Townshend, as well as other modern travellers.

# APPENDIX.

# APPENDIX.

APPENDIX, N° 1.

## ADMINISTRATION

OF

## FLORIDA BLANCA.

THIS STATEMENT of, or APOLOGY for, his Administration, written by FLORIDA BLANCA himself, though too long to be introduced into the Memoirs, is yet too interesting to be omitted. It is therefore here inserted as an Appendix.

HEADS.



1. *Termination of the disputes with Portugal, relative to the limits of the South American colonies—Advantages of the reconciliation.*
2. *Negotiations with the Porte, and the states of Barbary.*
3. *Negotiations with the princes of India.*
4. *Intercourse with Prussia and Russia, and formation of the armed neutrality.*
5. *Rupture with England.*
6. *Warlike operations in Europe and America.*
7. *Blockade of Gibraltar.*
8. *Capture of Minorca.*
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APPENDIX. N° I.

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*Statement of Count* FLORIDA BLANCA'S *Administration; addressed to Charles the third. Translated from the original, in the Spanish tongue.*

SIRE,

THE 19th Feb. 1777, I had the honour to lay myself at the feet of your majesty, to serve in the ministry of state, to which you condescended to raise me.

Termination of the disputes with Portugal, relative to the limits of the South American colonies—Advantages of the reconciliation.

The expedition had just sailed from Cadiz, which was destined for the Rio de la Plata, to obtain satisfaction for the insults of the Portuguese in the Rio Grande de St. Pedro, and to prevent further aggressions. At the same time, negotiations were carrying on at Paris to adjust these differences, by the mediation of France and England.

The death of the king, Don Joseph of Portugal, affording an opportunity for a pacific negotiation, the portuguese embassador, Don Ignacio de Sousa, proposed to treat with me for the accommodation of our disputes. I immediately answered that I was ready to accede, provided we might negotiate without the intervention of mediators; and received a satisfactory answer.

My view was to exclude from the negotiation two powerful courts, France and England, which, however friendly, yet, having no jealousy of Portugal, might be inclined to promote an accommodation at the expence of Spain. It was also my object that Portugal should have cause to be grateful to your majesty, for whatever condescension she might experience; whereas,

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under the mediation of France and England, gratitude would be due to those powers, to whose authority would be attributed the sacrifices extorted from Spain. On these principles, which your majesty condescended to approve, the negotiation was set on foot, and the treaty of limits, which was concluded the 1st Oct. 1777, prepared the way for the union now happily subsisting between both courts, and the execution of other treaties, from which we have drawn great advantages, particularly in the last war.

By that treaty your majesty obtained the colony of Sacramento, and the exclusion of all nations from the Rio de la Plata. Three times had Spain destroyed and conquered that colony. Once at the end of the last century, when it was just formed; a second time in the war of the succession at the beginning of this century; and a third in the war of 1762, terminated by the unfortunate treaty of Paris. On these three occasions, France and England interfered to conclude the treaties; and in all three Spain was forced to restore the colony.

It was reserved to your majesty to accomplish this object alone. It was one of the most fortunate incidents of my ministry, to be the instrument and witness of this acquisition; to obtain the destruction of a shelter for foreign contraband in the center of the Rio de la Plata; and to wrest from our enemies the means of disturbing the tranquillity of our provinces, by exciting insurrections, and appropriating the riches of our South America. For these reasons, the colony of Sacramento was deemed of such consequence in the preceding reign, that, to acquire it, a cession was made, by the treaty of 1750

with Portugal, of the whole territory of the Ibicui, comprising more than five hundred leagues in Paraguay. This treaty your majesty was obliged to annul, from the opposition and intrigues of the jesuits, and the unwillingness of the portuguese to yield the colony.

By the last treaty of 1777, and the definitive treaty, which followed, your majesty succeeded in acquiring the colony, in keeping the Ibicui and the ceded places of Paraguay, in extending the limits of your dominions as far as the Lake Mairin, from the Sitio of Castillos Grandes, to which they had been reduced by the treaty of 1750, and in acquiring, on the side of the Maranon and Rio Negro, all the necessary territories for securing the property of this crown.

Those who are unacquainted with the true interests of the monarchy, and who are only anxious for acquisitions, whether useful or injurious, censured these great and unhoped-for advantages, because we did not retain the town of Rio Grande, with its Rio, or Laguna de los Patos, and because we restored the conquered isle of St. Catherine. Such were the objections which they made to this glorious treaty, without adverting that the town of Rio Grande could not be justly retained, contrary to the restitution stipulated by the treaty of Paris; and that the general, Don Pedro Cevallos himself, who conquered it, had sufficiently proved it to be unsuitable for us. That the isle of St. Catherine, without the adjacent continent of Brazil, would be a load of expence and care, without profit, exposed to irruptions, and liable to be lost in the first war. That the advantages of the whale fishery there carried on might be surpassed on

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our own coasts of Buenos Ayres, and of all the Southern Sea, to the strait of Magellanes, where there are greater conveniencies, of which we neglect to avail ourselves. Finally, that to extend our limits in Brazil, as some desire, according to the famous demarcation of Alexander the sixth, was an impracticable project, and contrary to subsequent agreements. And even to dissolve them, it would have been necessary to surrender to the portuguese the Philippine isles, which they were entitled to claim by that demarcation.

The utility of these treaties was not limited by such advantages. Your majesty obtained the cession of the isles of Annobon and Fernando Po, with the power of carrying on the commerce of negroes on the neighbouring coast of Africa. Whoever is acquainted with the necessity we are under of obtaining negroes for our vast colonies of both Americas, the immense sums we have paid on that account to the portuguese, french, and english, and those which we now pay to the last, may judge of the advantages which may be drawn from this acquisition. The good or bad use which hitherto has been made of them, does not concern me, who have not been charged with the execution of the treaty.

Besides what has been mentioned, we obtained from the court of Portugal the offer to guaranty and secure Peru, and other provinces of South America, not only against foreign enemies, but against internal commotions. It would seem as if we foresaw the impending war with the english, which broke out in 1779, since in that war, when the court of London desired to form an expedition against the provinces of Peru and Rio

de la Plata, the portuguese ministry, unwilling to be implicated by the engagements of the guaranty, interposed their good offices, and prevented the mischief.

If we consider the fatal effects produced by an english expedition in those provinces, at the time when many of them were in insurrection, under the famous rebel Tupac Amar, and his partisans, we must allow that the hand of God, for the especial protection of your majesty and this monarchy, formed the articles of the treaty with the court of Lisbon, to preserve us from the loss of those vast dominions.

The good correspondence and friendship established by means of the treaties with Portugal, furnished many advantages in the war with England. It was the first in which our enemies did not abuse the power of frequenting the ports and coasts of Portugal, to our detriment, and in which we used them for many important objects. The portuguese flag, besides, served to bring us much treasure from America, without risk, particularly a sum exceeding three millions of dollars, which was left by the Buen Consejo, in the island of Fayal, and conveyed from thence by a portuguese ship of the line, sent out for the purpose, with extraordinary dexterity, to avoid the risk of privateers.

Your majesty was desirous of granting rewards for this treaty, and condescended to offer me the grand cross of the order of Charles III. I solicited your majesty to excuse me from accepting this honour, and succeeded. After kissing your royal hand for the favour, and for admitting my excuses, you had the goodness to order me to convey to the prince this news, in consequence

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of your having communicated your intention to his highness. This happened in 1777, at the time that I had obtained for my colleagues various favours, namely, for the count of Ricla, that of captain-general; for Don Joseph Galvez, the honours of the council of state; and for the marquis of Castejon, the grand cross. All had laboured, and all deserved and desired some gratification.

Negotiations with the Porte, and the states of Barbary.

2. THE same utility which we drew from the treaties with Portugal, God was pleased to give your majesty in those with the emperor of Morocco. The siege of Melilla, and its consequences, had left without effect the treaty made by Don George Juan. As soon as I entered the ministry, I laid before your majesty the necessity of gaining the african monarch, to avoid the evils of his enmity, on the appearance of the storm which threatened Europe, from the war between the english and americans, and to obviate the jealousies occasioned by the interference of France and other nations.

In fact, we succeeded in inducing the emperor of Morocco to send to your majesty the embassador, Ben Ottoman, as if for satisfaction, or a public demonstration of a reconciliation. By this means, the treaty of peace with him was renewed and confirmed, and those advantages obtained, which were strikingly evident during the last war with England. The assistance afforded by the moorish prince would appear incredible, had it not been seen. He opened his ports to the ships employed in the blockade of Gibraltar, permitted them to pursue and detain those of the enemy, facilitated the transport of

provisions and assistance to our camp, and, finally, deposited in our power part of his treasures, as a pledge of his sincerity. By his friendship, we were enabled to leave our african posts with weak garrisons, to draw from Ceuta a great portion of artillery and ammunition, and to remain without disquietude during the war. Your majesty comprehends better than any one, how numerous would have been our embarrassments, if, from our omitting to form this connection in due time, the english had instigated the emperor to undertake the siege of Ceuta or Melilla, to disturb, by his cruizers in the straits, the measures taken for the blockade of Gibraltar, or to obstruct the passage of provisions to our camp.

Negotiations with the princes of India.

3. AS the utility of our peace with the Morocco sovereign was appreciated, so it was considered equally important to secure, in the East Indies, the friendship of Hyder Alli Kan, whose power and warlike principles might disturb the english, and in case of a war, divert them from their meditated design of seizing Manilla, and the best part of our Philippine isles, as they had already begun to do in the last war. I found among the papers in the office of secretary of state, the friendly negotiation proposed by the emissary, Gale Mitz, who came to Spain for this purpose. I continued it, maintaining the correspondence with the asiatic prince, to render him firm in the hopes of our gratitude, and to conciliate his friendship. In fact, his exertions were evident during the last war, against the english possessions; and he apparently

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prevented the invasion and loss of the Philippines.

Intercourse with Prussia and Russia, and formation of the armed neutrality.

4. AS the war which threatened us might extend itself to the continent, if England should obtain allies there, which fortunately she did not attempt, I represented to your majesty the advantages which might be derived from the friendship of the great Frederick, king of Prussia, and recommended the re-establishment of reciprocal embassies in the two courts, which, contrary to sound policy, had never yet been adopted.

That glorious monarch acceded to this offer, in as becoming a manner as if he himself had made it. Means were also found to soothe the disquietudes which these steps gave to the court of Vienna, and your majesty acquired and preserved the friendship of the prussian monarch till his death. You maintained equal confidence with his successor, in spite of the disgust which arose from the troubles of Holland, and the great change in the system of union between the courts of Berlin and Versailles.

To strip our enemies of every maritime ally who might incommode us in case of a rupture, by order of your majesty, I cultivated a good correspondence with Russia, with whom there was a coldness and want of confidence, derived from disputes relative to the imperial title, and the ceremonies and pretensions of the russian court. France entered into these designs; and we not only succeeded in separating Russia from England, but she even sent us expressly two frigates, charged with naval stores, at the very time when the war prevented the transport of them for the equipment of our navy.

We succeeded also in inducing the empress to place herself at the head of almost all the neutral nations, in order to maintain the respect due to their flag, which has been called, the armed neutrality. Thus was England deprived of all the advantages which might have been drawn from any of the maritime powers, nay, even of Holland, her antient friend. Permit me, Sire, to relate here the management adopted to strike this blow, which, though attributed to Russia, took its rise in the political cabinet of your majesty, and in the maxims you sagaciously followed.

The rule acknowledged in the treaties of almost all nations, that the neutral friendly flag should secure from confiscation goods or merchandize belonging to enemies, had never been observed by the english marine, which was buoyed up by the haughty principles of its pretended sovereignty over the seas, or relied on the particular laws of its admiralty. When your majesty established and published the new ordinance of cruizing, for the last war, it was settled that ships, under a neutral flag, or of friendly powers conveying the effects of enemies, should be conducted to our ports, to execute against them and their cargoes the same law, which was executed by the english against those who conveyed effects belonging to spaniards, or their allies. By this measure, we hoped to obtain one of two things; either to restrain the conduct of the english towards the neutral flag, or to compensate, by way of reprisal, for the loss which we incurred, by the greater loss which would ensue to the british commerce.

From the execution of this article of the ordi-

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nance, and from the facility which the blockade of Gibraltar afforded, to detain the ships carrying english goods, of the many which pass into the Mediterranean, an universal clamour arose on the part of the neutral maritime powers. I was attacked by the ministers of Sweden, Denmark, Holland, Russia, Prussia, Venice, Genoa, and others, to put a stop to the detriment which their commerce suffered, from the detention of such a number of vessels. To these clamours and representations I constantly answered, that if the neutral maritime powers would defend their flag against the english, when they desired to seize under it spanish effects, then we would respect the same flag, although conveying english merchandize, because a neutral state should not submit, nor would we consent, to the abuse of the british power. But when they permitted the english marine to detain and confiscate spanish effects under their neutral or friendly flag, they ought not to expect that Spain would omit to do the same.

The matter being thus prepared to throw the odium, as was just, on the conduct of England, and to dispose the minds of the neutral powers for the defence of their flag, Russia came forward with a scheme, of which we opportunely availed ourselves. The chancellor of Russia insinuated to us, how much it would conduce to the tranquillity and good correspondence of the trading powers, if a general maritime code could be formed, comprising the most important points, to avoid doubts and controversies. To induce other nations to adopt it, he stated, that the empress of Russia would employ, with much pleasure, her offices and authority.

Perceiving instantly the desire of Russia to acquire the glory of giving maritime laws to trading Europe, I answered that the formation of such a code would meet many obstructions; but there was less difficulty in persuading the neutral maritime powers to defend their flag against the belligerents, who might wish to insult it, by establishing rules founded on treaties. To this I added, that Russia beginning to move the neutral powers, who were desirous to maintain the immunity of their flag, from which flowed the prosperity of commerce during war, a species of maritime code would insensibly be formed, and the empress, placing herself in the front of this alliance, or beginning of a neutrality, would acquire the honour of being protectress of the rights of maritime nations. The deceased king of Prussia, who desired to restrain the abuses of the english admiralty, supported this scheme; and it was consequently well received by the russian ministry. I assured them also, that Spain and France would conform to these principles, even if England should reject them. In fact, the tzarina thus began the project of an armed neutrality, which has been so celebrated, and which took its first rise, as I have already said, in the cabinet of your majesty.

Rupture with England.

*5.* ALL these facts contribute to explain what occurred in the last war with England. The origin of this war is known to your majesty, and to all, which was the insurrection of the american colonies. England, resenting the assistance given by France to the insurgents, and, finally, aggrieved by the treaty of alliance which she concluded with them, commenced hostilities in 1778.

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Your majesty likewise knows all the exertions and representations which I employed by your order to prevent that rupture; and after it had happened, those which I repeated to obtain a reconciliation, and to re-establish the peace under your mediation, which was accepted by both powers. The time spent in this negotiation enabled your majesty to mature your preparations and armaments, and to operate with advantage, in case your pacific desires did not take effect, and it should be necessary, as it proved, to proceed to a declaration of war.

France confiding in the family compact, had urged your majesty to declare yourself, and to act as an ally from the very moment of her rupture with England. Your majesty firmly maintained, that the existing case was not comprised in the compact, and that France had departed from its spirit, in concluding the eventual alliance with the united states, without your consent. To this was added the conduct of the french ministry, in the hasty step of notifying the treaty to England itself, without any previous communication to your majesty, and without entering into a concert for operations, which might lead us to a war. This resistance, and your firm and honourable resolution not to acknowledge the independence of the united states, in spite of the strongest solicitations, until the mother country herself had recognised their independence, allayed, in a great measure, the jealousies of England, and her suspicions that we were in a secret understanding with France. She accordingly yielded, or affected to yield, to the mediation of your majesty, for the purpose of adjusting the pending disputes.

It is not now to the purpose to commemorate the plans of pacification which I formed by order of your majesty, and the final proposal which preceded the rupture. If the english had paid attention to these proposals, and to the advantages they would have procured, compared with the loss and dishonour which resulted from the peace of 1783, they would doubtless have severely blamed the ministers who contemned those plans, and added Spain to the number of their enemies. It is proper to observe, that, during more than a year, which these negotiations lasted, your majesty placed your marine, as well in Europe as in America, in a state which Spain had never before witnessed, to attack your enemies in case of a rupture.

Warlike operations in Europe and America.

6. ACCORDINGLY, when it was discovered that England not only despised the plans of pacification proposed by your majesty, but that, during the negotiation, she had given orders, by means of the East India company, to invade the Philippine isles, and had arranged a design to penetrate, by the Rio St. Juan, to the great Lake of Nicaragua, and to ruin our establishments there, your majesty was enabled to commence hostilities with acknowledged superiority. You effected in proper time the junction of 36 sail of the line with the french squadron of 30, for an invasion of England, and you commenced the blockade of Gibraltar. Your forces also attacked Pensacola and Mobile, Fort Maleches and Baton Rouge, to re-establish the spanish dominion in Florida; and made an irruption along the whole coast of Campeachy, bay of Honduras, and the Mosquito shore, to expel the english

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from the extensive establishments which they had formed on that vast continent. All these enterprises I had the honour to propose to your majesty, as well as the occupation of Minorca, and almost all succeeded. And if the siege of Gibraltar, and the invasion of England were not equally fortunate, the failure arose from causes which your majesty will permit me to recall to memory, suppressing that part which can only serve to renew regrets now without remedy.

The union of the combined spanish and french squadrons ought to have been effected in the beginning of June, and till the end of that month, the wind did not permit our squadron to quit Cadiz. Consequently, the junction could not take place till the end of July, off Cape Finisterre, where the french ships had long waited. The operations in the english channel were necessarily not commenced till August, in consequence of which, little time was left for the purpose, by the approaching season of autumn. Our squadron could easily, indeed, have been at sea in April, and this was my opinion, because, if the rupture took place, we were in a condition to act without delay. For this, we had the just plea of protecting our trading fleet, which was expected from America. But the apprehension lest its departure should excite the suspicions of England, and hasten the war, weighed with the pious mind of your majesty, who was desirous to avoid hostilities at any price. Hence, the contrary opinion prevailed, to suspend the sailing of our fleet.

At length, when the combined squadrons entered the channel in the beginning of August, the cabinet of France formed the resolution of

attacking the english squadron, or blockading it in its ports, before they embarked the troops for the descent, which were prepared on three different points of the coast. Your majesty endeavoured to combat this design, demonstrating, in my opinion, that every thing would fail if it was followed. The combined squadrons amounted to 75 effective ships of the line, to which the english, not exceeding 30, never did, nor ever could present itself. It was not to be believed that we could succeed in attacking the english forces in the channel, where they have so many ports and resources. As little was it possible to form a permanent blockade in those narrow seas, where the winds are continual and irresistible; and still more in the proximity of autumn. In fact, the only time the english squadron was discovered, it fled with all speed; the sole loss was the Ardent, which was taken by the celerity and enterprise of two frigates.

Our proposal was, that the combined squadrons should take under their convoy the troops for the descent, which, in a few hours, might have penetrated into England, at the point of attack previously concerted; while the english squadron could not prevent it, or at least must have attacked the combined fleets with a great inferiority of force, which would have exposed it to a general defeat, and obliged it to abandon its own ports and coasts. It was the will of God, that this scheme should not be adopted, that the autumn should approach with its storms, that the combined squadrons should be obliged to retire to Brest, and that an epidemic distemper should break out among the crews, by the effects of which, the sick of the french amounted to above

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12,000, and those of ours to 3,000. The superior cleanliness and care of the spanish ships, although greater in number than the french, confined the progress of the disorder within the limits which I have mentioned. In consequence of this calamity, it was necessary to disarm the french ships, in order to cure the crews, to purify the hulks, and arrest the disorder. Hence, we were obliged to renounce, for that winter, all projects of invading England.

Blockade of Gibraltar.

7. HOWEVER, as the blockade of Gibraltar still continued, and as the sufferings of the garrison augmented daily, it was necessary to prevent the succours which England was about to send, accompanied with a force sufficient to attack the blockading squadron. For this object, your majesty settled, that there should be two stations in which the english squadron, bringing succours, should be attacked, with the view, that if it was not routed at the first, it might still be exposed to a second encounter at the other.

The first point was Brest, whither the count d'Aranda himself went from Paris, with the intention of hastening the equipment. It was arranged, that France should have at least 20 ships, which, united with 20 spanish, left at Brest under the command of Don Miguel Gaston, would make 40 of the line. This number exceeded, by more than a third, that which the english could dispatch with reinforcements. From Brest, as a port situated at the entrance of the channel, and so near to the coasts of England, it was easy to watch the departure of the english squadron, and anticipate it by an attack in seas so narrow, that it could not avoid a com-

bat, or prevent the combined squadrons from intercepting the convoy. Although the result of the combat might not be more than reciprocal damage, your majesty foresaw the difficulties which the english would encounter in so long a voyage as that to Gibraltar, in the midst of winter, to convey without damage the convoy of succours, and in that state, to resist a second attack, which was prepared for it on the second station, at the entrance of the strait between Capes Spartel and Trafalgar.

For this second point, your majesty settled, that Don Louis de Cordova should return to Cadiz with 16 ships, though in reality there were but 15, because the San Joseph was lost in quitting Brest. These 15, united with 11, employed in the blockade of Gibraltar, under the command of Don Juan de Langara, would have composed the number of 26, and by the addition of another from Ferrol, it would have been 27. These ships might have fought with advantage against the 21 or 22 forming the squadron under Rodney, and still more after a long navigation, and after a battle, as was expected, at the chops of the channel. Notwithstanding these precautions, which seemed likely to take effect, the business failed entirely, because the wisest resolutions are futile, if not scrupulously executed. This is the principal advantage which can now be drawn from the recollection of these circumstances, namely, the firm purpose of enforcing the execution of what is ordered after profound meditation. Let us proceed to examine the causes of our ill success.

Don Louis de Cordova left in the ports of Galicia, for repair, four of his fifteen ships,

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which could not continue their voyage, without great inconvenience: this was well done. He proceeded with 11 ships to the bay of Cadiz; but being informed that a storm had forced Don Juan de Langara into the Mediterranean, he stopped at the entrance of the strait, to wait for him. Previous orders had been given to Cordova to enter Cadiz, to refit with promptitude, and, in the mean time, to pass over to the bay of Gibraltar, in order to regulate the operations of the blockade. He would thus have prevented the want of concert, and the prejudice which must naturally ensue. But Cordova having himself taken the resolution which I have already mentioned, to remain at the mouth of the straits, in order to supply the absence of Langara, his conduct was approved through the medium of the secretaryship of the marine, with whose determination I was unacquainted till after the courier had been dispatched to communicate it to that admiral.

Cordova having remained at the mouth of the straits, in the months of November and December, his squadron suffered so severely from another gale, that he was in danger of being lost in the Trinidad, on the coast of Africa. His whole squadron being too shattered to continue the cruize, was obliged to enter Cadiz and refit. Meanwhile, Langara having repaired his damages at Carthagena, returned out of the Mediterranean, but did not meet Cordova in the straits, nor were the ships of Cordova in a condition to put to sea to join him, in consequence of the great damage which they had recently suffered. The four ships which Cordova had left in his passage by Galicia, and others, being in a situa-

tion to put to sea, Don Ignacio Ponce was ordered to proceed with them immediately, and join those of Cordova and Langara. Ponce falling sick at this juncture, orders were given that another should assume the command. He himself, however, was anxious to fulfil these orders, as he believed that he should speedily recover his health. But, although this occasioned no longer delay than 15 days, yet when he sailed, he encountered off cape Finisterre another storm, which obliged him to take refuge with his shattered ships in the ports of Galicia.

At the same time that we encountered these misfortunes in the spanish seas, great activity was employed at Brest, to repair and equip the 20 french ships which were to join with the 20 spanish. Such, however, was the tardiness, and so faint the hopes of the commanders to sail and attack the english, that our embassador at Paris requested permission for admiral Gaston and other officers to repair to court. Your majesty refused, and we renewed our instances for the equipment of the combined squadrons, and for their speedy preparation to be ready to meet the english when they quitted their ports. In fact, the english squadron sailed with the transports for relief, under the command of admiral Rodney, at the end of December, 1779, and the combined fleets were not in a state to put to sea till Langara was beaten and a prisoner, in January, 1780.

The spanish squadron, under the command of Gaston, arrived at Cadiz, after the defeat of Langara, with four french ships, which had refitted at Brest. But they encountered so many storms, and were in so shattered a condi-

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tion, as well as the squadron of Cordova, which might have joined them, that the admirals could not venture to attack Rodney, though he still remained at Gibraltar, after he had introduced the relief, repairing his damages, and though the number of our ships exceeded by one third that of the english.

It is not my wish to accuse any one in the relation of these facts, but to defend myself from the censures with which I was then persecuted, as if I had been the author of the misfortune. I have confined myself to the recapitulation of the first and principal arrangements in which my opinion had any weight, and of what was left unaccomplished either without my intervention or by accident. For the same reason, I have omitted many circumstances, not leading to the object of this statement, which is only intended to lay in one point of view the acts of my ministerial conduct, before your majesty, who has been a witness of them, that you may qualify or correct them, and that the causes of failure or misfortune in our past enterprises, being recalled to mind, may themselves serve as a lesson for the future.

After the defeat of Langara, we deliberated on dispatching powerful forces, both military and naval, to our islands, and particularly to the Havannah and Porto Rico, where we feared an invasion, because Rodney was to proceed to the West Indian seas. In fact, this expedition was formed under the command of the marquis del Socorro, Don Joseph Solano, with 12 ships and 12,000 men, to unite with the french forces at Martinico. This was accomplished with great sagacity; and I ought to do justice to the zeal

of the count of Ricla, and the marquis of Castejon,* who, with extraordinary celerity, completed this expedition, without neglecting domestic objects. Although we did not undertake the offensive operations that had been planned against the enemy's establishments, we at least succeeded in protecting and covering our own against all invasion.

With the rest of the ships remaining at Cadiz, and the french force which continued there, and was immediately augmented, and after the spring months had been spent in equipment, it became proper to think of some useful enterprise. The french proposed to return to Brest, to blockade the enemy in the channel, and harass their marine and commerce. Your majesty, however, warned by their inaction, and the misfortunes of the preceding season, was not only unwilling to consent, but gave orders to Cordova not to quit our own seas, notwithstanding any prospect of advantage, or any instances from the french commanders. In fact, the squadron departed from Cadiz, and returned in June, after a cruize of a few days. I then represented to the ministry of the marine, the ill consequences of this inaction, the discredit which it would draw on us, and the advantages which we might lose by shutting up our forces in the port of Cadiz. The squadron was therefore ordered to return, though enjoined to cruize only between the capes of St. Vincent and St. Mary. My zeal on this occasion involved me in some unpleasant circumstances, which I concealed, that your majesty might not be disgusted.

God was pleased to favour my good wishes,

* Ministers of war and marine.

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for, in consequence of the illness of the minister of marine, I dispatched the urgent affairs of that department. One morning, intelligence came to me from England, that two convoys were on the point of quitting its ports: one for Jamaica, with troops, clothing, and ammunition, to attempt something against our islands; and another of trading ships, richly laden for the East Indies. According to my intelligence, these convoys were to proceed together to the Azores, without any other escort than a single ship and two frigates, and in that latitude they were to divide, each taking its proper course. The english were acquainted with our determination not to leave our own coasts, because they were apprised of every thing which was ordered and done at Cadiz. This information being received a little before mid-day, I proceeded without a moment's delay to the apartment of your majesty, and represented the blow which might be struck by our squadrons, if, instead of cruizing between the capes, they should stretch out to the Azores, and wait for the english convoys. In spite of your reluctance to permit their departure from our coast, you saw the important consequences of my proposal; you accordingly gave your orders through me to Cordova, accompanied with various precautions, to prevent the abuse of your permission.

The same moment, two couriers were dispatched to Lisbon and Cadiz, that from both places light vessels might reach Cordova, or some of his ships, and communicate the instructions. The bark from Cadiz, having fallen in with the fleet, Cordova passed over to the Azores, waited for, and captured the two convoys, with

such good fortune, that of 55 transports, not a single one escaped; and the three vessels of war taking to flight, saved themselves only by their distance and celerity. This glorious and most fortunate exploit was considered as a species of miracle, because, although all was, and is, owing to the providence of God; yet he was pleased that these combinations should concur for the execution of his designs; namely, that I should receive the intelligence, that I should have the diligence to profit by it, and that I should possess the means, in consequence of executing the office of the marine, *ad interim*. The least effect of this action, was the capture of so many vessels worth more than 140 millions (1,690,000*l.*)—Your majesty thus became master of 3,000 men, of the clothing destined for the enemy's troops in their islands, and of the arms and ammunition which they were conveying thither, and you frustrated the plans of conquest which they meditated against our possessions the ensuing campaign. If our naval and military forces, detained at Cape François, had been able or willing to profit by this advantage, and to execute the plans of the count of Galvez, which, to some, appeared extravagant, perhaps Jamaica at least would have fallen into our hands. Another person would have requested some reward for this service. But your majesty knows, that neither for this, nor for any other, have I asked any thing directly or indirectly for myself. God has been pleased to preserve me from ambition; and to this moment, very few know the share which I had in that success, one of the most important in the last war.

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I avoid entering at present into the circumstances of the second relief which the english succeeded in throwing into Gibraltar, when our naval forces at Cadiz were separated from the french. I might notice the good or ill use of the bombardments, and the preparations made to burn the english squadron in the bay. But I repeat, it is neither my intention nor my temper to blame any, and I confine myself only to that in which I have had the most immediate concern.

The minister of war, the count of Ricla, being dead, your majesty, when you gave me orders to charge the count of Gausa with that department, observed, that I might take a share in matters of importance. I represented the difficulty of forming a combination; but at last, with the acquiescence of Gausa, I obeyed, and laboured to the utmost of my abilities, and with the harmony and success which I am about to describe.

Capture of Minorca.

8. WE deliberated on the plan for the campaign of 1780. Your majesty being resolved not to risk or waste your maritime forces on the coasts of France and England, I proposed the occupation of Minorca, whose port was a nursery for more than eighty privateers which infested the Mediterranean, and the only shelter which the english possessed for their squadrons, and for supporting their power in that sea.

Your majesty having sanctioned my proposal, I represented the necessity of secrecy, and of securing the natives before any expedition took place, that your troops might find no other enemies in landing, than the scanty garrison which occupied Fort St. Philip, and other posts. It was difficult to keep the secret, because it was

necessary to communicate with an ally, and to take a thousand unavoidable precautions; but every thing was accomplished under the pretext of blockading or besieging Gibraltar. For this end, the preparations for the enterprise were made in Cadiz, because no one imagined that expeditions from that port could be directed against any other quarter than Gibraltar or the Indies. The distance of Minorca, the necessity of passing the straits, with the superior facilities and nearness of Carthagena, Alicante, and Barcelona, from whence it was regular to form the expedition, and the presumption that Port Mahon and its castle were impregnable; all these united to deceive our own people as well as foreigners, and fixed their attention on other objects. While these suspicions were spread abroad, I endeavoured, by order of your majesty, to secure the natives, and obtained the strongest proofs of their fidelity, attachment, and obedience. With this beginning, which was principally owing to the credit, activity, and prudence of the marquis of Sollerich, your majesty was enabled to undertake the surprise of Minorca, with 8,000 troops, which were received with extraordinary joy and favour by the people.

If the wind, in the act of disembarkation, had permitted one of the divisions to be entire at the concerted time, according to the plan of operations arranged by the general, the duke of Crillon, we should have cut off either the whole or the principal part of the garrison, and a single day would have decided the fate of Minorca, to the glory of your majesty and your arms.

Although France shewed some resentment for the secrecy we had observed, we succeeded in

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appeasing her, by reminding her that we had expressed an intention to undertake an enterprise in the Mediterranean, which depended on many unforeseen accidents. In fact, your majesty knows that we did not distrust our ally, but the many hands through which the secret must pass, if we communicated it. Finally, France was not only tranquillised by my representations to her embassador, but even sent us 2,000 men to Minorca, who served at least to occupy the posts which our scanty force was unable to secure. However, notwithstanding the small number of our regular troops, we augmented the army of Minorca to 13,000 men, with which we accomplished the conquest of the castle of St. Philip, and obtained tranquil possession of the whole island. Your majesty then saw we had means for maintaining an army at the Havannah, and at Cape François, another in Minorca, and another at Gibraltar; to arm great part of our squadrons with regiments of veteran infantry; to effect the conquest of Pensacola and Mobile, in Florida; to defend ourselves against the english, to expel them from the coast of Honduras, the lake of Nicaragua, and the Rio de St. Juan; and to attack and triumph over the rebels of Peru and the Rio de la Plata. For all this, the establishment of our army was sufficient, without levying a single fifth,* and without any other help than that of dismounting some cavalry, forming new regulations relative to the pay and service of the companies of grenadiers and chasseurs belonging to the militia, and garrisoning with them some of our ports. I think that these transactions, of which your majesty and the

* A draft of one man in five, called Quinta.

prince have been the first witnesses, merit some reflection.

The conquest of Minorca being effected, your majesty had likewise the satisfaction to complete the acquisition of Western Florida, by the capture of Pensacola, which was owing to the firmness of your generals, who three times attempted this enterprise, though the winds and waves destroyed their squadrons and ruined their armaments.

Siege of Gibraltar, and destruction of the floating batteries.

9. NOTHING was wanting but the acquisition of Gibraltar. It being resolved to convert the blockade into a siege, the spanish and french troops, who had conquered Minorca, passed to the camp of St. Roque, with their general, the duke of Crillon, and were augmented with proper reinforcements. Two objects presented themselves in the siege of Gibraltar; one military, to reduce it if possible; the other political, to acquire it in the negotiations for peace, which were then set on foot. These negotiations, with some equivalent, would be less difficult, if the siege afforded some probability of its conquest, without the apprehension of which no british minister could combat the prejudices of his nation in favour of the onerous possession of this barren rock. The scarcity of provisions and ammunition, and the facility possessed by the combined squadrons, which had re-united at Cadiz to prevent the arrival of supplies, afforded a strong probability of the acquisition.

To push the siege both by sea and land, we recurred to men of science and skill, and the project of the engineer, d'Arçon, was adopted, for the construction of *floating batteries*, to

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attack the fortress by sea. To shorten the operation, we made use of large merchant ships, which, by the help of a strong coating, might resist the fire of the enemy, and by means of an internal circulation of water, defy combustion. These vessels being prepared, doubts were entertained whether these two objects could be at once effected, and particularly whether the internal circulation would not damage the powder. The engineer, however, insisted on the necessity of this circulation, and proposed to prove their capability of resisting combustion, in a public experiment, by exposing one of them to the fire of red-hot balls from our batteries, with a view to remedy defects and multiply precautions.

The ministry of the marine department, however, ordered the attack to be made without delay, from an apprehension, as I have since heard, lest the english squadron should arrive, and lest the troops and sailors, who were to be employed on the occasion, should be discouraged, if the floating battery were set on fire, in the intended experiment. These necessary precautions not being adopted, the engineer recommended at least that each vessel should be furnished with warp anchors, and double cables, to withdraw in case of accident. The duke of Crillon supported this proposal, and suggested several hints relative to the disposition of these batteries, in consequence of the doubts which had arisen concerning the points of attack. That of the old mole, which at the first view appeared to be the weakest part of the place, and which might have been supported with a diversion by land, was found to be covered by the principal

batteries, which the enemy had prepared to defend his front. That of the new mole presented other difficulties, which it is now needless to detail. Although, from the instructions which your majesty had ordered me to communicate through the war and marine departments, general Crillon was empowered to settle the disposition of the batteries, and their command and situation by land and sea; yet, in consequence of the disputes which arose at the moment, some well-intentioned persons proposed to Crillon himself to assemble a council of generals and experienced officers on the subject. The proposal was supported by the count of Artois and duke of Bourbon, who were then in the camp.

The council being held in the end of August, 1782, in the presence of the french princes, it was there proposed that Crillon should leave to the officers of the marine the command and disposition of the floating batteries, he himself remaining free from all responsibility. As he declined acceding, a report was made to the court, and it was immediately approved, through the channel by which the information was conveyed. This I knew after the departure of the courier, when I waited on your majesty relative to another object. The engineer, the general, some marine and other officers, however, repeated their instances that the floating batteries should be furnished with warp anchors, to be withdrawn in case of accident. But whether some change was necessarily made from the nature of the anchorage, or for some other just cause known only to the sea officers, this precaution was not taken. Those batteries were set on fire and the misfortunes ensued which are notorious to all.

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In spite of this ill success, hopes yet remained of reducing the place, if it was not succoured; because, according to the intelligence of the besieged, the greater part of their ammunition was expended in the defence. To prevent the succour, it was resolved, at the instance of the marine department, that the combined squadrons at Cadiz should pass over to the bay of Gibraltar, for the purpose of attacking the english fleet when it arrived. But Providence ordered that the very night preceding the arrival of the enemy's fleet, a furious tempest should shatter ours. Yet, notwithstanding the fatal accident, neither the english squadron nor the transports were able to reach the place, or throw in succours, but passed into the Mediterranean, and gave an opportunity to the combined squadrons to refit, and return for the purpose of an attack.

Many pretended, that if our squadron, instead of following the english, had kept off the cape at the mouth of the straits, on the side of the Mediterranean, our enemies could never have relieved the place, without an engagement, which they must have lost in consequence of their inferiority. Indeed, by remaining at the mouth of the straits, it would be more difficult to enter without an action, which must have been dangerous for the enemy. But unfavourable winds, and even the general opinion, caused our navy to adopt another part, which I do not now mean either to censure or defend. It is sufficient to hint what followed. The english relieved the place and escaped, without the fault or knowledge of your ministry of the marine.

Negotiations

10. STILL, however, after so many adverse

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accidents, the hope subsisted of acquiring the place by the pending negotiation. For this end, it was proper to give a reasonable colour to the formal prosecution of the siege, and to shew that the reduction was not so difficult as was believed. The english ministry themselves were under a species of necessity, as I have already said, to give a body and similitude to these hopes, as a justification for yielding Gibraltar, without shocking the national prejudices. With this aim, by order of your majesty, I privately represented to the duke of Crillon and other generals, the importance of continuing the siege. In fact, Crillon himself, in spite of other opinions, raised a new trench in a single night, without being discovered by the enemy, approached the lake and land-gate, and thus covered the batteries on that side. By this brilliant and dangerous operation, he was enabled to establish himself under the rock, to fortify himself against superior fire or sallies, and to prepare the means which might contribute to the conquest.

for peace— Hopes of recovering Gibraltar disappointed.

I cannot avoid here noticing the little attention which was shewn to the utility of these works, formed in a single night, without being discovered by the enemy. In the first trench, more than 10,000 men were employed, and in the second, more than 7,000. What order, what concert, what activity, what silence, were necessary among such a number of troops, to execute these difficult operations in a single night, to be covered in the morning against the enemies fire, and to conceal them from the vigilance of the intelligent governor, Elliot! How many lives were saved by these prompt and splendid operations! Let these trenches be com-

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pared with those of the siege in 1727. Hence we must conclude, that the general officers and soldiers in these immortal actions, gave proofs seldom seen of what may be effected by subordination, zeal, valour, and good will.

In this situation, and with the hopes which the siege still held out, the negotiations proceeded, and the preliminaries of peace were almost concluded. Of these, one article was the cession of Gibraltar to Spain, France giving to England a compensation in the isle of Guadaloupe, and we to France an equivalent in that of St. Domingo. Such were our expectations when your majesty went to Aranjuez, in December, 1782. But instead of the courier who was to bring the news of the signature, another arrived, and disappointed all our hopes. On one hand, the english ministry required new cessions, onerous to France; on the other, the french ministry were harassed with difficulties excited by those who had possessions in the french part of St. Domingo, and who opposed acquisitions which they thought prejudicial to themselves.

In such circumstances, it was necessary to abandon all negotiation, in order to prosecute the war with renewed vigour. For this purpose, count d'Estaing came to Spain, and with him and his court we discussed a plan of combined operations. By order of your majesty, I held with the count all the necessary conferences. With his enlarged capacity and experience, he digested the plan, which had received from the penetration and knowledge of your majesty all the improvement necessary to ensure success.

If this plan could be published, it would do immortal honour to your majesty, to the two

allied courts which adopted it, and to admiral d'Estaing, by whom it was drawn up. It suffices to say, that never before had the West Indies seen 70 ships of the line in one expedition, with about 40,000 troops, and all the preparations requisite to strike the meditated blow. Such, so many, and so well combined, were the objects of this formidable enterprise, that, without a declared opposition to our designs from Divine Providence, our enemies could not have escaped the terrible evils which threatened them.

When 50 ships were ready in Cadiz, which were to unite with more than 20 in the West Indies, and all the troops and preparations in order, the english ministry again proposed preliminaries of peace, in almost the same terms as before, and they were now signed. The cession of Minorca was substituted for that of Gibraltar, the acquisition of which was reserved for subsequent negotiation. The court of London freed France from the compensation which she was to give for Gibraltar, and Spain from the equivalent. Besides, England lured us with the cession of Eastern Florida, although, according to our instructions, our plenipotentiaries were to require only the retention of the part of Western Florida, which we had conquered, on the condition that it should be extended to cape Cañaveral, beyond the Bahama channel, in order to shut up, on this side, the passage out of the gulf of Mexico, and to render us masters of its coasts.

France pressed the speedy acceptance of these propositions, considering them as advantageous; and your majesty was not disinclined to admit them. But you saw that the negotiation would be more successful if the projected expedition,

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for which immense expences were already incurred, should sail from Cadiz. This was also my opinion.

The departure of our expedition would have proved to the english, that the project was not mere threat, as they endeavoured to persuade themselves. This knowledge would have induced them to embrace with alacrity those preliminaries which they afterwards decried, forcing the ministers, lord Shelburne and lord Grantham, who had so prudently arranged the terms, to retire from office. This expedition, I repeat, at sea, and directed to the destined point, even if obliged to retrocede, would have kept the well-intentioned ministers in their places, and the peace would have been made with other advantages, without breaking off the negotiations prepared for the acquisition of Gibraltar.

Preliminaries and definitive treaty.

11. SUCH, however, was not the case; your majesty was obliged to accede to other considerations, which it is not proper to mention, and the preliminaries were signed, from which the zeal of our plenipotentiary, the count d'Aranda, drew all possible advantage. The result was what was feared. The british ministry, who had made the peace, being disgraced, Mr. Fox, who succeeded, adopted a different principle, and at the expiration of eight months, we were obliged to accept a definitive treaty, in which he contrived to sow the seeds of new discords.

According to the preliminaries, the english were to evacuate all the clandestine establishments which they had made for a century before, on the extensive coast of Honduras and the adjacent shores. Their plenipotentiary having suc-

ceeded in inserting in the treaty the phrase 'that the spanish continent should be evacuated,' he took advantage of this equivocal expression, repeated with studious affectation, to pretend that the country of the Mosquitos was not to be evacuated, because it was not a part of the spanish continent, but independent and subject to indians, free from our domination. This was the most important article to render the treaty of advantage, namely, the reintegration of the country of the Mosquitos, as far as cape Gracias à Dios, or even beyond. Without this acquisition, the english would have been able to increase their fertile and extensive colonies, by establishing there numerous families of loyalists, banished from the united states, by fomenting the rebellion of the Mosquito indians, and their incursions in the spanish settlements, and by preparing great and *terrible* usurpations in our Indies, as well on the side of the river St. Juan, to the great lake of Nicaragua, and even to the southern sea, as on the side of California, in conformity with those plans which we had discovered before the war.

To prevent these mischiefs, it was necessary to charge the marquis del Campo with a new negotiation, by means of which we succeeded in avoiding a rupture, amplifying the explanations of the definitive treaty, and securing the reintegration or acquisition of the mosquito country, and the acknowledgment of the spanish sovereignty over all that continent, and obtaining the evacuation of the english colonies.

Advantages of the treaty with England.

12. I NEED not enlarge on the advantages obtained by this peace and its subsequent explana-

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tions, although it was not suffered to be perfected to the degree we were authorised to expect. Every one has done justice to your majesty in confessing, that so advantageous a treaty to Spain has not been concluded for two centuries past. The reintegration of Minorca, of the two Floridas, of the extensive coast of Honduras and Campeachy, are evidently objects of the highest consequence. The Mediterranean is freed from the principal shelter enjoyed by our enemies in times of war; the gulf of Mexico closed against foreign domination, which would have ruined the great kingdom of New Spain, the most useful of our Indies, and the extensive continent of our two Americas is rendered compact, and delivered from danger. From the beginning of the war, these acquisitions, and that of Gibraltar, were the objects which your majesty's comprehensive mind had principally in view. To these was added that of freeing our commerce, in our trading ports, and your royal authority in the department of finance, from the shackles imposed by England in the preceding treaties. This likewise has been accomplished by the present arrangement. To these objects were directed the secret arrangements with France, when necessity forced us into the war; and for these, the most circumstancial instructions were given to the plenipotentiaries, who concluded the treaties and subsequent conventions. Ought we not, therefore, to infer, that the good success of the treaty was not the effect of a blind chance or of foreign accidents; but of a plan well meditated, well concerted, and ably pursued by your majesty, from beginning to end?

In this manner, we concluded a war of five

years, which was maintained without suspending the payment of the forces, ministry, or royal household, without levying a forced fifth of men, and without prolonging the contributions which were required to meet the extraordinary expences. At the end of the year in which the definitive treaty was concluded, your majesty ordered the extraordinary contributions to cease, thus fulfilling your royal word, when they were imposed, that they should not continue beyond the period of hostilities. It will not be extraneous to notice, that such contributions were approved by a council, composed of all the deputies of the kingdoms, of the procurator general, and of many authorised ministers, the count of Campomanes and myself conducting the business. This important resolution was anticipated and arranged in the year 1770, in which we were suspicious of a rupture with England, in consequence of the dispute for the Malouine islands. It was also an advantage, that the said contributions were chiefly paid by taxes arising from the cultivation and inclosure of waste lands.

I proposed to your majesty the rewards which were merited by various persons, military and political, who had laboured with zeal and advantage in the objects of the war and of the peace. Among these were my companions in the ministry, the count of Gausa, the marquis of Sonora,* and the marquis of Castejon. The first obtained that title, and the grand cross of the order of your majesty, the second the grand cross, and the third the effective place of counsellor of state.

* Don Joseph de Galvez.

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Florida Blanca solicits leave to retire.

13. WHEN I proposed the grant of these favours for others, I urgently solicited one for myself, in the presence of the prince. Your majesty would not deign to grant it before I had explained my demand. When I stated that this favour was the permission to retire from the ministry, it was impossible to obtain your consent, although the state of my health was deplorable, and although I had long before made similar instances, but suspended them because we were in the midst of a war. Your majesty did not permit my retreat, nor grant to my labours the only reward to which I aspired; and you had the goodness to tell me, that you would reflect on the means of giving me some relief, but not by my dismission. I request your majesty to permit me to fold down this leaf, as the depositary of so sacred a promise, which you have deigned to repeat to me at other times, when I have repeated my solicitations.

Besides the honour which your majesty conferred on me in not permitting my retreat, you did me that of offering to me, as to the other ministers, the grand cross of your order. I earnestly desired your majesty not to distinguish me with this favour, and to accept my renunciation of it, as you had done five years before, on the peace with Portugal. But your majesty did not listen to my solicitations, although repeated on various occasions. At last you had the incomparable benignity to observe, "What will be said of me, if I do not attend to thee, after such great services? Take it at least for my sake." These words, engraven on my heart, moved me to tears, and I kissed your majesty's hand. I relate these facts to manifest your majesty's

magnanimity, and more than human benignity. It is just that the world and your subjects should know by this specimen of heroic virtue, something of that which is hidden by an unequalled modesty; and should judge how many lives ought to be sacrificed for a sovereign who can so nobly recompense and honour.

I will not deny to your majesty, that the romantic idea of my renunciation was not so much the effect of virtues which I do not possess, as of my temper, constitution, and philosophy. Naturally free from all views of vanity and self-interest, accustomed by my principles, maxims, and studies, to the most delicate sentiments of glory and honour, and apprehensive of exciting envy, which I have always desired to avoid, although I have not succeeded, I have from early youth thought that my vocation was and ought to be, to labour without any other object than to serve my king and country, and to acquire the best and most universal reputation.

Bombardment of Algiers.

14. THE war with Great Britain being ended, I proposed to your majesty what was necessary for attacking and reducing to terms of peace the barbary regencies, especially that of Algiers, which caused us so much damage, by its piracies on our coasts, and by infesting the commerce and navigation of the Mediterranean. This important object had already occupied the attention of your majesty before the conclusion of the war with England. The algerines had promised to enter into an accommodation with Spain, as soon as she should make peace with the Ottoman Porte, otherwise they declined pro-

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ceeding in the negotiations which I commenced by your royal order.

In spite of difficulties apparently insuperable, and in spite of the silent and vigorous opposition which we experienced from all foreign nations at Constantinople, we succeeded in concluding our peace with the Porte. It is to be regretted, that modesty and policy do not permit me to discover all the circumstances of this long negotiation, for the instruction of some, and the shame and chastisement of others. What I ought to say as a just eulogy of your majesty is, that, notwithstanding the bad example of other nations, neither in this nor in any other negotiation which has passed through my hands, have falsehood, deception, fraud, or artifice been employed. The good example, and the lessons of truth and probity which I always received from your majesty, in regard to my office and duties, have induced me to learn and practise a policy never imitated. Let it be a trifling proof of your majesty's scruples and inimitable veracity, that you did not permit the use of the flag, and licences of neutral powers, which some spanish ships had obtained for their commerce during the war, not even to transport without danger the most necessary effects, and those most wanting for the royal navy.

The peace with the Ottoman Porte being effected, the negotiation was renewed with the regency of Algiers. But they refused to fulfil their promise, and it was necessary to undertake the two bombardments. When the third was prepared, the regency listened to terms.

For the bombardments, although blamed by

those who murmur at every thing, there were three motives or objects. 1. To chastise the people of Algiers, and force them to demand peace of their regency, in consequence of being yearly exposed to such a detrimental visit. 2. To free ourselves from the algerine corsairs all the spring and summer, because the regency were necessitated to dismantle them, and apply their artillery and crews to the defence of the place. 3. To employ the great quantity of bombs and ammunition prepared for the last formidable expedition equipped at Cadiz, which did not take effect, in consequence of the peace with England.

Treaties with the mahometan states.

15. I WILL not, at present, justify or praise the manner and terms in which this treaty was concluded. It will suffice to recal to your memory the recollection of what preceded, when the point was submitted to the deliberation of the two councils of Castile and war.

A peace was likewise obtained with the regency of Tripoli, through the zeal and diligence of the count of Cifuentes; and after various truces with the regency of Tuniz, your majesty is apprised that the latter are ready to conclude a formal treaty.

By these means, your majesty is delivered from the enemies and pirates who issued from the extensive coasts between the atlantic ocean and the furthest dominions of the turkish emperor, at the extremity of the Mediterranean. The spanish flag is frequently displayed throughout the whole Levant, where it was before unknown, and the commercial nations themselves who had *persecuted* it indirectly, now prefer it;

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to the augmentation of our commerce and marine, to the improvement of our sailors, and to the respect and glory of Spain, and its august sovereign. Now terminated the slavery of many thousand unhappy persons, whose captivity had produced unspeakable detriment to religion and to the state. Now also ceased the continual exportation of enormous sums of money, which at once impoverished us, enriched our enemies, and facilitated their armaments to annoy us. Lastly, above three hundred leagues of country, the most fertile in the world, on the coasts of the Mediterranean, which, from the dread of pirates, had been forsaken, are now peopling and cultivating with unspeakable celerity. Whole towns and villages are formed, with capacious ports, to give vent to the productions and manufactures which are cultivated under the advantages of peace, and the protection of your majesty.

Matrimonial connection between the families of Spain and Portugal.

16. EXTERNAL peace being secured, your majesty gave it additional security, by the connections which took place between your royal family and that of Portugal. The marriages of the infanta, Donna Charlotta, grand-daughter of your majesty, now princess of Brazil, with the infant, now the prince Don John; and of the infant, Don Gabriel, with the infanta of Portugal, Donna Mariana Victoria, have excited the envy of all nations, who, to our misfortune, know much better than many spaniards, the true and solid interests of Spain and Portugal. The catholic sovereigns, Ferdinand and Isabella; the emperor, Charles 5th, and his son, Philip the 2nd, comprehended how much the two crowns were interested in the intimate friendship and

union of their sovereigns, and this union they cultivated with the success which is known to all. Under those princes, Spain rose to the highest rank of power and glory; and this ought to induce superficial politicians to acknowledge the prudence of your majesty and of your government, in imitating the example given in periods the most fortunate for the nation.

All who had a share in the execution of these matrimonial arrangements, obtained some remuneration or sign of your royal gratitude, your majesty deigning to hear, and benignly adopting my recommendations to that effect. To our embassador in Portugal, the count of Fernan Nuñez, was given a place, with a salary, in the council of state. To the marquis of Lourizal, embassador from the court of Lisbon at Madrid, the golden fleece. To Don Joseph de Galvez, who read and signed the contract, the title of marquis of Sonora, free from the customary fees. To the marquis of Llano, who assisted at the exchange, an effective place in the council of state. To the duke of Almodovar, the employment of mayor domo mayor, and cavallerizo of the portuguese infanta. A commandery was offered to his brother, the patriarch, who performed the marriage ceremonies, and, finally, even the chaplains of honour for the day, as well as other individuals, obtained pensions and favours from your royal munificence.

The marquis of Lourizal endeavoured to persuade me, that I ought to receive the golden fleece, as a favour which had been granted to several ministers of state, my predecessors, and even to the marquis of Ensenada, who was not a minister of state. He added, that he had hinted

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it to the prince. I repelled his officiousness, even with asperity, telling him, that my reward consisted in the satisfaction which resulted to your majesty from my services, such as they were, without intriguing for promotion. His highness knows this to be true. But what admits no doubt, is, that neither I nor my nephew, the Sumiller de Cortina, Don Antonio Joseph Salinas, who was substituted for the patriarch, in the journey for the exchange of the princesses, asked or obtained any favour directly or indirectly.

Since the marriages and treaties with Portugal, various important affairs have occurred with foreign powers, which it would be tedious to relate, but by which your majesty has succeeded in making yourself respected and venerated, in a manner seldom experienced during the two last centuries. It is enough, at present, to record what happened in the year 1787, at the time when the disturbances of Holland and the consequent disagreements between France, England, and Prussia, threatened a general combustion in Europe. The voice of your majesty, raised with as much vigour as prudence, was heard by those and other cabinets, and your dispositions and preparations calmed the tempest, securing peace, and even additional harmony, with Prussia and with England.

It is now evident to your majesty, how much was done to terminate the evils of the war, which began in the Levante, and extended to the north; and you have recently witnessed the respect entertained for your crown, by the most powerful sovereigns, and the confidence which even the turks repose in your known rectitude, impartiality, and probity.

Oh that Heaven would favour the ardent desires of your majesty to pacify the world! Your peculiar virtues give me cause to hope for this great good from the powerful hand of God, and to them I am indebted for the strength with which I have supported all the labours that I have undergone.

17. IT is now just to say something of the internal affairs of the state, and your improvements in all the branches of government, justice, œconomy, and policy, both of the capital and kingdom. The aspect of these, inspires sanguine hopes of restoring this great monarchy, and elevating it to the same degree of power and splendour as in its most happy periods.

Internal regulations—Charitable and patriotic institutions—Measures for the prevention of idleness and mendicity—Institutions and improvements of individuals and corporate bodies, under the patronage of the crown.

Your majesty had succeeded in preserving your capital from the filth which injured and obscured it, and by expence and perseverance had converted it into the neatest and cleanliest town on earth. It was necessary to purify it morally and politically, from the idle vagabonds and voluntary mendicants, who, with their families, formed a permanent seminary of delinquents and libertines. The amelioration of the metropolis has served as an example to the other capitals and towns.

In your parties of the chace, your majesty was followed by swarms of men, women, and children, who, abandoning their homes and work in the neighbourhood of the metropolis, and royal residences, flocked to receive the alms which were distributed by your order. The consequence was, the loss of the advantages derived from the industry of numbers, who, by passing many hours in the field, either became accustomed to

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leave their houses, or returned to them at night in mixed crowds of both sexes, to the depravation of their morals. I ventured to propose to your majesty, during the journey to the Escurial in 1777, that the amount of these alms should be distributed as at present among real poor and distressed of the same places, and as well there as at Madrid, that vigorous precautions should be taken to prevent voluntary mendicity, to bánish idleness, and to promote education and industry among the inferior classes. Your majesty was pleased to approve these hints. Circumstancial orders being given for their execution, through the council of Castile, a method was arranged for housing the beggars, and taking care of the poor and children, by the committees in each of the 64 wards, into which, since the government of the count d'Aranda, Madrid was divided. Eight of these compose a quarter, under its respective magistrate; and a general and superior junta of charity was formed to examine the means of sustaining this great work, to assist the committees when the alms of their respective wards and districts were not sufficient, and to change and apply to these ends such foundations and pious works as could be employed for the same effect.

Although at first much confidence was placed on the alms to be collected by the committees, experience has proved, that charity is neither so extensive or so discreet as was expected. It became necessary, therefore, to recur to impositions, by means of which your majesty has been able to give yearly to the general junta about 30,000 ducats (7,437*l.*;) to assist many of the committees with extraordinary succours; to grant

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to the general workhouse, in which the number of poor and beggars was augmented, about 14,000 ducats (3,470*l.*) annually; to the general hospital, as much more; to that of St. Juan de Dios about 3,000 (743*l.*); to the prisons of the capital and Galera, or place for confining prostitutes, besides other aids, 3,000 ducats and more, which have been consigned to furnish work for those unhappy creatures. This has been effected; and abandoned prostitutes have been converted into regular and industrious women. An association of ladies formed for this end, by the zeal and care of an active ecclesiastic, has been patronised by your majesty with happy success.

Separately and independently of the general junta and committees, succour is granted to several thousands of respectable, honest, and modest persons, who are pressed by necessity, and concealed by decorum; wives and widows of officers, of ministers, and of others in employment; younger sons and orphan daughters, their children and wives; farmers' workmen, traders and artisans, receive also daily assistance from the funds of the charitable impositions which your majesty intrusted to my care.

All the committees of wards have vied in establishing schools for poor or forsaken girls, in which, besides the christian doctrine and a good education, they are instructed in works proper for their sex, and in different branches of industry, which are considerably increased, and prove useful. The deputations of la Trinidad and St. Isidad weave ribbands similar to those of France. In those of the Barrio de la Comadra and Mira del Rio, besides needle-work, are made fine embroidery, with silk, gold, and silver, and artifi-

cial flowers. Many hundred girls are taught in these schools. Clothes have been given to the needy, rewards to those who distinguished themselves in the public examinations, and portions to those who have married. For this purpose, extraordinary sums have been granted to the committees from the same charitable fund, created by your majesty, and placed at my disposal. Poor and abandoned boys also receive a similar education, and experience similar attention in training them up to the business of which they are capable. Some thousands reap this advantage from the cares of your majesty, as appears from the relations printed and published every three months.

The deputies assist artisans and labourers who are in want of employment, and provide for the sick poor at their own houses, instead of sending them to the hospitals, where disgust and repugnance, delays in suffering themselves to be conveyed thither, the unwholesome air occasioned by numbers, and the want of particular assistance, cause the death of many, while those who recover, leave, at least during their illness, their families exposed to beggary and corruption of morals. Measures are taken to remedy these evils, by the care of the committees, of which there are already 24 in the three quarters of the palace, St. Geronimo and Affligidos, which have regulations and assignments from your majesty, for the expence of attending the poor at their own houses. Expedients are adopted for regulating the rest.

The example of the metropolis, as well in the formation of juntas and committees of charity, as in the endowment of workhouses and penitentia-

ries, produces a happy effect, under the protection of your majesty, in the different capitals of the kingdoms and other places. These merit particular mention, Grenada, Barcelona, Toledo, Burgos, Gerona, Cadiz, Alicante, Valladolid, Valencia, Ciudad Real, Ecija, Salamanca, and the Canaries, for the watchfulness of those who govern them, both spiritually and temporally.

The œconomical and patriotic societies which your majesty has established and patronised, amount already to about sixty, and the greater part of them labour in contributing to the assistance, education, and industry of the poor. They encourage principally agriculture, arts and trades, and good order; and have instituted many schools of design, which is necessary for the improvement of the sister arts.

The society of Madrid maintains by subscription a *monte pio*, to furnish employment to poor women, and to many men, with spinning, weaving, printing, and other works of industry, and for this your majesty has given by my hands more than 25,000 pesos (4,531*l.*) I do not aspire to be thought the inventor or founder of these societies. First, the biscayan society, and since that of Madrid, with some others, gave an example for the establishment of these useful bodies, in my time. The excellent work on popular education, composed and published by the count of Campomanes, has diffused lights highly useful on these important points.* Before your majesty, I neither can nor ought to withhold the justice due to this zealous magistrate, and to the council of Castile, for having pro-

* Campomanes Ensaio sobre la Educacion popular.

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moted the foundation and extension of the societies which now exist.

Moreover, your majesty has endowed by my means those which have made application, beginning with that of Madrid, to which have been consigned 80,000 reals (812*l.*) yearly, besides a sum advanced for its *monte pio*. Resources have been sought for the endowment of others; and to all your majesty has charged me to give your favour and assistance, and to promote their beneficial projects. I do not say that all the societies have been equally useful and attentive, but the greater part are so, and in general, many advantages have arisen, from uniting the principal citizens, employing worthily the time of the clergy and nobility, and exciting in every class the desire of doing good for the service of the country.

I said before, that the charity on which we relied to meet these objects, has not been so great nor so discreet as was hoped. Permit me, Sire, to pause, and lament the error of some who prefer distributing alms with their own hands to beggars and particular individuals; and not only refuse to consign their contributions to the committees of charity, who may be called the almsgivers of the state, but condemn the plan of collecting the poor in workhouses, and employing them in a manner suitable to their age and strength, in arts and public works. This is what I call indiscreet charity, nay even prejudicial and dangerous, in regard to internal police, if done in contempt of public authority, and with a knowledge of the injury it occasions. Private alms to beggars confound the true with the false

poor, give cause for the last to usurp from the first the assistance which they need, and encourage the idleness and vagrancy of those who receive alms, and the licentiousness and corruption of many.

All are poor, it is said; and the liberty ought not to be taken from some to ask, nor from others to give. According to this rule, all the individuals of the mendicant orders, particularly that of St. Francis, (because they are poor, and are maintained by alms,) should have the liberty of going out to demand them, without assigning questors and almoners for that purpose. How great then would be the confusion and disorder of those religious bodies, should they thus neglect their useful labours, and quit their retirement, their studies, their confessionals, their pulpits, and their chairs. If the mendicant orders are obliged to nominate questors or almoners to ask alms, and keep their monks retired and well employed, why cannot and ought not civil societies and towns, and why should not the sovereign establish in the workhouses, in the juntas, and charitable committees, certain fixed almoners, who likewise may ask alms, and keep the mendicants and poor retired and employed? If the first is absolutely necessary for discipline and good order in religion, why ought not the second to produce the same effect in civil and political society?

Sire, such great advantages result from the charity exercised by means of the workhouses and committees, that I cannot comprehend how conscientious and sensible persons can overlook them. He who gives charity through their channel, is not likely to render his liberality a

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mere personal and natural compassion for the individual, and for his situation. He necessarily gives it for the sake of Jesus Christ, raising this moral virtue to the class of those which are truly christian. Alms given to the workhouses and committees have three advantages; to aid the bodily necessities of the poor; to minister to their spiritual necessities, by removing them from sins and temptations, by retired life and christian education; to prepare and form another species of succour for many in works of industry.

Nothing of this is realised in the alms given to mendicants. Excepting those which are distributed among persons well known and really necessitous, I repeat, that any other kind of promiscuous charity ought to raise scruples in those who give, with a knowledge of its inconveniences, and a contempt of public authority. Greater scruples ought also to be entertained by spiritual and temporal superiors, who suffer the increase of this liberty of begging, which is a harvest of vice and wickedness. On the contrary, it is their duty to prevent it, to promote and maintain good order, and to be the first in enforcing obedience to the commands of the sovereign. I am sorry, Sire, in this part to confess, that there has been much neglect, coldness, and indifference, if not opposition, on the part of many superiors, and of some judges and executors of the public laws.

However, I ought to do justice to great part of the superior clergy, and their prelates, who, with my acquiescence, have contributed to this object with a zeal and liberality worthy of greater praise. They have founded, endowed, and

re-established workhouses or penitentiaries for the reception of the poor, foundling hospitals and infirmaries. They have undertaken and perfected many public works at great expence, to employ the poor, and to assist the needy in the late years of distress.

I cannot omit to mention to your majesty, some of those prelates who have most distinguished themselves, nor ought I to pass over my obligations to them personally and officially.

The archbishop of Toledo, Don Francisco de Lorenzana, is worthy of the primacy. He has exerted himself in giving the first and most shining example, in the erection of the two charity houses at Toledo and Ciudad Real; restoring, at a great expence, the magnificent palace or alcazar of Toledo, which was nearly ruined, and which was ceded to him by your majesty for this end. The other public works undertaken by this worthy archbishop, are the repopulation of many places ruined and forsaken, the illustration and preservation of the holy and antient spanish fathers, by publishing fine editions of their works at his own expence, and the improvement of the capital of his diocese, with useful edifices, instructive ornaments, and statues of its most celebrated kings, which were bestowed by your majesty. He has promoted other objects for its convenience and splendour, in which I have assisted by your order.

[Count Florida Blanca proceeds to enumerate different prelates who had imitated the example of the archbishop of Toledo, in improving their sees, encouraging industry, undertaking public works, and forming literary, patriotic, and cha-

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ritable institutions. It would be tedious to insert the whole article, which fills several pages, and therefore we shall only recapitulate the names as a justice due to the hierarchy of Spain.]

Don Thomas de Lorenzana, bishop of Gerona; Don Joseph Xavier Rodriguez de Arellana, archbishop of Burgos; Don F. de Fabian y Fuero, archbishop of Valencia; D. Nicholas de Santillan y Zapata, and D. F. Armaña, archbishops of Tarragona; D. I. Malpas y Pinto, archbishop of Santiago; D. J. Gonzalez Lazo, bishop of Placentia; D. J. Diaz de Guerra, bishop of Siguenza; D. J. F. Ximenes, bishop of Segovia; D. A. J. Galvan, archbishop of Grenada; D. Joseph de Molina, bishop of Malaga; D. R. de Celis, bishop of Carthagena; D. M. Abad y Llana, bishop of Astorga; D. C. Quadrillero, bishop of Leon; and the royal confessor, D. Joachim de Eleta, bishop of Ossuna.

The public spirit of the secular prelates has been, in a great measure, imitated by their clergy and chapters, and by the regular clergy. The ecclesiastical bodies of various cathedrals have supported different foundling hospitals and infirmaries, and other charities for the poor. Many of their individuals, and of the parish priests, have employed themselves in promoting the objects of the patriotic societies; and various monasteries have charged themselves with feeding, educating, and clothing, a number of poor children, orphans, or foundlings. It is to be desired, that all the regular clergy would follow the example given in this respect by some monastic communities, of the orders of St. Bene-

dict, and St. Bernard, and the Carthusians, that they would avoid meanness and dissipation, and the ill use made by the mendicant monks of their daily alms, in idleness and vice.

Pious fund raised by a tax on the clergy.

18. SEEING then the just and pious example given by the clergy of Spain, in employing their extensive revenues for the assistance of the poor, I cannot comprehend the reasons of those who censure the formation of the charitable fund, established by your majesty in my time, in virtue of a pontifical brief, for the erection, endowment, and augmentation of workhouses, penitentiaries, and hospitals, and for the encouragement and maintenance of the distressed, by means of the juntas and committees of charity, composed of seculars and ecclesiastics.

The bishops and other prelates of these kingdoms submit without murmur to the deduction of the third part of their revenues, which, by immemorial privilege and custom, is destined by your majesty to provide pensions for persons dedicated to study or other objects of public utility, and this without exempting the bishops and prelates from the principal cure of souls, or the primary obligation of assisting the poor. In the formation of the pious fund, the ecclesiastical preferments, having cure, are not charged. Besides, although your majesty may impose on them the deduction of a third for the poor, provided you do not touch on the reserved income, which amounts to 600 ducats in the residentiary benefices, and 300 in those not residentiary; yet your majesty considerably reduces this deduction in favour of those incumbents, who deserve it, from the circumstances of their

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doubt which they conceived respecting its use. The silence and approbation of almost all the bishops, the love and fidelity which the clergy profess towards your majesty, and their daily experience of the advantage derived from this patrimony of the poor, will eradicate those mistaken notions, which want of consideration rather than malignity has spread against it.

Contributions and assistance derived from the church.

19. SINCE I have here touched on what ought to be hoped from the knowledge, and love, and respect of the clergy towards your majesty, I cannot pass in silence over what they performed for your service in consequence of the expences which we incurred in the last war. By a letter which your majesty ordered me to write to the prelates and chapters, you obtained from them, by way of loan, without interest, about 30 millions of reals; deducting, as has been done, the sums advanced in the places which contributed the *subsidio* and *excusado*, after the termination of the war.

This disposition of the superior clergy to serve your majesty, without employing the forcible and disagreeable means which have been practised in other times with little advantage, proves the truth of what I have had frequently the honour of representing, namely, that the clergy of Spain are perhaps, of all those in the world, the most faithful and obedient to their king, the most regular in living, retired and prudent, and the most useful to the country, by their zeal and œconomical resources. They ought, therefore, to be esteemed, and care taken to render them respected and obeyed, in all things compatible with the sovereign authority and public good. For the

same reason, their legitimate privileges ought to be preserved, without entering into odious discussions, or the degrading regulations which have been employed in other parts.* Your majesty has heard these maxims many times in the secrecy of the cabinet, where neither adulation nor interest could guide the expressions of my tongue. Of the regular clergy, I have said as much, although I was, and am still of opinion, that for their own and the general good, it is proper to watch over their discipline. The religious orders, well instructed in solid learning, well treated and well regulated, with regard to the strict execution of their institutes, conformably to the canon and civil laws, will be highly useful to religion and the state.

The relief of the poor and forsaken, has been accompanied with other active and vigorous regulations for preventing idleness, vice, and voluntary mendicity. In imitation of the metropolis, committees have been established to punish vagabonds, idlers, and ill-disposed persons, in all the different capitals, where there are audiences or chanceries; and similar precautions have been already taken in the principal and populous towns.

Law for reclaiming the gypsies.

20. THE famous law or pragmatica by which your majesty extinguished the very name and race of those called gypsies, has had the same object of converting into useful and industrious persons so many thousands of those who were lost in licentious idleness and vice. None can fail to applaud this celebrated law, and its well defined relations; and it is to be wished that care

* Probably alluding to the sweeping innovations of Joseph the second, which found many approvers in Spain.

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should be taken for its rigorous execution. In spite of some negligences, which I have endeavoured to remedy, but which require much more vigilance on the part of the magistracy, I have noticed that among the many delinquents and malefactors apprehended since the last war, few of those called gypsies have been implicated in atrocious offences. This is a proof that the law which qualified them for labour and business, and blotted out the stain of their race and name, has produced much of its effect.

Your majesty foresaw that it was not sufficient to succour the poor and punish the idle, without preparing occupation for those whom necessity, virtue, or the regulations of your government rendered industrious. For this purpose, your majesty has laboured in promoting agriculture, arts, internal traffic, and external commerce; while the execution of your designs has been promoted by the patriotic societies, and other numerous bodies and distinguished members of the state.

Plans for the improvement of agriculture and traffic—Formation of canals and roads, and erection of new settlements.

21. FOR agriculture, which is the first and most certain source of human subsistence, riches, and solid prosperity, your majesty has undertaken those works of irrigation which will astonish the remotest ages. Spain, always exposed to drought, cannot become agricultural, unless irrigation be substituted to supply the water which is wanting in most of the provinces, that the farmer may obtain the fruit of his labours. The canal of Aragon, an immortal work, which was begun with more boldness than practicability, by the great Charles the fifth of Germany, and first of Spain, was reserved for another

Charles, that he might overcome its difficulties, carrying it for the space of many leagues, to Saragossa, from whence it is continued towards the Mediterranean. It is hoped that this incomparable project will be completed within a few years, with the resources which your majesty has intrusted to me for defraying the expence, and with the known zeal and activity employed in the promotion of the work, by its protector, Don Ramon Pignatelli, to whom I ought to do justice.

This canal, which, at the same time, is one of navigation and irrigation, contains works so great, so bold, and so useful, that, for the honour of the nation, and of those who have directed it, and for the glory of your majesty, I ought to enter into a circumstantial relation of the said works, the lands which are already cultivated and watered; the many plantations made and making; the mills and machines constructed and constructing, for promoting every species of industry. The canal of Tauste, incorporated with that of Aragon, is another encouragement already given to agriculture, by means of its channels of irrigation.

In the fertile territory of Lorca, in the kingdom of Murcia, your majesty has prepared for irrigation two reservoirs of water, which already contain more than 24 millions of cubic varas; although the dikes do not yet exceed half the intended height of 70 varas. The thickness of these dikes is 50 varas, or 150 feet, all fabricated and faced with hewn stone, which is strengthened with large bars of iron. The plans are published in the circumstantial relation of these works, their excavations and aqueducts, with a

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description of their advantages for the national instruction and glory.

In soils producing an hundred for one, as those of the Campo de Lorca, it is easy to examine what it gained by such irrigation. Your majesty has already executed a solid, convenient, and even magnificent road to the port of Aguilas, situated on the maritime coast of that district, and established there a farming and commercial town, for the export of its produce. You have caused to be conducted to that place abundant supplies of water from the distance of some leagues, by an aqueduct worthy of your grandeur. Without water, of which that port is totally deprived, in a country where it seldom rains, it would have been impossible to establish dwellings; while, with this convenience, it already contains above 400 inhabitants. Your majesty has erected a church, constructed houses, and the necessary public buildings. It is surprising how rapidly this district increases in population, and how quickly the territory is cultivated, with which your majesty has endowed it. This, I repeat, is principally owing to the peace with the regency of Algiers, whose piracies kept the coasts of Spain in alarm, and consequently barren and forsaken. I ought to praise the zeal and activity of Don Antonio de Robles-vives, minister of the royal council of finance, to whose inspection these works have been confided, as well as the creation of impositions to defray the expence. In little more than three years, he has carried them to their present state of forwardness.

The canal of Tortosa is another undertaking, by which your majesty in a few years has facili-

tated the communication along the Ebro, from the neighbourhood of Amposta to the port of Alfaques, avoiding the circuit and dangers of entering the sea by its mouth. This canal serves both for transport, and for watering the numerous lands of that district, which before were desert, from the frequent want of rain. At that port has been formed the new town of San Carlos, and the works are still continued for its completion.

In many other parts similar works have been promoted, for canals of irrigation, and for encouraging agriculture and traffic. The canals of Manzanares and Guadarrama are continued by means of the national bank, which has appropriated one half of the profits derived from the export of silver to this end. We are now treating for the construction of a canal in the Campo de Urgel, of irrigation at Albalote, and those of the Campos of Bajar, in the kingdom of Grenada, to employ much water in the fertile and extensive fields of Albacete, and to drain the marshy grounds and lakes near the town of Villena, in the kingdom of Murcia, and in other provinces.

The town of Almuradiel, formed in the middle of the *campo nuevo* of Andalusia, for the rugged pass of Despeña Perros, is another example of agriculture for the neighbouring places; since, instead of woods and frightful deserts, we have seen in a few years public buildings, houses, plantations, and cultivated lands, producing every species of grain and fruits, which border the road, and banish the danger of robbers and banditti.

I do not here speak of the canal of Campos

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and Castile, because it is directed by the branch of the finances, and the expences paid by that department. The works and improvements of agriculture, canals, irrigations, roads, and public buildings, which I have detailed to your majesty in this statement, are those made by my intervention, without any expence to the public finances destined for the service of the crown. It is necessary to keep this in remembrance, and to recollect that what has been, and is executing by my means, is without any burthen to the royal treasury.

Examples shewn by the king and the royal family.

22. THE infants, Don Gabriel and Don Antonio, following the example of your majesty, have undertaken various extensive plans of irrigation, and canals of great expence; the first, in his priory of St. John; and the second, in Calanda, belonging to the commanderies they enjoy in the kingdom of Aragon. The orders of your majesty, and the approbation which you have shewn to their highnesses, have been conformable to the gratification with which you see these patriotic views in your beloved sons.

I cannot avoid pausing a moment to relate the singular zeal of the infants, in promoting every species of agriculture, as well as of their august brother, the prince of Asturias. It is well known what waste lands have been suddenly converted by their highnesses into fruitful and abundant orchards, and delicious gardens and plantations; it is well known how much they have promoted cultivation in the royal residences, labouring with their own hands, ennobling the plough and the spade, and, by their example, teaching the great, the object, the application, and

the importance, of the cultivator and his labours.

Your majesty has been the great master, who has founded a practical school of agriculture, in the lands which you have ordered me to cultivate and improve, near the royal residence of Aranjuez. Already do we observe in the neigbourhood, the effect of this school. We witness the imitation of the true method of employing each soil according to its proper and most useful productions. We see stony and sandy lands covered with many thousand olive trees; those of more substance, employed in crops of grain; and the low and most humid destined for orchards, meadows, mulberry plantations, maize, hemp, flax, and all sorts of fruits and vegetables.

Fine silks are there gathered, and a great portion of honey and wax, which your majesty yourself desired to raise. There flocks and their wool are turned to advantage; and the acorns from the oaks, which serve as shades to the beautiful allies, are employed in breeding swine. Finally, there is no fruit which is not cultivated, and neither diligence or expence spared, in drawing every species of plants and useful seeds from the four quarters of the world.

The great works which your majesty has ordered me to execute, to attain the highest perfection and profit, with regard to cultivation, are, and will be, a perpetual monument of your vigilance for its progress and advancement. Wine and oil are pressed in cleanly mills with the greatest nicety, and are preserved in extensive cellars and vessels, containing many thousand arrobas. All this is a model, or rather practical school of cultivation and breeding, in

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which your majesty, as the first, the most provident, and experienced farmer, instructs your subjects in the most useful and necessary profession of the monarchy.

By the new general regulation, adopted with the advice of the council, for planting and inclosing lands, your majesty has procured a considerable augmentation of agriculture. If to this are added others already meditated, to extend the freedom of cultivation or to aid the cultivator, Spain may become an inexhaustible source of productions and riches.

Permit me here, Sire, to recall to mind the points which you have already suggested in your instruction to the council of state, and which it is necessary to determine with promptitude, and communicate to the council of Castile. 1. To declare and establish a right in every possessor of a mayorazgo,* or entail, to deduct the im-

* Mayorazgos, or entails, are of four kinds. 1. The Agnacion rigurosa, which strictly restrains the succession to male descendents, and excludes females. 2. Agnacion artificiosa, by which the male heirs in the direct line first succeed, and on the failure of the direct line, the nearest in degree in the female. 3. Agnacion de masculinidad, or the restriction of the succession to males and females of the male line. 4. Agnacion regular, is the entail of the succession on both males and females, the former preceding the latter.

These mayorazgos are generally in favour of the first born; some, however, are settled on the second children; so that when a second son succeeds by the death of his elder brother, his mayorazgo descends to the third.

Numerous disadvantages attend this multiplication of entails, which are inalienable, especially where the succession descends to females. If male heirs fail for a generation, the family property passes by the females to strangers, while the collateral branches sink into indigence and obscurity. The possessors of such entails, who have no children, feel little attachment to a property in which they have only a life interest; they suffer the buildings to fall into ruin, and the land into utter neglect. The hope of such successions likewise leads to promote idleness, by removing a stimulus to activity. La Borde, v. 5, p. 105.

provement made by new irrigations, plantations, and breaking up ground, according to the value and returns of the land, estimated by juridical authority, in the period anterior to such improvements. This augmentation to be the property of the occupier and his heirs, all laws to the contrary notwithstanding. In such a case, how great would be the stimulus to occupiers, to improve the extensive property subject to restitution, which they now abandon, in order not to deprive their children and heirs of what they expend in improvements!

2. In order to encourage the building of houses, to permit, as your majesty has just done, by the advice of a junta at Madrid, that all waste land may be sold and alienated, by legal authority, after an estimate, although it may belong to a mayorazgo, patronate, anniversary, chapelry, or any other perpetual charge; its value being deposited for the benefit of the lord of the soil, or possessor of the entail, that he may employ it in civil revenues of juros, censos, actions of the bank, &c.

3. To prohibit improvements of a *third* or *fifth*, or any other kind of property, from being perpetually entailed even by those who have no direct heirs, without the permission of your majesty. This point is most important, because, with the power of improvement, which is given by the law, all improve, even low persons, and with small sums, in favour of a son or grandson. They regularly entail the improvement, forming a patrimony for vanity and idleness, and locking

The privilege of entailing improvements, when amounting to the value of a third or fifth of the original property, naturally tended to increase the evils derived from this law of succession.

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up much property, which cannot be well cultivated in poor hands, nor sold to the rich, who might turn it to account. Hence results a general hindrance of agriculture and the useful arts, and an incalculable loss not only of much land, but of the increase and labour of the poor proprietors.

The same thing happens with the other entails, or perpetual foundations; and therefore I think a prompt remedy necessary for such great evils. Let there be improvements and substitutions, according to the law, but without the power of entail, and of prohibiting the alienation of property. Let there be mayorazgos and perpetual foundations, but all subject to the royal authority. Let it be then seen if the mayorazgo, the improvement, or the foundation, is composed of property or civil rents, in the whole or part; let the quality of the founder, of the foundation, and of the rent be examined, to ascertain whether its destruction is likely to produce profit to the state, by the perpetual endowment of a family, and by increasing the number of faithful servants to the king and country.

Mayorazgos and entails which do not produce an income of 4,000 ducats, and consist, as I have said, principally in civil profits, ought not to be allowed at the present time. I should feel strong scruples of conscience, if I had not represented this to your majesty; and as often as it is desired, I will explain and illustrate the indubitable reasons on which I found my opinion.

Improvement of arts, sciences, and manufactures.

23. TO your cares for agriculture, your majesty has added greater for the progress of industry, the improvement of arts and trades, and

the encouragement of internal and external traffic. Thousands of artists have been invited from abroad; models of machines, and other things necessary for the arts, and for attaining with œconomy that perfection which gives so many advantages to foreign fabrics, have also been imported. Numerous currieries are established in Seville; fabrics of cloths and cotton in Avila; in Madrid, and the other capitals, of buttons and cutlery, trinkets, jewellery, watches, fans, and other articles of ordinary consumption, all of which drew from us great sums of money, and left the hands of your subjects unemployed. Schools for making stockings, ribbands, fine linens, embroidery, and for other branches of industry, are zealously promoted by order of your majesty. It is not just to conceal the extraordinary solicitude with which the minister of the finances, Don Pedro de Llerena, supports so many of these undertakings. Your majesty has already established in Madrid, in the palace belonging to prince Pio, a fabric of machines, under the care of able mechanics and foreign professors; and in another quarter, a collection of the best models, drawn from the most industrious and enlightened countries of Europe.

As the arts cannot be perfected without the sciences, and especially without mathematics and natural philosophy, your majesty has resolved to form an academy, which may equal or surpass the most celebrated of the kind. For this end, you have sent abroad many persons of talents and information, supported with pensions and assistance, that they may acquire all the necessary knowledge and experience; may see and ob-

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serve, and bring us the best and most useful improvements from every country.

Since your majesty commanded me to form a provisional establishment for the study of chemistry and botany, and particularly a botanical garden, which is the delight of the court, you have authorised me to construct a magnificent palace for the sciences, in which we already observe, that grandeur and solidity will vie with utility and elegance. This superb edifice is more than 700 feet in length, and considerably advanced. Here is the rich cabinet of natural history that your majesty has collected; and the academy of natural sciences, will have a residence worthy the branches of knowledge most useful to mankind. All this is executed without the smallest expence to the treasury.

I will not speak of the noble arts of architecture, painting, and engraving, which have been so much promoted by the cares of your majesty, because the establishment of those academies was anterior to my ministry. But your majesty knows the progress which they have made in my time, and how much, by your order, I have promoted them, by rewards and salaries conferred on their professors. Medicine and surgery have not been forgotten. For their improvement, we have defrayed the travelling expences of many persons of known ability into foreign countries; and equal attention has been shewn to other branches of human knowledge. Youths have been sent for the acquisition of languages to the respective courts of Europe, some even to Constantinople, Asia, and Africa; and we have invited strangers skilled in the oriental tongues,

which may be equally useful to religion and the state.

These measures, for the improvement of agriculture, the sciences, and arts, have been accompanied by others, to facilitate the internal traffic of your subjects, and the communication of their knowledge, productions, and industry. For all this, it was absolutely necessary to construct roads and canals, which are the veins and arteries in the circulation of the political body. Without such a circulation, how would it be possible to renovate and strengthen this great monarchy? The mutual aids of the towns and province, the export of their productions and manufactures, and the course of internal commerce, would be in a great measure impeded, without the facility and convenience of roads.

Measures for facilitating internal intercourse and communications.

24. THUS it was; and though your majesty, from the beginning of your happy reign, directed your attention to this necessary and important object, by imposing, for this purpose, in 1760, the tax on salt; yet in nineteen years, only ten leagues were completed of the road between Aranjuez and Valencia; the same number in that of Barcelona; about three from Corunña; and less than one in the way to Andalusia. Even these scanty portions, those of the royal residences, and those of the passes of Guadarrama and Santander, constructed in the former reign, were so neglected, as to be almost impracticable. The neighbouring occupiers had taken possession of part of the ground destined for that of St. Andero; the same circumstance had happened in regard to the roads of Navarre,

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Biscay, Alava, and Guipuscoa, which those provinces had themselves undertaken.

In the nine years in which your majesty has been pleased to commit to me the general superintendence of the roads, all those which were neglected have been repaired, with new bridges, balustrades, drains, and other requisites. Besides, your majesty has seen, by the plan which I presented a few days ago, that, without comprising some works, and a great part of what has been done this year, more than 195 leagues have been constructed and opened in my time; and more than 200 repaired in the different provinces (each league containing almost a fourth part more than the common league); 322 bridges have been erected, 46 repaired, and above 1,049 drains formed, without reckoning those repaired. Besides those specified in the plan, many others have been executed, as is cited in the notes; for example, the approaches to bridges, walls of support, causeways, arches, parapets, dikes, bridges, washing places, also plantations and nurseries of trees, and more, which it would be tedious to relate.

At the same time, a new regulation has been issued for their preservation. Road labourers have been established on each league, with a superintendent for every eight; and houses have been built for these labourers, in situations where the distances of the towns were too great for their convenience. Forty-nine of these houses are already erected, and serve as a shelter for travellers in case of accident. Others have been also built to receive the tolls, while the principal roads are constructing. To maintain them, the

taxes now raised for their construction, may be appropriated. Inns, post-houses, hermitages, large churches, and even towns, have been built in proper places, that there may be convenient habitations on all the roads.

Among so many useful undertakings, are distinguished those of the pass of the Sierra Morena, or Puerta del Rey; that of the Puerta de Cadena, in the road to Carthagena; that of the road from Antequera to Malaga; that of Galicia from Astorga. What difficulties, what dangers, what inconveniencies, what expences, were encountered in these undertakings! There is no one who does not admire and bless your majesty, when he traverses these districts, particularly that of the Sierra Morena, which has astonished the most able and distinguished foreigners, by the art, the magnificence, the solidity, and convenience, with which such arduous and costly works are executed.

A diligence* has been established for the distance of more than an hundred leagues between the metropolis and Cadiz, to facilitate the communication to that great emporium of commerce, to the neighbouring ports, and even to Seville, Cordova, Ecija, and other cities on the route. Another is establishing on the road to France, the post being now current from Victoria, as well as weekly diligences from Madrid to Bayonne, with convenient inns, which were wanting in the center of Castile. The expence of this great undertaking approaches, according

* The reader perhaps may smile to observe the prime minister of Spain priding himself on the establishment of a diligence; but we request him to recollect, that within the remembrance of many still living, such a convenient mode of conveyance was rare even in England.

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to the plan presented, to 90 millions of reals (1,078,125*l.*); and the tax on salt not having produced more than 27 (323,437*l.*) in the nine years that it has been placed under my care, it may be seen that means have been found to collect more than 60 millions for these expences, in which are not comprised those incurred for canals of navigation and irrigation, reservoirs, ports, public buildings for the sciences and arts, for the ornament and security of several of the cities, and other works, of which this representation will treat.

It is true, I have been assisted by the towns themselves, the archbishops and bishops, whom I have named in another part, the patriotic societies, and even well-intentioned individuals. I have been also aided by the surplus of the post revenue, which my predecessors arbitrarily destined to other objects: while I proposed its application to the roads, and gave up the liberty of disposing of it. With the authority of your majesty, I have equally profited by the augmentation derived from the regular and exact collection of the property belonging to unknown persons, which was lost and squandered when intrusted to the care of the ordinary magistracy. Thus have we executed, and continue so many useful and great enterprises, without drawing money from the general treasury, or from the funds intrusted to the ministry of finance.

People have not been wanting to say, that these funds ought to have been applied to the payment of the royal debts; as if your majesty could in justice and conscience give them any other destination except that for which they have been liberally offered; or to any better end than that

of employing and maintaining thousands of your poor subjects, many of whom perished in the late hard winters, and in the present season still perish from want. How little do they who talk thus, understand the debts of the crown, and the mode of paying them. Would it be just to rob the people of their maintenance, their provisions, the export of their productions and industry, and of their communications, till the debts of the crown could be paid, which, with the scanty funds furnished by towns and individuals, for roads and public works, would require above 200 years? The debts of the crown contracted by your majesty are either liquidated, or the creditors are satisfied with the interest, which is punctually paid, without regard to the convenience of the treasury. For the debts of other reigns, which are large, it is necessary to seek expedients, more abundant than those of depriving the towns of their traffic and intercourse. On this point, I may venture to say, there are means of satisfying justice, and saving credit, without exhausting the treasury.

O how can we forget the necessities and labours of the unfortunate people bemired in the antient roads, drowned in the rivers and torrents, their carriages overturned, or destroyed, with the loss of their cattle, or their lives! How, I repeat, can we forget the scarcity to which the very court and capitals were reduced; distressed in winter by the snows and rains; the passes shut up; even bread frequently wanting at Madrid and the royal residences! The notion of such as censure these improvements is as absurd as that of suffering the army, ministry, and those employed in the service of your majesty to die

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of hunger, by applying their salaries to the payment of the public debts. Let us quit projects so inhuman, and be just. Let us confess, that the great work of the roads is one of the most necessary, useful, and glorious, that your majesty has performed for the benefit of your beloved people. With this your majesty assists all the provinces of this great monarchy; there being in each of the 26 intendencies, into which it is divided, two or more great public works carrying on at the same time, without comprising the Canary islands. Thus innumerable poor are maintained, and leave, as the fruits of their labours, a perpetual monument of utility and convenience to their country.

On the other hand, the œconomy of others is worthy of admiration. In past times, the expence of each new league of road was regulated at a million of reals (11,978*l.*) yet that now incurred does not, on an average, reach the third part of that sum, as may be seen in the plan presented to your majesty. This is owing to the extraordinary activity and intelligence of zealous magistrates and their dependents, or to that of certain worthy patriots, who, without any other pay or reward than what they expect from heaven, quit their own business, the pleasures and comforts of their families, to expose themselves to fatigue and the rigours of the seasons, in order to superintend the execution of the works.

[The seven following pages being employed in an uninteresting enumeration of the different persons to whom the minister states himself indebted for their assistance, are here omitted. The principal directors of the public roads were

Don Vincent Carrasco, and Don Joachim de Urbido; the acting superintendents were Don Juan de Villanueva, and Don Manuel Serrano.]

Besides these public works, your majesty by my means has commenced others of great necessity, use, and ornament, in many towns which wanted means to defray them. As it would be tedious to speak of all, I shall recapitulate the most distinguished.

Improvement of the capitals and towns.

25. BY my means, Madrid has been assisted with considerable sums to pave and repair its streets, which, from the scantiness of the funds for the public charge, were dilapidated. The spacious and handsome entrances, roads, and walks of the great gate of Alcala, that of the bridge of Segovia, that of Atocha towards Vallecas, the communication between these gates and that of Toledo, have been formed, to the unspeakable benefit of the capital, with the funds which your majesty has ordered me to employ for this end. The covered washing place,* which is constructing for the unfortunate women, who suffered so much from the severities of the

* To give the english reader an idea of the advantage of this species of public building, it is necessary to observe, that in most foreign countries, the women wash the linen on the banks of rivers, exposed to all the changes of the seasons. Even in the severest weather, at St. Petersburgh, I observed, with much surprise, several women engaged in washing upon the Neva, or on the canals. They cut holes in the ice with a hatchet, dipped their linen into the water with bare hands, and then beat it with flat sticks. During this operation the ice continually formed again, and they were constantly employed in clearing it away. Many of them passed two hours without intermission at this work, when the thermometer was at 60 below freezing point; a circumstance which proves, that the human body may be brought to endure all extremes.

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tages of the bank; and how much they have assailed it with whispers and suggestions, ill digested and worse directed. I love your majesty and your service. I love my country, and deem it my duty to give way to my zeal and love, on those points, in which your majesty and the country have the principal interest. For this reason it is necessary to call to mind the real facts which occurred.

The enormous expences with which we were threatened by the last war, obliged us to devise supplies or means to support them, because the revenues of the crown scarcely sufficed for the ordinary charges. Necessity, therefore, forced us to seek for considerable sums of money, on loan, at a moderate interest; and for this purpose, the ministry of the finance thought proper to avail themselves of the body or company of the five superior gremios at Madrid. In 1779, in which year the war commenced, Don Juan Manuel de Baños, and Don Isidor da Castilla, were on the point of terminating their office as deputies of the gremios. In consequence of the confidence which the minister of finance, Don Miguel Musquiz, reposed in me, as well as in them, he desired me, by order of your majesty, to induce the gremios to prorogue the office of the said deputies, with whom a negotiation had been already commenced for a loan of sixty millions of pesos, (10,750,000*l.*) divided into six instalments of 10 millions each.

In fact, I spoke with the six delegates of the gremios and the deputies; and all acquiescing in the prorogation, and the loan, they began to advance the instalments. But at the fourth, they perceived they could not continue this disburse-

patriotism of its inhabitants has much contributed, as well as in Segovia, by the zeal of the bishop and œconomical society, with considerable assistance from your majesty.

In Murcia have been erected the expensive walls to defend the city from the inundations, to which it has been hitherto exposed. By the helps which your majesty has supplied through me, various useful and magnificent works have been erected on its river, and its streets have been paved, widened, and provided with conveniences, which were before wanted. Valladolid, Palencia, Toro, Zamora, Seville, and other cities of less consideration, have been improved; and it is now agitated to supply further assistance, for other undertakings of considerable advantage to their inhabitants, commerce, industry, and agriculture.

Not to fatigue your majesty further on these subjects, I will now proceed to renew the memory of other great objects of general utility, which have occupied your attention in the time of my ministry, omitting many that it would require whole volumes to recapitulate with proper minuteness.

Institution of the bank of San Carlos.

26. THE erection of a national bank is one of those immortal undertakings which, in spite of the attacks it has experienced from the emulation or interest of the secret enemies to the state, as well foreigners as natives, will be in future ages a perpetual monument of your glory. Permit me, Sire, with your incomparable benignity, to inform you, that I am conscious how much persons ill-informed, angry, or disaffected, have laboured to discredit in your mind the advan-

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tual to obtain money to sustain the expences of the war, and to pay the arrears of the forces, ministry, royal household, and others in the service of the crown.

It was afterwards brought into discussion to repeat this operation with loans, and the issue of vales at 300 pesos (*53l. 15s*) My opinion being required, I represented that the increase of this paper would lower its value, ruin our credit, and expose the nation to a shameful failure, if we did not seek means to facilitate to the holders of the paper, its reduction into money, whenever required. I urged, that the facility of this reduction would give credit to the paper, and prevent a general want of confidence and the risks of its depreciation. To this opinion, I added the project of an interim chest of discount or reduction, to which purpose we might have applied a considerable quantity of gold, which we had negotiated and drawn from Portugal.

Convinced by these reflexions, I concurred with your minister of finance; and sketched out the minutes of the orders and decrees for this effect, as well as a regulation to prevent the holders of the vales from negotiating them at a discount, so that those who needed money might readily find it; and all might be persuaded, that paper and money were one and the same thing. When I supposed every thing to be in train, I was surprised with the news, that by the opinion of a junta held in the house of the governor of the council, in the presence of various chiefs and dependents of the finances, it was resolved to make a new issue of vales, without adopting the chest of reduction proposed by me.

I comprehended and foretold at the moment the ill success of this resolution. I withdrew the minutes of the decrees, orders, and regulations which I had drawn up, and earnestly desired, that I might not again be entangled in operations of finance, in order not to become the instrument and witness of our disgrace, nor to expose myself to your majesty and the public as their author, without deserving blame. Your majesty, and my love for your service, and the public good, have not permitted me to maintain these resolutions, though I have found, by experience, that many things have been attributed to me, which I have zealously opposed. However, I have honourably held my peace in these and other points, as a good subject and minister, who ought not to discredit the operations of the government, whatever may be his private opinion. Let us proceed to the case.

My fatal prophecy was verified: paper augmented, and specie disappeared. By order of your majesty, we sought with great anxiety for money to pay the forces, ministry, and household. Those who had money attempted to make advantageous bargains, by exaggerating the risks of the vales, the loss of their capital and interest, in consequence of the increased debts of the crown, and the vast expences rendered necessary by the war. The holders of the vales who wanted money for their smaller payments, or who doubted their security, were equally competitors for silver and gold. No resource, chest, or fixed fund, being found to convert the paper into money, a premium was offered to those who entered into this species of traffic. Hence, arose the discredit of the vales, and the loss amounted

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to 22 and even more per cent. the premium on negotiating them in no instance sinking below 13. All was confusion and disorder, suits took place to decline receiving them in payments, in spite of the compulsory law, or to avoid the discount of the premium. The contractors and other creditors, as well as the army and navy, solicited your majesty to make a compensation for their loss.

This was the situation of the monarchy, and these were the imminent risks of a national bankruptcy, when I resolved to propose to your majesty the foundation of a bank, which, while it obviated the total ruin of our credit, might facilitate commercial operations in general, particularly those of Spain, as is done in England, Holland, and other countries, conscious of their solid and true interests.

The foundation of a bank took effect. Three hundred millions of reals (3,593,750*l.*) formed its fund, divided into 150,000 shares. The reduction of vales, and the discount of bills of exchange, was established; and the imagination of the holders being thus tranquillised, paper recovered its credit to such a degree, that it already bears a premium. The crown and nation were delivered from a shameful bankruptcy, and the finances found every resource in the said bank. In spite of all this, the clamours of foreigners, of the exporters of money, and of those who raised enormous interest from discounts and exchanges, have painted the bank in such black colours, that its benefits have been forgotten, as well as the straits from which it relieved us. With its ruin they endeavoured to throw us back into the perils from which we

have escaped. What shall we do with thirty millions of paper, if the proprietors become disgusted with the treatment they experience, withdraw their shares, and the bank fails? Can we shut our eyes on the precipice over which the enemies of the bank endeavour to force us? What relation have the faults of its directors, if such really exist, to the establishment itself? Have not the sharers nominated twelve impartial persons to examine the conduct of their directors? Why do we not wait the result of their examination? Are we to ruin the people, because their superiors govern them ill? Nevertheless, let us see how this bank was founded, and whether it was possible to act with more circumspection than we did in its establishment.

I had already conversed on these matters with Don Francisco Cabarrus, when he was referred to me by Don Michael Musquiz, at the order of your majesty, to discuss the first operation of vales. Finding in this active and able merchant all the talent, perspicuity, and eloquence, which so difficult and complicated a business as the formation of the bank required, I settled that the explanation and project should be drawn up in his name. Cabarrus has encountered a rivalry without bounds, and been exposed to the enmity of a formidable party, who still labour to ruin his projects. I do not deny that he managed the business with great advantage to himself, and that the boldness of his eloquence, and ardent imagination, have offended many. But I cannot omit to render him justice, by observing, that we are indebted to him for delivering us from many straits during the war; and for having furnished many suggestions, useful to the bank

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and the whole nation. Deign, Sire, to permit this digression in justice to a man, whose important services were forgotten as soon as we escaped from our necessities; and who is now examined only on the side, where he has or may have defects, as if any one was without them.

I reported to your majesty the plan for the erection of a bank; and its examination was referred to a junta of ministers and select persons, who assembled in the house of the deceased governor of the council, Don Manuel Ventura de Figueroa. The junta approved the plan, with various explanations, modifications, and additions. Your majesty, not content with this approbation, desired to add that of another great junta, composed of all the orders of the state, individuals of the different classes of nobility, deputies of the kingdoms, ministers of all the councils, persons practised in commerce at Madrid and Cadiz, and regidors and deputies of this corporation. Finally, all who had any knowledge of the matter, or were of public estimation, were convoked on this occasion; and all concurred with applause in the erection of a bank, and in approbation of the plan.

Scarcely has any plan ever been examined and approved with such circumspection and solemnity. Your majesty consequently ordered the royal cedula to be expedited for its institution, in which you gave the bank rules for its government, and the grant of various favours. Many, or the greater part of these favours have not taken effect; and although the grant of the extraction of money may be considered as an equivalent, yet it will be just, not to forget this point, that this privilege may not likewise be

diminished or taken away, as is intended, under different pretences.

The extraction of money by means of the bank, reduces its exportation to a single place, and thus it is more easy to watch over that one, than over a thousand, by as many merchants and bankers, who exercised this trade. By this vigilance the government may not only more easily prevent frauds and contraband, but may inform itself with more precision of the state of exchanges, of foreign imports into the kingdom, and of the advantages drawn from us by the export of our productions and commodities. In fact, we have seen that the duty on the extraction of money, and the profits of the treasury, have doubled since the bank took charge of this branch. This and other proofs, from the statements formed in the offices of the customs, ought to silence the conjectures, reasonings, and clamours of those who wish to deprive the bank of the privilege of exportation; and this, without reckoning the good use which the bank makes of half the profits, by applying them to the construction of the canal of Guadarrama.

27. TO the grand work of the bank may be added, the establishment of a free trade to the Indies, which has tripled that of our nation with those regions; and more than doubled the produce of the customs and revenues in both dominions. To these proofs ought also to yield the clamorous exaggerations of those merchants, who, accustomed to a monopoly within a single port, and to a profit of one and two hundred per cent., oppress the poor Indians with excessive prices, encourage foreign traffic and contraband,

Free trade to the Indies.

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hinder the consumption and produce of european and indian commodities, from their dearness, and smother the national industry, agriculture, and trade, reducing them all to the narrow passage of Cadiz, where there is no facility for the distant provinces of this great monarchy to bring into competition their commodities and productions. It has been urged, that commerce was ruined; that the Indies were filled with commodities without a sale; that the principal mercantile houses had failed. I do not deny, Sire, that many houses of credit have failed; but the same happened with the most respectable before the establishment of the free trade; and it was equally the case in England and France. The monster luxury, joined with the vices adopted by the merchants, as if they had fixed incomes like the greatest nobles, has devoured and still devours the largest profits, and nourishes itself with the most extensive capitals. Riches are acquired and augmented by œconomy, and lost by dissipation. If the most powerful kings become poor by waste and prodigality, how can it be otherwise with merchants, whose patrimony is uncertain, and exposed to dangerous accidents? The cheapness of european goods, and their abundance in the Indies will augment their consumption. Thus it generally happens, and experience will daily shew the prudence of the resolutions which your majesty has taken, and your firmness in supporting them.

By order of your majesty, I acted in this matter with the marquis of Sonora and other ministers and experienced persons; and though I admitted many improvements and explanations, according to the lights which were derived from the observa-

tion and combination of events, it never can be denied, that the beginning of this happy revolution in the commerce of Spain and the Indies, with its favourable consequences in the augmentation of trade, of the revenues, and of the marine, are owing to the enlightened government of your majesty.

The erection of the Philippine company, which your majesty has effected in my time, may prove another spring of riches and resources for the state. Your majesty knows the difficulties which have been overcome, and the exertions which I have been obliged to make against foreign opposition, especially against the pretensions of the states-general of the United Provinces, and their company of the Indies, who desired to impede the trade and navigation directly from Spain by the Cape of Good Hope to the East Indies. The memorial I drew up by order of your majesty against these pretensions, was in the opinion of all courts so victorious, that some which were watching the moment to join their clamours to those of Holland, as they did in the reign of Philip V., have now maintained silence, and left your majesty at liberty to do what is proper. These great and general commercial establishments have given such energy to the nation, that new companies of insurance, of manufactures and other great enterprises are daily formed. From these, if protected, will result the prosperity of Spain, and the grandeur of our country and its sovereigns.

Attempts to abolish oppressive taxes, and introduce

28. FOR this establishment, it was necessary to prepare the way by proper regulations. The national commerce and industry were swallowed

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a new system in the customs, for the encouragement of native fabrics.

up in foreign importations. To maintain and facilitate a competition, and even a preference for native commodities and manufactures, it was necessary to regulate, on one hand, the custom-houses and duties; and on the other, to prohibit the entry of such effects as we did not need, and which only served to deprive our poor of employment, and convert them into beggars. By order of your majesty, and with my intervention, was then formed the tariff of import duties on foreign goods. We rooted out the abuse of excessive and voluntary favours, conceded to certain powerful nations* by the farmers of the customs in former times; and although they desired to convert them into irrevocable titles, I defended with zeal and firmness the rights of your majesty. These favours amounted to no less than one third part of the duty in the custom-houses of Andalusia and others. The firmness of your majesty triumphed over the repeated attacks of certain courts, not accustomed to yield without gaining an advantage. Our former weakness, more than the strength of others, was the true origin of our evils.

For the purpose of forming this tariff, and rendering it uniform in all the ports and frontiers of these kingdoms, it was necessary to equalize the duties in all the custom-houses, without distinction of provinces. I had the good fortune beforehand to prepare for this equalization, when I promoted the extinction of the duty of the *bolla* and *plomos de Ramos,* in Catalonia.

Although this was anterior to my actual ministry, permit me, Sire, to call some of them to mind, in consequence of the connection which they

* Alluding to England and Holland in particular.

have with the present matters, and because they are all the works of your own great mind, by which, in spite of obstacles apparently insuperable, your majesty has restored vigour to this debilitated monarchy.

The *bolla* in Catalonia was a duty similar to the alcavala in Castile, although more hard and oppressive, because in the last, 6 or 7 per cent. were levied, and in the former, 15 were rigorously exacted. In Castile, the alcavala is frequently reduced to a composition, or is levied by a mild assessment, made by the companies of artists or manufacturers. But in Catalonia, every time a weaver, for example, began a piece of cloth or stuff, he was to give notice to the tax officer, to affix a lead stamp; and at the conclusion of the piece, he was obliged to give a second notice to affix another. This was called *plomos de Ramos*. After this, whenever the manufacturer or trader sold a part of his piece, though only a single palm, he was obliged to give notice to the Bollero, that he might come and put a seal of wax, which was called *bolla*, and 15 per cent. was levied on the sale. Failing in these formalities, the manufacturer or trader was subject to the penalties of fraud.

Any one may figure to himself how much this cruel tribute impeded the prosperity of manufactures and commerce; and how much that person must have contributed to encourage them who, by supplying the place of these duties with an augmentation of the duties of entry in the custom-houses of Catalonia, thus equalized them with those of Castile, and the other kingdoms. From this equalization, of which I drew up the report as a member of the junta, to whom the

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has inspired me with similar firmness to conquer all difficulties. All that remains is from time to time to investigate, augment, and rectify, what the change of circumstances requires, as your majesty has wisely provided in some articles of your instruction to the junta of state. It now remains to regulate the tariff of exports, which has been a long time in my hands, for examination and amendment. But the necessity of ascertaining the progress of our commerce and returns from the Indies, and that of our agriculture and manufactures, has detained me longer than I could have wished, in this matter of the highest difficulty and delicacy. Meanwhile, particular regulations are brought forward, in the most urgent cases, and measures are taken to prepare the public mind, as well as the matter itself, for an effectual and final resolution.

In the regulation of what are called the provincial revenues, I have laboured, by order of your majesty, in the manner which has been represented to you. If every thing has not been done conformably to the diffuse representations which I have made, these have at least contributed towards easing your subjects in many points, as well as ascertaining what is proper in others for a similar alleviation, and for amending what is oppressive in the last regulations.

Plan to commute the alcavala and millones for a tax on income, and to relieve the poorer classes.

29. FOR the present, manufacturers have been liberated from the duty of alcavalas and cientos, on every thing sold at the manufactory, and a reduction of 2 per cent. has been made on what is sold in other parts. I have repeatedly proposed that the same should be done with regard to artisans, by freeing them from the corporate

assessments; and your majesty has condescended to adopt my representations in regard to Madrid. I hope in God, that the enlightened and compassionate mind of your majesty will cause this just and necessary measure to be extended to all your kingdoms.

Your majesty has diminished the said duty of alcavalas and cientos, in the places of public sale, where the poor provide themselves, from the rigorous 14 per cent. which was levied on goods subject to the contribution of milliones, to 8 per cent. in the Andalusias, and 5 per cent. in Castile. This alleviation is more than half the contribution; and if we can succeed in lessening the trammels and formalities of the administration, which are what most disgust the contributors, their number will increase, to the advantage of the royal treasury. The best thing would be, as I have represented to your majesty, to extinguish the alcavalas and cientos, which are enemies to circulation, commerce, and traffic, and supply them with an equivalent. But every thing cannot be done at once, although it is proper to labour much on this point, and rectify what experience has shewn to require amendment, as your majesty has ordered in your instruction to the junta of state.

To the poor farmers, who, for the most part, are tenants and labourers of the great, your majesty has granted some alleviation, by the regulations, reducing to 2, 3, or 4 per cent, (or less than a third part), the duty of alcavalas, according to the quality of their commodities, and ordering the composition for the taxes in conformity with this rate. Besides, I proposed to your majesty not to levy on farmers the alca-

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vala on the sale of bread corn, though authorised by the laws, and I rely on your goodness to take this resolution. In the same manner, your majesty has diminished considerably the duty of millones, on flesh, wine, vinegar, and oil; you have even granted great indulgence with regard to oil, because it serves for the ordinary aliment of the poor, and is necessary for manufactures. Finally, other reductions have been made in various branches, which are of considerable importance; and all that is wanting, is, as I have observed, to amend what experience shall prove to be oppressive. In compensation for such reductions and alleviations, devised purposely for your poor subjects, your majesty has made no other imposition to replace the enormous losses of the treasury, than about half the alcavala, or 5 per cent on civil productions and revenues. This mild and moderate contribution, which for the most part is not levied, has excited the complaints of landholders, and of the great, who, with their unjust clamours, mislead your innocent and ill-informed subjects.

It has been said that this contribution is new, as if this alone, which is not certain, were sufficient to render it unjust, when it falls upon those who can pay it, to diminish the burthens which the poor are unable to bear. Besides, it is false, most false, that the said 5 per cent on civil incomes is a new contribution. This I think proper to explain, in this statement, that the firmness of your majesty may accomplish so useful and necessary a regulation.

No one has said that the *unica contribucion* is new, which, by the rules of the cadastro, has been endeavoured to be established, in the pro-

vinces of Castile, both during the reign of your majesty, and in that of your august brother, Don Ferdinand the sixth. That which has been said, is said, and will be said, is, that by the *unica contribucion* it was intended by new rules, more just and equitable than the antient, to supersede, by means of an equivalent, the duties of milliones, alcavalas, cientos, and other provincial rents, which are now levied. The same thing was done under the crown of Aragon; by establishing the equivalent for the provincial rents, in Catalonia, by the rules of the cadastro, although the bolla, now abrogated, was suffered to exist, as well as the gate duties of Barcelona, Girona, and other cities, in Aragon and Valencia, by a species of general poll tax, although the gate duties were left in the city of Valencia, and fixed at 8 per cent.

This same substitution, but more natural and conformable to the rules followed in the exaction of the alcavala, is what your majesty has adopted in the establishment of the 5 per cent on civil revenues. Your majesty had, and now has by the laws, the right of levying for the alcavalas and cientos 14 per cent, on every thing sold or exchanged; and this by a grant of the kingdom assembled in Cortes, in which this contribution was made perpetual. Should your majesty levy on every seller of productions, goods, or fabrics, this 14 per cent, you could not be charged with injustice, nor could it be said that you levied a new contribution. In fact, Philip V. by his cedula of Oct. 25, 1742, ordered that in all places of public sale, for the effects subject to the contribution of milliones, besides the duty of milliones, an additional 14 per cent. should be

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levied for the alcavalas and cientos, and such has been done till the present time.

Your majesty observed, that this heavy duty, levied in such a form, directly oppressed the consumers, among whom are comprised all the lower orders, who daily resort for necessaries to the public shops or markets. Hence, as I have said, you reduced the 14 per cent to 5, in the two Castiles, and to 8 in the Andalusias, being an alleviation of 9 per cent in one instance, and 6 in the other. So that your majesty is justified in replacing it by an equivalent more tolerable and more suited to the means of the contributors, but it cannot be called a new contribution.

In regard to other commodities or products, not subject to the contribution of milliones, your majesty has abolished the 14 per cent. on the sale of fabrics at the manufactory, and reduced it to 2 in every other case. You have also reduced it to 2, 3, or 4, per cent. on all the sales of traders, artisans, farmers, and cultivators of their own land. Productions, which are sold by wholesale, are charged with 6 per cent. when vended by proprietors; and 3 when vended by tenants or farmers.

There is no proprietor of civil revenues who does not derive them from goods, works of industry, or impositions, which, in their origin, ought to have paid the alcavalas and cientos. There is likewise no proprietor of civil revenues, who, either directly or indirectly, ought not to contribute the said alcavalas and cientos at the moment of their consumption, when they make purchases in the public markets or shops. Now, if the said proprietors of civil revenues do not contribute in the public markets the 9 per cent.

which has been taken off from commodities, subject to the milliones in the Castiles, and Andalusias, are they aggrieved by being charged with an equivalent of 5 per cent. on those incomes, which poor contributors and consumers do not possess?

If in other commodities and products of industry, from which arise the revenues, called civil, the manufacturers, artisans, farmers, and merchants cease to contribute the whole, or a greater part, in consequence of the deduction of from 12, 11, or 10 per cent, to 2, 3, or 4, to which your majesty has reduced the alcavala; is it too rigorous to exact, as an equivalent, that the proprietor should contribute 5 per cent. of his revenue; since that revenue will necessarily be augmented, by the alleviation of the tenant, fabricator, artisan, or trader, and since the same proprietor will enjoy this alleviation in the purchases which he may make from them?

Is it a new contribution, when, in lieu of 14 per cent. alcavala, which your majesty might require, you only levy 7, 8, 9, or 10, distributing this tax among tenants and proprietors, venders and consumers, poor and rich, in proportion to their means? Yet all the clamour amounts only to this, and to the complaint of novelty. Since the 5 per cent. added to the 2, 3, 4, 5, or even the 7, which is charged on the few sales of inheritances and pastures (yerbas), never rises to 14, which your majesty might have levied on all. For the greater part of the productions of the land and industry, this contribution on the whole is reduced to 6, or at most 7, divided, as I have said, between proprietors, the tenants, rich and poor, though with more mildness towards the

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latter, as is just, because they have little property and furnish all the labour.

It now remains to observe, that when the proprietors reside in the places where their property is situated, this contribution is reduced by your majesty to the half, or $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. with the politic and salutary view of tempting them to superintend their own property, inducing them to spend their income in the places where it is situated, to promote the arts, to augment population, and to assist by their consumption in paying the taxes. Encouragement is thus given them to retire from the court and capitals, whither they are called by idleness, diversions, and luxury, and where they ruin their families and corrupt the public morals.

I repeat, Sire, all the clamour against the contribution on civil revenues, which is called new, is because your majesty has distributed the antient contribution of alcavalas and cientos, with a considerable abatement, among all your subjects, according to their means, as was intended to be done by the *unica contribucion*, which nobody called new. In a word, the possessors of civil revenues, desire, in the public markets, to enjoy the abatement of 9 and 6 per cent. alcavala and cientos, on commodities subject to the milliones; to avail themselves in their purchases of the reduction of the said alcavala, granted by your majesty, to manufacturers, and to various productions, such as hemp, flax, &c.; to enjoy also in their purchases and consumption the abatements of 10, 11, and 12 per cent. granted to tenants, labourers, artists, and dealers; and to obtain greater rents and incomes by these favours. Yet, after all, they would pay nothing

for that easy and unlaborious civil income, which they increase and waste in idleness, abundance, and luxury.

This is what is desired by the possessors of civil revenues, although the crown might be injured by the deductions, which it is proper to make in favour of poor and industrious subjects; or else they desire that the poor should be oppressed with the enormous weight of taxes, if the greater part be laid upon them, as has been hitherto the case. Thus population, cultivation, and industry will decrease, and in time, proprietors themselves will suffer, because their rents will diminish or cease. If this be neither just nor proper, it is equally unjust and improper to relinquish the measures adopted in compliance with inconsiderate clamours.

I might inform your majesty of many other things which have been done, or are preparing in matters of finance and the Indies, both useful to the crown and favourable to the subject. But this statement is already too long, and it is not right to abuse your royal patience. It is sufficient merely to call to mind the exact accounts of imports and exports, both national and foreign, from the custom houses, which your majesty has caused to be formed during the present ministry, in order to have a complete knowledge of our loss or gain in each branch, and in the balance of commerce. The accounts of the state of the provinces, and their natural productions and works of industry, which are now required from the different intendants, are also useful regulations. These investigations, so necessary for the government of your revenue, and even of the whole monarchy, had been neglected; and it was

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not without the greatest difficulty that your minister of finances succeeded in bringing them to the requisite correctness.

It is likewise proper to mention the endeavours made to draw advantage from the revenues of Madrid, without oppressing the inhabitants. I will not complain, because my labours and advice to promote this matter have been referred to the most rigorous examination of a junta, which one, more proud than myself, might think contrary to the respect due to his person and employments, and to the disinterestedness and purity of his intentions.

In affairs of grace and justice, and in the government in general, your majesty has done so many great things during the time I have had the honour to serve you, that they have excited my continual admiration, seeing the magnanimity, promptitude, zeal and firmness, with which you undertake and maintain, whatever designs may be useful to your faithful and beloved people.

Regulation relative to ecclesiastical and civil promotions.

30. THE established method of filling bishoprics, prebends, and other ecclesiastical benefices, is an immortal work of the highest utility, both spiritual and temporal, to these kingdoms, if, as there ought to be, great care is taken in its observance. In such extensive dominions, and with a clergy who possess so much influence and power, it is easy to calculate what advantages may be derived from ecclesiastics the most virtuous and learned; from parish priests the most accustomed to labour in their functions, beloved by their flocks, and most zealous for the public good; with a change and alternation in their offices, which will prevent and destroy parties

and factions. To this, the regulation for ecclesiastical nominations essentially contributes.

The civil regulation for the appointment of corregidors and other magistrates, will be another perpetual monument of glory for your majesty, and of your love for justice and the good of your people. On the conduct and integrity of these judges depends, in a great measure, the felicity of your poor subjects, who, not having in general the means of calling for the decisions of the primary tribunals, may be the victims of cupidity, vengeance, or caprice, if the subordinate magistrates are not as just and upright as your majesty desires. On the other hand, these being the agents of general and particular measures for the public good, and the prime movers of those which it is necessary to solicit or dispatch, it is easy to see how much may be lost, if they are not duly zealous and active. That there may be less risk in these promotions, it has been resolved to take three secret informations, from the persons most distinguished in the province, where the corregidor or alcalde mayor has served. Of these informations a secret book is kept, in which, by alphabetical order, are arranged and compared the notices which have been obtained of the conduct of each magistrate, to advance or throw him back in his career, and to render his promotion proportionate to his merits.

To the regulation of the corregidorship and civil justice, your majesty has added another for ecclesiastical judges, which will prove no less advantageous, if it is as rigorously observed as hitherto. Notwithstanding your majesty, as patron of the spanish churches, nominated or presented all the bishops, these delegated a part

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of their authority to their provisors or vicars general, whom they chose without your approbation. Hence, many either had no knowledge or practice in the exercise of justice, conformable to the laws of these kingdoms, or were imbued with maxims contrary to the royal privileges and national customs. From such dangerous sources proceeded fatal consequences, which rendered it often necessary to employ strong measures against such provisors and ecclesiastical judges, to the diminution of the respect due to their office.

In kingdoms like those of your majesty, in which the ecclesiastical jurisdiction is permitted and even authorised, in processes of great interest to the subject, it would be extraordinary that the sovereign should be ignorant of the qualities and appointment of those who are to exercise such a jurisdiction. Still more when your majesty is the patron of the churches, and nominates the bishops who designate these judges. The example given by the head of the church ought to serve as a rule to your prelates. The pope proposes to your majesty the persons whom he destines for the nuntiature, that you may approve or exclude such as you think proper; for no other reason, but because they are to exercise an external jurisdiction in the dominions, and over the subjects of your majesty. Why then should less attention be shewn towards the monarch on the part of the bishops whom he has nominated, in imparting to him their promotions and waiting his approbation? In fact, your majesty ordered that such nominations should be made of persons who possessed the qualifications required by the laws for the judicature; and that notice should

be given for your approbation by means of the chamber of Castile. The event has proved the prudence of this precaution, in the obedience and love of justice manifested by the spanish prelates.

Improvements in the administration of justice.

31. TO secure the prompt administration of justice, especially in criminal causes, the tribunals of Madrid were ordered to deliver monthly reports of such processes and their state. This precaution being insufficient to remedy the evil in general, your majesty not only resolved that such reports should be made from all the audiences and chanceries; but ordered formularies and rules to be communicated, by means of which, it may be readily known, what is the state of each suit, its commencement and progress, its delays and their cause, with a distinction of those which are begun or existing, in the ordinary tribunals, and those referred to the superior tribunals for consideration or appeal. With these notices, prompt regulations can be made in each cause, and the tribunals and judges are attentive, to avoid complaints.

In other matters, your majesty has adopted new precautions to promote the general good. Rules have been given to prevent abuses, and the malice of the parties, in judgments of detention; to cut off appeals; and to point out the causes of revision in the affairs of Madrid and its province; to facilitate to artisans and journeymen the scanty payment of their labours, in spite of the privileges and interest of the powerful. You have taken measures that the tribunals may be respected in these and other cases, and that exemptions may not prevent the chastisement of

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disrespect towards them. That the scholars of colleges and seminaries, and the students of the higher universities, may not be obliged to contract improper or involuntary marriages, the previous licence of the legitimate superiors is rendered necessary, to avoid the expences and trouble of matrimonial suits, and proper precautions taken to ascertain the assent or dissent of the parents, and whether the parties are in sound mind. Finally, your majesty has made provision for so many and such useful things, that it would be endless to recapitulate them.

Administration of the property originally belonging to the jesuits.

32. THE regulation of the temporalities belonging to the jesuits of Spain and the Indies, the new method for their administration, and the decision of the causes regarding them, has been another object of your majesty; and it is of superior interest to many of the most important establishments. Before your last resolutions, funds were wanting; the property was lost or deteriorated, obligations and charges were ill fulfilled; processes were endless, and the application of houses and colleges was no longer carried into effect, in consequence of the appeals, malice, or negligence, of those who were interested. Now funds abound, and this important affair is on the point of being concluded, so as to produce the greatest advantage to your subjects, and your own glory, as soon as the annuities payable to the banished jesuits shall expire.

Regulations relative to interments.

33. YOUR majesty has had sufficient firmness to order the construction of general cemetries in contradiction to vulgar prejudices, and thus to remove from the sacred temples, the abomination

of interments, so contrary to the decorum of holy places, and so detrimental to the health of your beloved subjects. Almost all the bishops, academies, corporate bodies, and persons in authority are stimulated by this resolution; and nothing is now wanting, but vigilance, zeal, and exactness in the execution, on the part of the magistrates, and the ministers who have to watch over their conduct.

Grant of hereditary nobility to professors of the arts and sciences.

34. YOUR majesty has given such privileges to the arts, that those who exercise them may enjoy hereditary nobility, thus taking away a pretext for idleness and vice, from those who, with the title of nobles, notwithstanding their poverty, refuse to apply themselves to active employment.

Census, and Geographical Dictionary of Spain.

35. YOUR majesty has caused the census or enumeration of your subjects to be taken, with a regularity and exactness never before practised. In consequence of this operation, you have had the satisfaction to witness an increase of above a million and a half in the number of your european subjects. To this increase, and to the knowledge of many hundreds of places and parishes, which has been thus acquired, has been added, that of many thousand contributors, by the diminution of exemptions among all ranks, offices, and professions. Your majesty, by the wise regulation, has augmented the number of useful subjects, who assist in the service and defence of the state, without prejudice to the real interests of religion.

To know the number and quality of the places of this great monarchy, with which, to our shame,

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we have hitherto been imperfectly acquainted, your majesty has ordered the formation of a Geographical Dictionary, which is now printing, and in which, by alphabetical order, are punctually ascertained the quality and situation of each place, even of the meanest hamlet, the district and province in which it is comprised, whether it be royal, seignorial, belonging to an abbey or to an order, and all that is necessary to enable your government to extend its care to the poorest and most remote subject, in the same manner as to the inhabitants of the metropolis, and those nearest your royal person.*

Regulation of the intercourse with the roman see.

36. THE regulation of remittances to Rome is another point, in which your majesty conferred much good on your subjects, and promoted the establishment of a better discipline in ecclesiastical affairs. The arrangements which your majesty has now ordered for your dominions in Europe, had already been carried into execution in your american territories. This is, that all remittances to the roman court should pass through the channel of your own embassadors, ministers, or agents. Thus we are enabled to watch over the execution of our laws, and the preservation of the royal prerogatives; over the abuse of favours and dispensations, which interested licentious or ambitious subjects, have too often obtained by false and importunate applications; and over the preservation and improvement of regular and secular discipline. These,

* Of this Dictionary, only the two first volumes have been published, comprising Navarre, Biscay, Alava, and Guipuscoa. It is to be regretted, that circumstances should have prevented the completion of so elaborate and correct a work.

Sire, are the true objects of this excellent regulation; and the true means to attain the intended effect. Pecuniary interests are comparatively of less importance than is usually imagined, since the remittances of Spain to Rome are not equal in value, to those of any other catholic power, of similar rank, such as France, Germany, Poland, and others.

Improvements in the army and navy.

37. I MIGHT here recapitulate other important regulations, in the departments of war, marine, and the Indies, in which you have condescended to employ or consult me. But some have been pointed out in the instruction of state approved by your majesty; and the relation of others belongs more properly to the zealous ministers of those departments, who have executed your orders.

I will not, however, omit to observe, that the augmentation of the pay of marine officers, and the establishment of the necessary regulations for arming the third part of the fleet, which has been considerably augmented in your reign, was a project, which, although originally suggested by the zeal of Don Antonio Valdes, yet could not take effect till it was discussed and approved in the council of state. You referred to me on the subject, and acceded to the advice of the council, on the necessity of paying due attention to the marine department. The same thing happened, with regard to the charge for the clothing of the army. On this subject, I may aver, as your majesty knows, that there is scarcely a general of any merit, or even an officer of inferior rank, of whom I have not been the voluntary agent with your majesty, for your favours and

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rewards; because I deemed it expedient for your service and the good of the country. Possibly this truth may not be believed or acknowledged by some of those who have profited by my good offices; but it is known to your majesty, and this is sufficient for me. I have, in this instance, overcome the temptation of forming a list of these officers, beginning with the captains general of the army, to whom you condescended to testify the truth of my assertions with your royal declaration. I have confined myself to these general remarks, not to excite the shame of some who would be mortified, were it said, that they are indebted to a man whom, without cause, they have endeavoured to discredit and persecute.

Formation and advantages of the junta of state.

38. LASTLY, I will not omit to mention here, what you were pleased to direct, in regard to the formal establishment of the supreme junta of state, and the necessity of carrying into effect all the points of its instruction, if we desire that this great monarchy should increase in power, lustre, and felicity. I consider this happy establishment as the greatest, most necessary, and most useful of all those which your majesty has formed. For the same reason it is, and will be most attacked by domestic and foreign enemies; and hence it is necessary to be vigilant in resisting their insidious attempts.

The junta of state was accustomed to assemble long before my entrance into the ministry; and on this footing it continued till the close of the last war with Great Britain. Then the meetings began to be less frequent and assiduous, because affairs became less urgent. Don Antonio Valdes, who succeeded in the ministry of the marine, on

the death of the marquis of Castejon, encountered various obstructions in the execution of many matters, and especially of those relating to the Indies, in consequence of some disagreements between the secretaryships of the Indies and marine, and their respective chiefs. Other difficulties were not wanting, though of less moment, in the other secretaryships. With this motive, Valdes frequently represented to me the necessity of our assembling, to clear up and settle the points of difference, and to avoid those heats and dissensions which are usually derived from correspondence and memorials, to the detriment of your majesty's service and the public good.

I appreciated the propriety of this advice. I pressed my other colleagues to assemble more frequently; and represented to your majesty the necessity of giving a formal and permanent existence to the junta of state, with the requisite solemnity, and with a minute instruction for each of the different departments of state, grace, and justice, war, the Indies, marine, and finance. Your majesty acceded to the proposal; and I drew up the instruction, amounting to 443 articles. You had the patience to hear it read; and to employ the space of almost three months, after the ordinary business of the despachos was concluded, in making additions and amendments. This preceded the regular formation of the junta. It now remains to examine its objects, and the malignant aspersions to which it has been exposed.

The principal objects of the junta of state, according to the royal decree of its foundation, July 8, 1787, are two-fold, namely, to treat of affairs, from which general rules may be drawn,

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and to examine the disputes between the secretaryships of the despacho, and the superior tribunals, if these should not have been decided in proper meetings, or if, from their importance or other motives, it should be proper to quicken the decision. To these two objects alone, the provisions of the decree refer, in which are specified the subjects to be submitted to the junta, as well in matters of state and foreign affairs, as in those of grace and justice, war, marine, the Indies, finance, and commerce.

In addition to these two principal objects, your majesty ordered, that the proposition for the nomination of officers to situations belonging to distinct departments, such as the political and military, or political and financial, should be brought forward in the junta. By the same decree, the proposition was to be made by the secretary to whose department it belonged. He was to propose such deserving persons as he thought proper, in order, that after taking the opinion of the junta, he might render an account to your majesty of such a nomination or resolution as had been recommended. Your majesty ordered in general, that the opinions of the junta should be presented by the secretary to whose department the affair in agitation belonged, except when for dispatch, or other reasons, your majesty or the junta should charge another secretary with the communication.

The advantages of these regulations are so visible, that I ought to save your majesty the trouble of hearing them again, having already represented them before the publication of the decree. But if by chance this statement should fall into other hands, as it naturally may, and

should conduce, at a future period, to call to memory the valid reasons which induced your majesty to form this important regulation, I intreat you to permit me to specify some of its consequences.

The first is the examination and combination of the different interests and relations of the different branches of administration; each secretary and minister of the junta concurring with the knowledge and experience acquired in his department, in the settlement of all general regulations. Any one may comprehend the use, or rather the necessity, of this combination; but I will give an example from the resolutions of your majesty, in times long before the commencement of my ministry.

In 1770, when we were threatened with a war with Great Britain, it was necessary to examine the state of our army, and to complete the great deficiency of the troops. Your majesty gave orders for the formation of a junta in the war department, which was filled by Don Juan Gregorio Muniain, and you desired that, besides the ministers, it should be composed of the count d'Aranda, who was president of the council, and the two fiscals, the count of Campomanes and myself. In that junta, although employed in military regulations, both your majesty and the persons who composed it, were convinced that it was necessary to have the assistance and advice of those who were intrusted with the political affairs of the monarchy.

The deficiency of the army, according to its ordinary constitution, was found to exceed 18,000 men, and it was evidently necessary to devise means for filling this deficiency, both then and

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in future, that we might not find ourselves a second time exposed to similar difficulties, if war should actually take place. In fact, the deficiency could only be supplied by other subjects, who were not soldiers; and for that end, it was necessary to know the strength of the towns; the number of persons capable of service; the means of drawing them forth without oppression; the funds for the expence, and other minutiæ, of which those alone who were charged with the government of the towns, could have an intimate and practical knowledge. We escaped from our momentary straits, by availing ourselves of the provincial militia to complete the veteran regiments, and granted a reduction of the term of service, and various favours to those who were to be drawn from the provincial bodies. For the future, it was resolved to form an ordinance for recruiting the army. Of this, I sketched the outline, and it was afterwards drawn up in form, by the count of Campomanes and myself, both of us giving proper explanations to the council of war, in the difficulties which successively occurred. For recruiting the militia, it was also evidently necessary to rectify its ordinance; and the business was equally confided to us, the two fiscals jointly with the inspectors of infantry and militia. We commenced our meetings; but I left the business in consequence of my ministry at Rome.

I do not now pretend that what was settled at that time, was really the best, although I told your majesty with proper frankness and truth, that, with a few additions and amendments, with more facilities to the towns to furnish their contingents, and with other aids and expedients, which I have meditated, the completion, and even

the augmentation of the army would be regular and invariable, without giving any cause of complaint. I will, however, abstain from entering into a matter which is no longer confided to me. I will only repeat, that this example proves the necessity of uniting the knowledge of different departments, in the establishment or reform of general rules, for any department in particular.

The new ordinance relating to forests, which your majesty proposed to form, with relation to those belonging to the jurisdiction of the marine, has been confided to me, and it will be proper to examine it in a junta of state, and even in other meetings, composed of skilful and experienced persons. Although timber belongs to the marine, yet it must be raised in the lands, and within the boundaries of the towns and villages, and must be planted and preserved by your subjects, with proper funds and resources, and under due restrictions. All this knowledge is peculiar to the department of state, united with that of the marine. I say as much of the innumerable objects embraced by the departments of war and marine, and those of state, grace, and justice, finance and the Indies. How can a treaty be properly concluded, or vigorously maintained, if we do not unite for this purpose a knowledge of our strength by sea and land, and the interest of the monarchy in its acquisitions or cessions? And in business of finance and commerce, how can we act with prudence without a practical knowledge of our necessities and obligations, particularly in the branches of war and marine, and the abilities and situation of those who are to contribute? Or how can we combine the interests and felicity of the subjects in the Indies

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with those of the metropolis, if the ministers of both departments do not concur with their experience and knowledge?

In this first advantage, is comprised the second, which consists in preventing by mutual agreement, and the decision of disputes, the contradictory regulations which might otherwise emanate from different departments. How injurious would this contrariety of resolutions be to the royal authority, and the reputation of the sovereign! How detrimental would their execution be to the subject! Have we not had melancholy experience of these truths in past times?

The third advantage is, that in the juntas, all the ministers take a share in the decision of important affairs, even though not belonging to their respective departments. Hence, all feel a species of personal interest in their execution. Even should the minister who suggested the plan be removed, the rest remain to continue and support it, with his successor, because they know the motives for its adoption. Thus the junta becomes an useful depository of general regulations, aud will attend to their execution, and prevent the facility of changing them under a new government, from whence so many evils have resulted to the monarchy.

Another and fourth advantage is the more accurate investigation, which the ministers themselves will employ in the affairs to be laid before the junta, and the greater care of their officers in drawing up extracts, when they know that hree or four colleagues of the chief are to examine the matter, and the possibility of their discovering omissions or errors of importance. All men resemble each other. However diligent and

active, we cannot avoid confiding in others, more particularly when we consider the number and weight of the affairs which overwhelm us. Our confidence is diminished when we perceive that we may mistake, and that it is easy to discover our errors, and render us responsible. Then we redouble our attention, and thus contribute much to enable your majesty to form your resolutions with greater certainty and effect. You cannot yourself inspect all, or even the greater part of the matters carried into execution. Hence, the more closely they are previously investigated in a junta of ministers, the more assured your majesty will be of the facts on which your regulations are established.

I finish with the fifth advantage, the greater facility of attaining the end designed, by the advice and opinions of many, rather than by those of one alone, especially in grave and important matters. The conduct of all the cabinets of Europe, who unite the different ministers in a council, and even the former conduct of Spain, proves this advantage. Moreover it should be noticed, that when the councils and juntas are held only in private houses, and for weighty matters, which occur at the instant, they awaken the attention of the idle, or those who are interested to discover the secrets of state. Whereas if the meetings are usual, the greatest and most private matters may be investigated without affording a motive to watch them, or exciting suspicion and curiosity.

From the decision of disputes in urgent matters of small import, which are transferred from the superior tribunals to the junta, results the sixth advantage, namely, of facilitating the dispatch of many affairs, which, from the contentions

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or etiquette of the tribunals, or the blameable management of those who are interested, remain long in suspence. The occurrence of these delays is too notorious and too frequent to need any waste of time in defending this truth.

Finally, by seeing in the junta the propositions relative to employments belonging to two branches or departments, there is this advantage, that your majesty becomes acquainted with the qualities of the candidates proposed, and from the information of those relating to each branch, you chuse the fittest. One whom we might wish to make intendant of the army, may be very intelligent and experienced in affairs of finance, and very ignorant in those of war. Another whom we wish to nominate intendant and corregidor, may have a knowledge of policy and government, and want that of finance and taxation. A military governor may be a great soldier and bad politician, from the want of knowledge, prudence, or experience.

It was repeatedly determined in former times, that propositions relating to two branches of state, should be arranged by the ministers of both. This is now superseded by the maxim, that this decision shall be made in the junta of state, where all the ministers assemble. What will a minister who conveys the proposition to your majesty, risk in hearing the opinion of his colleagues, especially of him who is charged with the other department, to which the affair belongs? Once more, provided that such a minister is not deprived of the right to propose, by the decision of the junta, nor your majesty of the liberty to chuse whom you please, what harm can ensue, if the said minister should be assured of the fidelity, qualities, and fitness of those he

may recommend? Such being the case, the attacks of malignity have been directed against truths so evident and invariable. According to malicious censors, the junta is nothing but an invention to controul the free choice of the sovereign, and a contrivance by which the minister of state may appropriate the authority of every department, and dictate to his colleagues.

Will not your majesty have more persons of merit, from whom to make your choice, should some candidates be recommended by the junta, who did not occur to the secretary? Will not your majesty acquire more certain information, by hearing the opinion of different ministers, whether against some of the candidates there be any objection, or whether there may be more aptitude and ability in some than in others? Sire, let us undeceive ourselves. Those who diminish their authority by this investigation, are we, the ministers, and our dependents; and in proportion as ours is lowered, that of your majesty rises. This is the truth, and the rest is a mere pretence of the ambitious, to facilitate their own views, by communicating with a single person, or with a subaltern, whom they may deceive or gain. The minister of state remains under controul, as well as the affairs which are pointed out by the royal decree; and thus, far from augmenting his authority, as is pretended by unjust censurers, he diminishes it.

All the malice of these enemies to the public good, arises from their having pretended, with a view to render the junta of state odious, that it was formed to interfere in every thing; whereas it is only to treat of general arrangements, or of those which form general rules, to decide disputes, in urgent matters of small import, and to

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hear propositions relative to employments, which belong to two departments, that it may be enabled to make proper representations, by means of the very ministry to which the proposition belongs. If your majesty refers other particulars to the junta, it is because it is your pleasure, and not according to its constitution.

I have deemed it right to make this digression, because the formal institution of the junta of state being one of the greatest and even the most useful regulation of your glorious reign, it is just that it should be seen in its true point of view, and that it should be firmly supported against those who are hostile to the happiness of the monarchy, and the glory of the crown.

Domestic concord of the royal family, and establishments for the infants.

39. I WILL not now enlarge on other things which have been accomplished in the last twelve years, to the great comfort of your majesty. The domestic peace of your family, the exemplary subordination of the successor to the crown, and of his brothers, to their august father, and the harmony of all, have been envied and admired by the courts of Europe. Your majesty knows, and the prince of Asturias likewise, whether I have not laboured efficaciously to promote this great operation of your policy and love, towards your most worthy son and faithful subjects. Indeed I have employed continual diligence and zeal, in counteracting the whispers and falsehoods formerly employed, to indispose the minds of a loving father and his obedient sons.

The formation of a fund drawn from certain commanderies to provide for the second and third sons of the king, by pontifical authority, without burthen to the crown; and the secularization of the priory of St. John, with its perpetuity in the

august family of your majesty, are works of your great foresight, and fatherly cares for your beloved issue. Finally, there is scarcely an object of importance which has not occupied your royal attention during your happy reign. I have confined myself, however, to your principal acts and regulations during my ministry; but I may call to mind others anterior, in which you condescended to give me a share, and which by subsequent improvement have since produced many advantages.

The *indulgence*, which extended to the kingdom of Aragon the same privilege as Castile, by permitting the use of flesh on Saturdays, extinguished at once fifty-two lent days, of which foreign nations profited to draw from us large sums of money by the sale of their dry and salt fish. Similar was the indulgence of lent for all the kingdoms of this crown, by which the fast days were diminished one half, and the alms derived from this abolition, were applied to the succour of the poor, of workhouses and hospitals. The *indulgence* for reducing the asylums to a single church in each town, and to two at most in the capitals, had been solicited by king Philip the fifth, in the pontificate of Clement the 13th. King Ferdinand seeing the difficulties which the court of Rome opposed to this solicitation, ordered it to be confined to the cities of Madrid and Barcelona, but with no better success. Your majesty charged me with this matter, and the indulgence was obtained for all your dominions as it subsists at present.

Conduct of Florida Blanca during his embassy at

40. YOUR majesty knows what I did by your order, to adjust the differences of the court of Rome, with those of Spain, France, Naples, and

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Rome—Contributes to the election of Pius VI—Obtains various graces from the roman see, and the abolition of the jesuits.

Parma, difficulties which all believed insuperable; and to obtain the brief for the extinction of the formidable body of jesuits, which was effected with the consent of the principal catholic powers. These and other delicate and important matters, which you deigned to commit to me, as well in your own affairs, as in those of other courts, could only be facilitated by means of the confidence which your majesty condescended to repose in me; and the goodness with which I was favoured by pope Clement the 14th, and by Pius the 6th, actually reigning. The regulations relative to those who were implicated in the insurrection of Malta; the termination of the discords at Venice relative to the Patriarchate; the secularization of the revenues of the archbishopric of Monreal in Sicily, were among other negotiations of the most difficult kind, with which your majesty charged me, and which were successfully terminated.

Most of our success in our solicitations at the court of Rome, has been owing to the influence which your majesty obtained in the conclave for the election of the present pontiff, and the credit which you have acquired in the papal court. To conclude this statement, your majesty will please to permit me to sum up the principal occurrences of that conclave, of which you desired to be minutely informed, as well as of my conduct towards the cardinals of the crowns and others.

The death of Clement the 14th left the sacred college divided into great and violent parties. The most powerful was that called the celantes, or adverse to the crowns, which, being inflamed by the ex-jesuits and their numerous protectors, pretended that the chair of St. Peter required a

firm and vigorous pontiff, to re-establish the rights of the holy see, which they supposed lost or infringed; and to repair the injuries which they imputed to his predecessor. By these insinuations, the party of the celantes shewed that if they could procure the election of such a pope as they desired, he would labour to reverse the acts of Clement the 14th; and for that purpose would disturb the peace of the church, and of the catholic powers. The renovation of the Bull *in Cenâ Domini* alone, of which the publication had been suspended by order of Pope Clement, was capable of producing the most fatal consequences. If to this was added the restoration of the jesuits, and the renewal of the troubles occasioned by Pope Rezzonico, in Parma, Spain, France, Naples, and Portugal, terrible disturbances would have ensued.

These circumstances rendered it necessary to form a party in the sacred college, which might amount to a few votes more than the third part of the cardinals. Your majesty knows that the election of the pope cannot be verified, unless the suffrages of two thirds of the electors, assembled in the conclave, concur. With one third part, and the addition of one or two votes more, which we, the ministers of France and Spain, succeeded in uniting in favour of the crowns, we had a permanent exclusion, for preventing the choice of a pope who was not acceptable to us. The great difficulty was to preserve the union of the 16 or 17 votes which formed this third part, and to promote their augmentation; a thing which was full of difficulties, considering the temper, age, interests, and connections of each. I assure your majesty, that on this point I

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employed continual vigilance; and that it is not possible to exaggerate my pains and difficulties. The cardinals Bernis and Luines, especially the first, who was charged with the vote of France; Conti, who was charged with that of Portugal; and Orsini with that of Naples, assisted to the utmost of their power. But shut up in the conclave, and subjected to its formalities, they could not manage the external arrangements, which in that court have the greatest influence. Cardinal de Solis arrived late in the conclave, and although he strenuously exerted himself, yet the want of local knowledge, and of an acquaintance with the characters of persons and the language, exposed him to insuperable difficulties.

I reflected that if we lost this power of exclusion, that which is called the vote of the crowns, would little avail us, being by custom confined to only one of the candidates, and this before the election is verified. We were consequently exposed to this alternative; either to find a pope chosen before we knew it, as happened to cardinal Portocarrero and D. Alonso Clement, in the election of Clement the thirteenth; or after having given the exclusion to one, two, or three, to see the celantes elect a violent member of their own party. These and other inconveniences induced me to recur to another expedient, as solidly founded as it was bold, according to the ideas of the time. I found in the antient canons, and in the primitive bulls, which treat of the election of prelates, and especially of popes, that although the choice belongs to the clergy, yet the consent of the people ought to concur. I then firmly declared, that the sovereigns being the heads and representatives of the Christian

people, their consent ought to accompany or precede the election of a pope; and that, without such an acquiescence, the election would be null, the church exposed to a schism, and Rome to a thousand disasters, amidst the agitations of party.

The strength of my arguments, supported by the well-affected cardinals, especially by cardinal Bernis, who desired the peace of the church and the tranquil conclusion of the conclave, produced the intended effect, and induced the whole sacred college to agree in the principle of concerting the election with the two crowns. However, after a conclave of about three months, it yet remained to find a person who might be agreeable to all. The celantes had declared for the two brothers, the cardinals Colonna, prelates of rank and credit from their birth and manners; but the very austerity of their morals and their known principles in regard to the roman immunities and pre-eminence, rendered them improper for the system of tranquillity and harmony which was now adopted by the courts and the sacred college.

I was conscious that with a third of the votes maintained with the utmost difficulty, it was impossible to select a pope from among our own friends. I therefore proposed to your majesty to direct our views to one of the contrary party, who by his knowledge, temper, principles, and the consciousness of owing his election to Spain, might be disposed to favour us in all things consistent with justice. I had already had an official and confidential intercourse with cardinal Braschi, while treasurer of the holy see; and had observed in him a frank, although hasty temper, uncommon knowledge, a generous character,

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strict fidelity to his word, and a love of glory.* This cardinal had begun his career under Benedict the 14th, and although attached to the celantes from gratitude to the Rezzonicos, it was evident that his erudition and principles were far different from those of ordinary . . . .

I was assisted in these observations by another cardinal, since dead, who was devoted to the crowns; and after having sounded by his means the true principles of his friend, cardinal Braschi, I represented to your majesty that this was the only expedient, to close with honour and advantage so long and so contested a conclave. The hint was approved; I had the good fortune to obtain the assent of all the embassadors and ministers of the crowns, including some who were moved with personal enmity against Braschi; and they placed the commission in my hands. The sacred college readily followed their example. Accordingly, on the morning of the 14th of February, 1775, I wrote billets to cardinals de Solis, Bernis, Orsini, Conti, and Migazzi, who had the votes of Spain, France, Naples, Portugal, and Vienna, notifying that it was settled to proceed to the unanimous election of him who has been since called Pius 6th.

A particular circumstance occurred in the scrutiny of the morning, which shews the influence of the king of Spain in the conclave. Almost all the cardinals being assembled in the sixtine

* These few expressions present a faithful portrait of Pius the sixth, who certainly performed many great and useful works during his pontificate; but whose principal defect was an inordinate love of glory. On this defect, a pasquinade was published at Rome, alluding to his arms, of which the supporters were eagles, and the bearings stars, fleurs-de-lis, and a puff of wind.

"Redde aquilam imperio, gallorum lilia regi,
"Stellas redde Polo, cetera Brasche, tibi."

chapel for the election; and informed, by my billets, of the disposition of the crowns towards Braschi, they began to deposit their votes *open* in the chest. When they had thus declared themselves, cardinal de Solis, who had been retarded by accident, entered; and not having received my billet, he refused to give his consent, in the name of your majesty, to the continuance of the election. Although the other cardinals of the crowns shewed him my billets, they could not convince him; he even protested against their choice. This protest astounded and embarrassed the whole sacred college: without further dispute, the cardinals withdrew their votes from the chest, and made another scrutiny. At the conclusion of the act, however, as they went out of the chapel, my billet reached Solis. Without a moment's delay, all the cardinals unanimously concurred in acknowledging and adoring Braschi that very evening, as the successor of St. Peter, and proclaimed the election on the following day.

It would be idle to describe the glory and happy consequences of this event; unexampled for Spain, and even for all catholic nations, since it is acknowledged by your majesty and all enlightened men. The new pope has not deceived our hopes, since he has not only favoured the just desires of your majesty, for the amelioration of the spanish church, and the happiness of all your subjects; but has given proofs of priestly mildness, unknown to past ages, in matters the most delicate and perilous, relating to the ecclesiastical government, which have afflicted, and still afflict great part of Europe.

It is now just, that I leave your majesty in

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repose, and finish this diffuse statement. I only request your majesty to turn back the leaf which doubles on the other side, where I mentioned your goodness in condescending to offer me some repose. If I have laboured, it is not unknown to your majesty; and if my health suffers, you are apprised of it. Deign then, Sire, to attend to my supplications; and permit me to return to an honourable retreat. If your majesty wishes to employ me in any occupation suited to my profession and experience, I may there execute it with more tranquillity and leisure, and less risk of error. At least, Sire, free me from the continual disquietude of business; from the care of examining the merits of persons for employments, dignities, favours, and honours; from the frequent hazards of mistaking in this and other matters; from the peril of ruining my health, and endangering my life, in the confusion and embarrassment which surround me. Do it, I adjure your majesty, as a king, by the services I have rendered, by the love I bear, and shall always bear, to the last moment of my existence, to your royal person, and above all, for the love of God our Lord, who, I sincerely pray, may preserve your precious life for many and happy years.

Sir,

EL CONDE DE FLORIDA BLANCA.

*St. Lorenzo, Oct.* 1788.

41. *Statement addressed to King Charles IV.*

SIRE,

APPENDIX. N° I. Address to Charles IV.

THE glorious father of your majesty had the goodness to hear great part of the adjoined statement, in your presence. That just, equitable, and adorable sovereign, deigned to authenticate the facts which were read to him, with the strong and energetic expression, that what it contained was as true as the gospel. Your majesty yourself heard this approbation of those facts, which were nothing but the most important measures political, military, and civil, of your august father, in the twelve years that I had the honour to serve at his royal feet.

Your majesty has desired that I would again read to you the whole statement. Without doubt, with the design and firm purpose which you have manifested, to follow the example of so great a monarch in the art of reigning. The beginnings of your government give us reason to hope that Spain and its inhabitants will hereafter reap from these resolutions abundant fruits of happiness and plenty. From the very day in which we had the grief of losing our beloved and deceased king, your majesty expressed to me your ardent desires to comfort and relieve your subjects by all possible means, and that the city of Madrid should be the first to experience some proof of your love and munificence.

In compliance with these desires, which were supported by the tender insinuations of the queen, your most worthy consort, I proposed the exposition, which I drew up in writing, relative

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to the remission of the taxes in arrear; the payment of the debts left by your august father; the declaration, that it was the duty of the crown to satisfy the others incurred by your predecessors, by such œconomy as was compatible with the charges of the state; the suspension of the alcavala on wheat; and the reduction, although small, of the price of bread in Madrid, as far as was possible from the scantiness of the harvest, for four years, the general dearness, inundations and misfortunes, and the epidemical disorders that have afflicted most of the provinces, and raised the value of every thing.

Your majesty, with unspeakable pleasure, adopted these suggestions, and gave them all the perfection which they needed, by the opinion of the junta of state, whose members concurred with their information and experience. Royal decrees were in consequence expedited, and the applause and gratitude of your good and faithful subjects were equal to the high expectations which they formed from such happy beginnings. To these arrangements were added others, very important for Spain and the Indies. With the celebration of the cortes, and the measures adopted by their concurrence, your majesty has shewn the intimate union which subsists in the body of this monarchy between the head and the members; the subordination, love, and fidelity of these, and the zeal of all for the general good. With regard to foreign affairs, from the first days of your exaltation to the throne, your majesty communicated to the greater sovereigns of the earth, the means of accomplishing a general pacification, with regard to which they had consulted the deceased king. The empire of Germany, that

of Russia, England, Sweden, Denmark, and even the Ottoman Porte, had deposited their confidence in the late spanish monarch, in the melancholy moment when he was at the point of death, or had just closed his life.

Your majesty, following the oracle and precepts which you had heard from the mouth of your beloved father, has facilitated the communications which were desired by the monarchs of such great and powerful nations. May the Omnipotent bless these works, and the purity and rectitude of your intentions, for the immortal glory of your person and reign, and of Spain itself!

Now, Sire, since the august father of your majesty began, by attesting the truth of the facts contained in my Exposition, condescend to complete the work, and tell the world whether they are or are not true, in all which your majesty has witnessed or known. This is the only reward to which I aspire for my services, to preserve my reputation, and that of my family, from the gross and cruel calumnies with which, as your majesty knows, my enemies persecute me. It appears to me right, that your majesty, as the first judge and protector, should protect and render justice towards a minister who has the honour to serve you. If I obtain this decree from your majesty, I desire and ask nothing more than, that you would condescend to listen to the prayers with which I conclude the adjoined representation, addressed to your august father. This is what is hoped from the royal clemency of your majesty,

by EL CONDE DE FLORIDA BLANCA.

*St. Lorenzo, Nov. 6,* 1789.

## 42. ROYAL DECREE.

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Royal decree confirming the statement.

SEEING that the facts are true which are related to the king my royal father, and to me, in this Statement, and others, which accompany it, as well as in a paper of Observations, joined to the process formed against Don Vincente Salucci, the marquis of Manca, and others, of which the superintendent of police will give a relation himself to the council, in full assembly; the said council will examine and call the whole to mind, and give me its opinion, as well on the chastisement which may be merited by those who shall be proved delinquents, as on the satisfaction which is owing to those who may be calumniated; and the precautions which are proper to prevent their defamation. This is to be executed with great secrecy, and with closed doors; and the papers to be returned to me, although an authenticated copy may remain where it ought.

*To the count of Campomanes.*

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ALTHOUGH favoured by the confidence of the sovereign, Florida Blanca was opposed by a strong party, secretly instigated by the queen. Two of this party, the banker, Salucci, an Italian, and the marquis of Manca, a spaniard, who had been employed in several diplomatic missions, wrote two bitter satires against his administration; one under the title of "Conversacion que tuvieron los Condes de Florida Blanca y de Campomanes, en Julio de 1788," (a Conversa-

tion between Florida Blanca and Campomanes, &c.;) and secondly, "Confesion del Señor Conde de Florida Blanca, papel que se cayò de la manga al padre comisario general de S. Francisco, 1789," (Confession of Count Florida Blanca, a paper which fell from the sleeve of the father commissary general of St. Francisco.) These papers appear to have given rise to the preceding Statement; and afterwards to an answer to the second satire, under the title of "Observations on the paper intitled Confession, &c." by Florida Blanca himself. To these a reply was made, under the title of "Notes on the Statement." Meanwhile, under the reign of Charles the IVth, a process was commenced in the council of Castile against the authors of the satire; and these compositions were submitted to the council, as will appear by the decree just cited. The two satirists were arrested, but Salucci escaped to his native country, and Manca was imprisoned.

However, the opposition of Florida Blanca to the rise of the new favourite, Godoy, afterwards Prince of Peace, excited the resentment of the queen; and advantage was taken of the circumstances of this process, to discredit him with the king. To obtain the disgrace of Florida Blanca, d'Aranda was recalled, in Feb. 1792, and placed at the head of administration. But when the promotion of Godoy was secured, the subordinate agents of this political farce were dismissed from the scene. After a short confinement, Florida Blanca was permitted to retire, d'Arando was sacrificed, and died in 1802; and Manca was either banished, or prudently withdrew to his native country, Burgos.

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In 1808, soon after the commencement of the late revolution, Florida Blanca was again called into public life, and appointed one of the Central Junta. But unfortunately, either from his advanced age, or the difficulties of his situation, he gave no proofs of his characteristic energy and activity. He died in the following year.

APPENDIX, N° II.

# STATISTICAL ACCOUNT OF SPAIN.

*Geography—Population—Government—Revenue—Army—Navy.*



THE ordinary division of Spain into kingdoms and provinces, as given in maps and geographical treatises, was not employed by the government, which knew but one general division, *viz.*

I. The kingdom of CASTILE.
II. The kingdom of ARAGON.
III. The lordship of BISCAY.

## I.—THE KINGDOM OF CASTILE.

| *Provinces.* | *Divisions.* |
|---|---|
| 1. New Castile..... | Guadalaxara |
| | Madrid. |
| | Toledo. |
| | Cuenca. |
| | La Mancha. |
| 2. Estremadura. | |
| 3. Murcia. | |
| 4. Grenada, called also Upper Andalusia. | |

APPENDIX. N° II. Geography.

| *Provinces.* | *Divisions.* |
|---|---|
| 5. Andalusia | Jaen. |
| | Cordova. |
| | Seville. |
| 6. Old Castile | Burgos. |
| | Soria. |
| | Segovia. |
| | Avila. |
| 7. Leon | Leon. |
| | Palencia. |
| | Toro. |
| | Valladolid. |
| | Zamora. |
| | Salamanca. |
| 8. Asturias. | |
| 9. Galicia. | |
| 10. Navarre. | |

## II.—The Kingdom of ARAGON.

| | |
|---|---|
| 1. Aragon. | |
| 2. Catalonia. | |
| 3. Valencia. | |
| 4. Balearic Isles | Majorca. |
| | Minorca. |
| | Iviza and Fromentera. |

## III.—The Lordship of BISCAY.

1. Guipuscoa.
2. Alava.
3. Biscay proper.

The town of Antequera, on the borders of Seville and Grenada, is not included in any of the Spanish provinces.

## *COLONIES AND SETTLEMENTS.*

### IN AFRICA.

Ceuta.
Oran.*
Melilla.
Masalquivir.*
Canary Islands ..... Ferro.
Tenerif.

### IN ASIA.

Phillippine Islands .... Mindanao.
Lusson or Manilla.
Leyta.
Ibabao, &c.
Ladrone, or the Marianne Isles.
Caroline, including the Palaos or new Phillippine Islands.

### WEST INDIA ISLANDS.

1. Cuba.
2. St. Domingo, or Hispaniola.
   The largest, or western part, belongs to the Spaniards ;† the remainder to the French.
3. Puerto Rico.
4. Trinidad.‡
5. Margareta.
6. Tortuga.

* Oran and Masalquivir were abandoned in 1792.

† The spanish part of St. Domingo was ceded to the french in one of the late compulsory treaties.

‡ Since ceded to England.

APPENDIX. N° II. Geography.

## NORTH AMERICA.

Florida, East and West.
Louisiana.
New Mexico ..... New Mexico.
New Navarre.
California.

Old Mexico, or New Spain ..... New Biscay.
Culiacan.
Guadalaxara.
Panuco.
Mechoacan.
Mexico.
Tlascala.
Guaraca.
Chiapa.
Tabasco.
Yucatan.
Guatimala.
Honduras.
Nicaragua.
Costa Rica.
Veragua.

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## SOUTH AMERICA.

New Grenada, or Terra Firma ..... Land of Darien, or Panama.
Coro.
Carthagena.
Santa Martha.
Rio de la Hacha.
Popuyan.
Venezuela.

| | |
|---|---|
| *(South America continued.)* | New Andalusia. |
| | New Grenada. |
| Part of Guiana. | |
| Quito. | |
| Peru ..... | Lima. |
| | Chili. |
| Rio de la Plata..... | South Peru. |
| | Tucuman. |
| | East Chili. |
| | Spanish Paraguay. |
| | Paraguay. |
| | Rio de la Plata. |
| | Buenos Ayres. |

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Population.

SINCE the war of the succession, the Population of Spain has been gradually increasing. In 1727, it was estimated by Uztariz at 7,500,000, though evidently under the real amount. In the reign of Charles the third the first census was taken, under the administration of d'Aranda, in 1768; according to which, the amount was 9,307,804. During the ministry of Florida Blanca, in 1787, a second census was taken, of which we present the result; and by which it appears, that the increase, in nine years, was 960,346.

| PROVINCES. | PLACES. | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| * These are detached farms, with cottages for labourers. | *Cities.* | *Towns.* | *Villages.* | *Hamlets.* | *Farms.** | *Parks.* | *Wastes.* | *Parishes.* |
| Andalusia | 15 | 163 | 24 | 65 | 15 | 11 | 6 | 303 |
| Aragon | 12 | 239 | 999 | 89 | 6 | 120 | 149 | 1,396 |
| Avila | 1 | 82 | 202 | - - - | - - - | - - - | 74 | 299 |
| Burgos | 7 | 715 | 1,118 | 38 | 59 | 14 | 43 | 1,947 |
| Old Castile | 1 | 54 | 148 | 52 | - - - | 81 | 34 | 276 |
| Catalonia | 14 | 283 | 1,683 | 103 | 21 | 47 | 304 | 1,682 |
| Cuidad Real, or La Mancha. | 2 | 94 | 1 | 45 | 414 | 14 | 11 | 111 |
| Cordova | 4 | 54 | 5 | 34 | 1 | 2 | 28 | 75 |
| Cuenca | 2 | 240 | 37 | 152 | - - - | - - - | 43 | 458 |
| Estremadura | 7 | 228 | - - - | 130 | - - - | - - - | - - - | 415 |
| Gallicia | 7 | 77 | 3,425 | - - - | - - - | 147 | - - - | 3,683 |
| Grenada | 15 | 180 | 155 | 12 | - - - | 25 | 2 | 490 |
| Guadalaxara | 2 | 180 | 119 | - - - | 1 | - - - | 22 | 251 |
| Jaen | 5 | 57 | 13 | - - - | - - - | 15 | 12 | 118 |
| Leon | 2 | 197 | 1,140 | - - - | - - - | - - - | 6 | 1,373 |
| Madrid | - - - | 68 | 8 | - - - | - - - | 2 | 40 | 91 |
| Town of Madrid | - - - | 1 | - - - | - - - | - - - | - - - | - - - | 15 |
| Murcia | 6 | 64 | 38 | 104 | - - - | - - - | - - - | 101 |
| Palencia | 1 | 130 | 175 | - - - | 11 | 1 | - - - | 315 |
| Salamanca | 2 | 131 | 451 | - - - | 182 | - - - | 289 | 381 |
| Segovia | 1 | 110 | 288 | - - - | 13 | 9 | 74 | 314 |
| Soria | 4 | 135 | 497 | - - - | 25 | - - - | 75 | 664 |

| NUMBER OF SOULS. | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Unmarried.* | | *Married.* | | *Widowed.* | | *Total Number of Souls.* |
| *Men.* | *Women.* | *Men.* | *Women.* | *Men.* | *Women.* | |
| 219,770 | 191,141 | 132,589 | 131,445 | 20,666 | 42,542 | 738,153 |
| 178,762 | 151,009 | 121,711 | 121,095 | 15,264 | 26,229 | 614,070 |
| 33,017 | 29,728 | 21,907 | 21,752 | 2,769 | 4,589 | 113,762 |
| 125,850 | 126,703 | 89,094 | 89,686 | 9,410 | 19,652 | 460,395 |
| 20,628 | 19,424 | 14,806 | 14,816 | 1,442 | 2,764 | 73,890 |
| 222,369 | 225,392 | 146,630 | 151,195 | 18,671 | 37,345 | 801,602 |
| 58,808 | 51,331 | 40,322 | 39,162 | 4,878 | 9,935 | 204,436 |
| 65,205 | 65,230 | 40,492 | 40,611 | 6,121 | 13,480 | 231,139 |
| 72,373 | 67,150 | 53,619 | 53,665 | 6,835 | 10,285 | 263,927 |
| 118,018 | 102,202 | 81,361 | 80,803 | 11,014 | 18,643 | 412,041 |
| 364,313 | 394,633 | 243,568 | 243,568 | 33,321 | 60,789 | 1,340,192 |
| 187,305 | 176,907 | 120,484 | 121,389 | 14,243 | 32,662 | 652,990 |
| 32,327 | 28,385 | 22,418 | 22,266 | 2,960 | 4,394 | 112,750 |
| 58,895 | 47,396 | 31,777 | 29,082 | 2,114 | 4,211 | 173,475 |
| 70,514 | 68,832 | 46,869 | 46,869 | 5,813 | 9,271 | 248,168 |
| 16,498 | 13,619 | 11,963 | 11,983 | 1,611 | 2,599 | 58,273 |
| 42,057 | 33,275 | 30,215 | 28,313 | 3,505 | 10,178 | 147,543 |
| 97,415 | 82,811 | 66,254 | 65,264 | 6,227 | 14,503 | 332,474 |
| 30,207 | 29,501 | 22,607 | 22,309 | 2,265 | 4,254 | 111,143 |
| 61,637 | 54,795 | 38,407 | 39,128 | 4,588 | 7,552 | 206,107 |
| 48,060 | 42,140 | 32,952 | 32,880 | 3,696 | 6,077 | 165,805 |
| 45,937 | 43,899 | 35,234 | 34,999 | 3,416 | 5,918 | 169,413 |

| (Continuation.) PROVINCES. | PLACES. | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| * These are detached farms, with cottages for labourers. | *Cities.* | *Towns.* | *Villages.* | *Hamlets.* | *Farms.** | *Parks.* | *Wastes.* | *Parishes.* |
| Toledo | 2 | 224 | 94 | 5 | 17 | 17 | 127 | 375 |
| Toro | 1 | 82 | 239 | - - | 4 | 10 | 70 | 391 |
| Valencia | 9 | 161 | 378 | 10 | - - | - - | - - | 562 |
| Valladolid | 2 | 174 | 228 | 38 | 17 | 11 | 87 | 555 |
| Majorca | 2 | 33 | 26 | 19 | - - | 4 | 1 | 39 |
| Minorca | - - | 4 | 5 | - - | - - | - - | - - | 6 |
| Iviza and Fromentera | 1 | - - | - - | - - | - - | - - | 6 | 21 |
| Canaries | 3 | 6 | 151 | 1 | - - | - - | - - | 74 |
| Navarre | 9 | 154 | 638 | - - | 29 | - - | 8 | 753 |
| Asturias | 1 | 69 | 6 | - - | - - | 81 | - - | 688 |
| Alava | 1 | 91 | 340 | - - | - - | - - | - - | 435 |
| Guipuzcoa | 2 | 72 | 17 | 27 | - - | - - | - - | 120 |
| Biscay | 1 | 20 | - - | 102 | - - | - - | - - | 165 |
| New Colonies | - - | - - | 14 | 32 | - - | - - | - - | 15 |
| Aranjuez | - - | - - | 1 | - - | - - | - - | - - | 1 |
| Pardo | - - | - - | 1 | - - | - - | - - | - - | 1 |
| San Ildefonso | - - | - - | 2 | - - | - - | - - | - - | 2 |
| San Lorenzo, or the Escurial | - - | - - | 1 | - - | - - | - - | - - | - - |
| Oran | - - | - - | 2 | - - | - - | - - | - - | 2 |
| Ceuta | 1 | - - | - - | - - | - - | - - | - - | 6 |
| Smaller Garrisons (Presidios) | - - | - - | 3 | - - | - - | - - | - - | 3 |
| Total | 145 | 4,572 | 12,732 | 1,058 | 815 | 611 | 1,511 | 18,972 |

| NUMBER OF SOULS. | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Unmarried.* | | *Married.* | | *Widowed.* | | *Total Number of Souls.* |
| *Men.* | *Women.* | *Men.* | *Women.* | *Men.* | *Women.* | |
| 93,481 | 81,068 | 64,664 | 64,274 | 8,385 | 15,711 | 327,583 |
| 25,570 | 24,340 | 18,080 | 17,947 | 1,994 | 3,601 | 91,532 |
| 219,670 | 194,521 | 156,268 | 156,200 | 15,175 | 30,047 | 771,881 |
| 54,769 | 54,444 | 37,177 | 37,030 | 4,207 | 8,034 | 192,661 |
| 40,662 | 34,736 | 24,184 | 24,189 | 2,882 | 8,134 | 134,787 |
| 7,763 | 7,213 | 5,441 | 5,441 | 384 | 1,486 | 27,728 |
| 4,264 | 3,725 | 2,357 | 2,290 | 269 | 722 | 13,637 |
| 49,739 | 54,376 | 25,673 | 27,588 | 2,168 | 7,699 | 167,243 |
| 66,147 | 60,143 | 41,653 | 41,444 | 5,388 | 9,774 | 224,549 |
| 94,503 | 101,799 | 63,886 | 64,166 | 7,410 | 14,069 | 345,833 |
| 20,668 | 19,617 | 13,416 | 13,438 | 1,588 | 2,583 | 70,710 |
| 34,202 | 36,355 | 20,139 | 20,474 | 2,131 | 5,827 | 119,128 |
| 30,510 | 33,058 | 21,727 | 21,988 | 2,013 | 5,567 | 114,863 |
| 2,388 | 1,724 | 1,620 | 1,609 | 209 | 318 | 7,868 |
| 764 | 517 | 577 | 552 | 54 | 129 | 2,593 |
| 269 | 103 | 86 | 76 | 16 | 18 | 568 |
| 1,246 | 1,011 | 656 | 846 | 79 | 249 | 4,287 |
| 513 | 445 | 589 | 311 | 77 | 63 | 1,998 |
| 4,987 | 581 | 1,407 | 495 | 176 | 147 | 7,793 |
| 3,773 | 795 | 1,423 | 686 | 218 | 181 | 1,076 |
| 966 | 140 | 663 | 172 | 126 | 27 | 2,094 |
| 2,926,229 | 2,753,224 | 1,947,165 | 1,943,496 | 235,778 | 462,258 | 10,268,150 |

APPENDIX. N° II.

The principal classes are thus computed:

*Ecclesiastics.*

| | |
|---|---|
| Beneficiaries | 23,692 |
| Parochial clergy | 16,689 |
| Curates (Tenientes de Curas) | 5,771 |
| Sextons | 10,873 |
| Persons in orders, de patrimonio, having a patrimony of 3 reals a day | 13,244 |
| Persons in the minor orders | 10,774 |
| Syndics, or collectors for the mendicant orders | 4,127 |
| Demandantes, probably employed in a similar office | 7,030 |
| Dependents on the Inquisition | 2,705 |
| Dependents on the Cruzada | 1,844 |
| Monks, including novices, servants, &c. | 61,617 |
| Nuns, *ibid.* | 32,500 |
| Beatas, an order similar to the Beguines | 1,130 |
| | 191,996 |

*Laity.*

| | |
|---|---|
| Gentlemen (Hidalgos) | 480,589 |
| Advocates and Notaries | 15,528 |
| Students | 50,994 |
| Peasants, or farmers (labradores) | 917,197 |
| Day labourers (jornaleros) | 964,571 |
| Traders | 34,339 |
| Manufacturers | 39,750 |
| Artisans | 270,989 |
| In the royal service | 36,465 |
| Exempted from military service | 77,884 |
| | 2,888,306 |

According to the general computation, the american population, including the islands, at the latter end of the reign of Charles the third, amounted to 10,000,000: that of the Philippines, and other eastern islands, was estimated at 1,000,000.*

The spanish dominions were also formed into twelve military divisions, exclusive of the places on the african coast; the chiefs of which were distinguished with the title of captains general, except Navarre, of which the governor was stiled viceroy. These were Old Castile, Aragon, Catalonia, Valencia and Murcia, Majorca, Navarre, Guipuscoa, Andalusia, coast of Grenada, Galicia, Estremadura, Madrid, and its district.

The civil divisions, for the administration of justice, were the chanceries of Grenada and Valladolid; the audiences of Saragossa, Barcelona, Valencia, Majorca, Seville, Corunna, Oviedo, the Canaries, and the royal council of Navarre. The heads of the chanceries were styled presidents; those of the audiences, regents. The subordinate magistrates in the different places, were the corregidors, the alcaldes mayores, who were nominated by the king, and the ordinary alcades, who were chosen by the corporations.

Government.

IN the early periods of spanish history, we find the constitutions of the different states built on the same rude model, as those in the neighbouring countries, where the feudal system was established. The whole power of the state was vested in the king, conjointly with an assembly

* By the late estimation of Humboldt, the total amount of the american population was 13,500,000; and of the Philippines 1,500,000.

APPENDIX. N° II. Government.

called the cortes, which was formed of the two principal orders of nobles and clergy, and a certain number of deputies, representing the towns most distinguished for wealth and population.

Although this system, with various modifications, prevailed throughout the different kingdoms and provinces; yet, when united under one head, the legislative assemblies were not blended into a single body, but each part retained its peculiar constitution and cortes.

In Castile, the executive part of government resided in the king; the legislative authority, with the right of imposing taxes, in the cortes, composed of the nobles, dignified ecclesiastics, and deputies of the towns.* They deliberated together, and decided all questions by the majority of voices. The royal assent was necessary to give validity to all acts; but that assent was generally extorted by the refusal of subsidies. In cases of grievance, however, the subject appears to have had no other remedy than by petition to the sovereign.

In Aragon and its dependencies, Valencia and Catalonia, the royal authority was more limited. The cortes of Aragon was composed of four orders, or as they were called, *arms*, because they were considered as *embracing* the whole commonwealth. 1. The ecclesiastical. 2. The titulados,† and nobles. 3. The gentry, or caval-

* In 1390, according to an account given by Clarke, p. 28, the number of deputies summoned was 125, of whom Salamanca and Burgos sent 8 each; other places 4; and some only 1. The number of towns and places to be represented was 48. In the cortes of 1391, there were present 124 deputies, from 46 cities and towns.

† The titulados were the eight privileged families of Ribagorza,

leros and hidalgos. 4. Deputies of towns.* This assembly, in conjunction with the king, was empowered to remedy abuses, to enact laws, and impose taxes; and, till the close of the sixteenth century, no act could pass, if negatived by a single member. The cortes, at first annual, were afterwards regularly convened every two years. To this assembly any individual or body might transmit complaints of grievances, or plans of improvement, and such complaints were to be first examined and redressed before supplies were granted, or public business transacted. The points arranged were finally passed into laws, in a general union of the different orders, at which the king presided; and a solemn oath was taken by the monarch, as well as by the orders, to carry them into execution.†

The royal power was still further limited by the privileges of the justiza or supreme judge, who was appointed for life, and whose office was to examine and decide, with the advice of the king and cortes, those complaints in which he was not himself personally interested. He was thus empowered to inspect the conduct of the king; he reviewed the royal decrees; obtained the dismission of ministers, or arraigned them for mal-administration. His tribunal also received appeals from those of the king and barons; and

Sastago, Morata, Ricla, Aranda, Belchite, Fuentes, and Castro. These were the remaining descendents of the twelve nobles, called *ricos hombres*, who assisted in the conquest of Aragon from the Moors. Blancas, p. 15.

* According to Blancas, the number of towns which sent deputies to cortes, in general, was 31; but on another occasion, he conjectures, that of those only 13 were present. Modo de proceder en Cortes de Aragon, p. 16.

† Blancas modo de proceder en Cortes de Aragon.——Martel forma de celebrar Cortes en Aragon, 4to. Saragossa, 1641.

APPENDIX. N° II. Government.

he enjoyed the power of interposing in criminal causes, and removing the accused to the prison of the state, to which he alone had access. He was amenable only to the cortes.

Catalonia and Valencia had each its cortes, composed of three branches, the ecclesiastical, the military, or nobles and gentry, and deputies of towns. These were either held separately, or conjointly with the cortes of Aragon. Navarre likewise possessed its cortes, and Biscay its peculiar states.*

The constitution of Castile was first changed by Charles the fifth. In 1538, he ceased to summon the prelates and nobles, under the plea that they did not contribute to the public burthens; and thus the cortes, though still preserving the name, from that period consisted only of the deputies of towns. The constitution of Aragon was afterwards invaded by Philip the second, and the office of justiza abolished. The cortes indeed still existed, but were seldom summoned, except on extraordinary occasions, to swear allegiance to the sovereign on his accession, or to acknowledge the heir to the crown. Soon after the accession of Philip the fifth, the cortes of Aragon and Catalonia were assembled for the last time;† in 1713 the constitution was finally abolished, and the government of Aragon, Valencia, and Catalonia, assimilated to that of Castile.

From the account of St. Philip, it appears, however, that in 1713, a species of general cortes was convened, consisting of the three orders of deputies, nobles, and prelates, for the

* Diccionario Geografico de España. Art. Navarre.

† Vol. 1, p. 190.

particular purpose of receiving the renunciation of the french crown, made by Philip the fifth, and sanctioning his new law of succession*

The decline of the cortes naturally gave additional consideration to another body, consisting of a species of permanent committee, called deputies of the kingdoms, who were elected by the three orders, from their own body, and whose office was instituted for the purpose of superintending the administration of the tax called milliones, and watching over the welfare of the monarchy, during the intervals between the sessions of the cortes. These deputies were constituted members of the royal council of finance, through which the monarch communicated to the nation the necessity and imposition of new taxes: and the approbation which they were thus supposed to give, and which they could not withhold, was considered as equivalent to the formal assent of the cortes. The number of these, after the change in the government of Aragon and its dependencies, was six for Castile, one for Majorca and Catalonia, and one for Valencia and Aragon.† Their office was held for six years.

FROM these facts, it appears that the spanish sovereigns gradually threw off all legislative controul, and exercised absolute authority in every part of the monarchy, with the exception of Biscay,‡ and perhaps of Navarre. The

* San Felipe Commentarios de la Guerra de Espana, t. 2, p. 88. ——Vol. 2, of these Memoirs, p. 115.

† Under the original constitution, the number for Aragon amounted to eight.

‡ From a MS. account of Spain in the British Museum, (Sloane MSS. No. 908) written in the reign of Philip the second, it appears

APPENDIX. N° II. Government.

organs of the royal will were the different councils or boards, charged with the various branches of government. These were: the councils of state; of Castile and Aragon; Italy, Flanders, and the Indies; and those of war, marine, finance; and of grace and justice. The councils of Italy and Flanders were abolished on the loss of those territories, and that of Aragon superseded by the change in the constitution.

During the austrian, and at the commencement of the bourbon dynasty, the council of state was the highest deliberative body of the realm, and appears to have occasionally exercised some of the functions originally belonging to the cortes. It was consulted on occasions of the highest importance, deliberated on the general concerns of the monarchy, and recommended the appointment of viceroys, governors, and embassadors. Its authority was first reduced by Alberoni; and it fell into such disuse, that, towards the close of Philip's reign, only one member remained. After that period, new members were again appointed; but the places in general were merely titular, and chiefly valued for the pension and honours attached to them.

The council of Castile, called by way of pre-eminence *the council*, though equally filled by the nomination of the king, possessed an extensive influence in the operations of internal

that Biscay was accustomed to render an annual homage to the king, by presenting a purse, at the end of a long lance, containing a single maravedi, the lowest species of coin, in value not quite half a farthing.—In consequence of the superior privileges enjoyed by the people of Biscay, and their exemption from onerous burthens, this lordship was more populous, better cultivated, more industrious, carried on a more extensive trade, and was better provided with inns and roads, than any other part of Spain.

government. Its functions were judicial as well as administrative; and it was divided into chambers or boards, according to the different departments of which it took cognizance. The chief was a grandee of the highest rank, with the title of president. He enjoyed the privilege of a weekly audience of the king in private, and when a member of the despacho, he took the lead in the transaction of business. In consequence of the power which he possessed by this union of personal consideration with ministerial influence, the office was mostly suspended during the latter part of the bourbon period, and its functions exercised by a person of inferior rank, with the title of governor.

The *chamber* of Castile was an emanation from this council, consisting of a species of committee, not exceeding six members, with the president or governor. Their office was to convey to the king the resolutions and deliberations of the council; and their name was derived from their co-operation with the ministers of state, in expediting affairs in the *chamber* of the king. In former periods, the chamber of Castile always attended the court; proposed the appointments to offices of state and justice; and became the organ of the monarch in communicating his laws and decrees to the nation at large. It was even addressed in its collective capacity by the same title as the sovereign.

The other councils were equally charged with the administrative and judicial functions in their repective departments.

The body which gave motion to the different parts of this complicated machinery was the universal despacho, consisting of the secretaries

APPENDIX. N° II. Government.

or chiefs of the different departments, of which the secretary for foreign affairs or state, was generally considered the chief. These secretaries formed a species of cabinet council, sometimes alone, sometimes in conjunction with other members of administration; and, in the period immediately after the the accession of Philip, even the french embassador was permitted to take a part in their deliberations. The number of these secretaries was, however, seldom uniform; for, in some instances, the same person filled two or more departments, as the Indies and marine; and in others, as in the case of Ripperda, these different offices were united under one head. During the administration of Florida Blanca, a regular cabinet was established, under the title of junta of state, and rules drawn up for the order of its proceedings, as well as the objects of its deliberation.

From these remarks, it will appear that there was no regular and uniform system of administration; but that the situation and choice of the person who filled the office of prime minister, depended on the will of the sovereign. It will appear likewise that, though the kings of Spain were absolute, in the general sense of the term, because all the members of the councils and secretaries were appointed or removed at pleasure; yet they were indirectly controuled, by the power which the councils and boards obtained from extensive patronage, local influence, and the formalities of office.*

* This account of the governments has been drawn from a great variety of writers, among whom we may particularly mention Robertson's Charles the Fifth, Ortiz, Desormeaux, Vayrac Etat de l'Espagne; Blancas and Martel on the Cortes of Aragon; St. Real

IT has been the just and general remark of all, who have written on Spain and its revenues, that perhaps human invention never formed a system more grievous in itself, more detrimental to public welfare, and more vexatious in its operation, than the public imposts of Spain. This will readily appear from a brief review of the chief branches which formed the great mass of receipts.

The revenues of Spain were generally divided into three classes:

General rents, comprising the customs, indultos, or tax on the traffic with America, posts, and the produce of the royal monopolies of hair-powder, sealing wax, quicksilver, sulphur, tobacco, salt, lead, cards, and the duty on stamps.

The provincial rents, comprising the alcavala and cientos, milliones, and the ordinary and extraordinary service.

The territorial revenues, comprising the produce of mines, rights of the chancery, or fines and taxes on titles, offices, and professions; and imposts on the clergy, with some other branches, merely local, or of inferior importance.

The alcavala was one of the most ancient branches of the royal patrimony. It was first partially introduced in 1341; and in 1349, finally established throughout the dominions of Castile. It was an impost of ten per cent. on every sale or exchange of moveables, immoveables, and productions of every kind, which was paid by the seller, or original proprietor. In recent periods, the amount of this duty was not

Science du Gouvernment; the travellers, Clarke, Swinburne' Townshend, Burgoing, Laborde; and Meusel, with other german statistical writers.

APPENDIX. N° II. Revenue.

rigidly exacted. It was either placed under administration, or each town was permitted to commute that part of the tax which was levied on raw materials, manufactures, cattle, and the productions of the soil, for a certain sum, according to the extent of its traffic. Ecclesiastics were exempted from the direct operation of this tax, on commodities of their own growth or patrimony.

To the alcavala was afterwards added a similar imposition, called cientos or hundredths, of four parts in the hundred, established at four different periods between 1639 and 1644. The alcavala and cientos were consolidated into one imposition, making in the whole a nominal 14 per cent.

The milliones derived their name from a contribution of twenty four millions of dollars, granted in 1601. This tax was a species of excise on certain articles of household consumption, such as wine, flesh, oil, and vinegar, tallow and soap; and afterwards extended to sugar, salt fish, paper, and other commodities. It might likewise be commuted at the option of particular places or communities, according to the amount of their consumption. It was levied on ecclesiastics, in virtue of a papal bull.

The alcavala and other provincial revenues having been partially anticipated, were charged with a species of perpetual annuities, under the name of pensions.*

* The reader may judge of the operation of these vexatious taxes by the account of an intelligent and recent traveller, in his description of Seville:—

"Every person entering the city with any thing for sale, is required to make an entry, and pay his duty; every purchaser in the city to take out a clearance from the proper office. Even a person

The provincial taxes, in their original form, existed only in Castile and its dependencies. In Catalonia they were replaced by the *cadastro*, a tax of ten per cent. on all incomes, from whatever source derived; including a proportionate contribution from journeymen and day labourers, and a certain sum for every head of cattle, whether for burthen or provision. In Aragon and Majorca, by the *equivalent*, a tax on each family in proportion to its number and means; and in Valencia, by an *extraordinary imposition*, levied on the same principle, and differing only in amount.

The next branch of revenue in point of importance was the customs; to which may be added the indultos, or duties levied on the trade with the american colonies.

The tax called lanzas was levied on titled persons, in lieu of a certain number of soldiers which they were formerly obliged to furnish in time of war. That of media annata was the amount of half a year's income, levied on all offices, dignities, and employments in the gift of the crown, when conferred, and on physicians and lawyers, on their admission to the exercise of their professions. These, with the taxes on

bringing onions or garlic must wait for the despacho (permit); and after purchasing necessaries for his consumption at home, must again apply for a clearance before he can return. Thus the whole day is lost. The officers of government are multiplied without a correspondent advantage to the expence.

"An ox brought into the city must be first drove to the public slaughter-house, where it is killed by an authorised *matador*, who retains, as his fee, the hide, horns, and hoofs. The duties of alcavala and milliones must be paid; and then a permit issued, allowing the meat to be sold within the walls. These duties amount to as much as the original price; and hence, though oxen are cheap, meat is as dear at Seville as in London." Jacob's Travels in Spain, p. 169.

APPENDIX. N° II. Revenue.

letters of naturalization, dispensations, patents, fines, &c. were called rights of the chancery.

The servicio was an annual subsidy of 441,176 crowns on the personal estates of the pecheros, or commonalty, as distinguished from the hijos-dalgo or gentry.

The cruzada* was the produce of the bulls of indulgence for those who contribute to a war against the infidels, which were still annually sold after the motive had ceased. It was vested in the crown by the concordate of 1752.

The clergy, besides the media annata, paid the mesada, or month's income of certain benefices in the gift of the king; the tercios reales, or royal thirds, a certain portion of the tythes granted for a war against the infidels in 1219, and rendered perpetual in 1487. It was united with the alcavala. Also the subsidio, the escusado, or tythe of the parishes in Castile and Aragon, and the benevolencia.

In addition to these, sinecure benefices, of a certain value, were charged with an imposition

* Townshend has enumerated the indulgencies granted by this cruzada.

1. To eat flesh on fast days.

2. For every voluntary fast to be excused from fifteen years, and fifteen times forty hours of penance imposed or due; also to partake of all the prayers, alms, pilgrimages, even to Jerusalem, which may be performed by the church militant.

3. For visiting five altars, or five visits to one altar, plenary indulgence to themselves or any departed friend.

4. Once in life, and once at the time of death, to obtain, from the confessor, remission even of sins reserved for the pope, and of other sins as often as they confess.

5. Dying suddenly, and without confession, to obtain the same plenary indulgence as if dying under contrition.

6 Visiting five altars as above, on the eleven days specified in the Calendar, to deliver a soul from purgatory each day by prayer.

7. Paying for two copies of the bull to obtain double the indulgencies and benefits before enumerated. Townshend's Travels, v. 2, p. 171.

¶

under the name of pensions, amounting, in some instances, to a third part, and appropriated for the support of charities and other public works. Other supplies, derived from church property, were the revenues of vacant benefices, and the temporalities of the jesuits and suppressed orders.

Other sources of revenue were the duties on wool, on the passage of the flocks to pastures, on the export of silver, compensation for the lodgment of troops, mines, stamped paper used in legal processes, posts, excises of Madrid, the produce of the royal monopolies, and other local taxes which it would be tedious or needless to particularize.

Biscay contributed only a donative; and Navarre and the Asturias were exempted from the provincial rents.

The revenues of the spanish crown are extremely variable in themselves, and have been still more variously given by different writers, according to their respective systems, or means of information. In 1789, the first official statement published, was given by the marquis of Lerena, minister of the finances; who thus estimated the produce of the different branches, during the last years of the reign of Charles the third:

| | *Reals.* |
|---|---|
| Provincial Revenues - - - | 122,867,678 |
| General Revenues - - - | 159,108,172 |
| Tobacco - - - - - - - | 129,007,414 |
| Salt - - - - - - - - - | 55,408,934 |
| Wool - - - - - - - - | 27,449,246 |
| Powder, &c. - - - - - | 8,468,124 |
| Brimstone - - - - - - | 369,417 |
| Quicksilver, &c. - - - - | 436,844 |

APPENDIX. N° II. Revenue.

| | |
|---|---|
| Cards - - - - - - - - - | 1,072,649 |
| 21 other articles - - - - - | 105,435,720 |
| | 609,624,198* |

But as the obvious intention of the minister was to shew the merit of his own administration in raising the produce of the revenue, and in

* Burgoing, from whom this statement is taken, makes the total 616,295,657 reals. Probably there is some omission or error of the press, either in the original or translation.

The real vellon, which is used in accounts, is equal to 2$\frac{7}{8}$*d.* english money. The reader will therefore obtain a ready and sufficient approximation of the value of the following totals in pounds sterling, by dividing by 100, or cutting two figures at the end.

Townshend has given a comparative table of the revenue from Uztariz, in 1722; and ending with an official document communicated by Mr. Liston, on an average of ten years. The following is the result:—

| | |
|---|---|
| Uztariz | 232,946,744 |
| Official in 1768, exclusive of the Indian Revenue | 292,192,587 |
| Count de Greby, in 1774 | 749,103,873 |
| Zienowieff, the Russian embassador, in 1778 | 707,873,152 |
| Carmichael, average of 5 years | 360,375,082 |
| Mr. Liston, average of 10 years | 417,264,835 |
| To this we may add the estimate given by Clarke in 1761, of £.5,431,889 sterling, or | 450,000,000 |
| Also an estimate of the lowest annual amount in 1788 | 416,959,844 |

Of these, Mr. Liston's may be considered as the most accurate statement.

Townshend gives an official account of the expenditure in 1778:—

| | |
|---|---|
| Royal Household | 108,000,000 |
| Military | 204,202,194 |
| Naval | 100,000,000 |
| Indies | 8,000,000 |
| Finance and other Departments | 28,775,931 |
| Royal Manufactories, &c. | 9,873,288 |
| Interest of Debts and Annual Liquidation | 30,000,000 |
| | 488,851,413 |

Travels in Spain, v. 2, p. 182.

covering a deficit of 40 millions, which he acknowledges to have existed at the period of his entrance into office, we may justly suspect, that he rather exaggerated than diminished the amount of the receipts. As a counterpart to his statement, we therefore present to the reader another formed at the same period by the british embassador at Madrid.

| | |
|---|---|
| General Revenues - - - | 151,000,000 |
| Provincial Revenues - - - | 91,000,000 |
| Tobacco - - - - - - - | 95,000,000 |
| Salt - - - - - - - - - | 20,000,000 |
| Wool - - - - - - - - | 22,000,000 |
| Brandy - - - - - - - - | 2,500,000 |
| Popios and Arbitrios - - | 6,000,000 |
| Posts and Couriers - - - | 14,000,000 |
| Cards - - - - - - - - | 8,500,000 |
| Stamped Paper - - - - | 4,500,000 |
| Arrendamiento of Madrid, and Customs - - - - - | 8,000,000 |
| Royal Fabric of Crystal } Fabric of San Fernando } - | 2,500,000 |
| Effects of Castile - - - - | 1,000,000 |
| Royal Lottery - - - - - - | 6,000,000 |
| Cruzada - - - - - - - | 14,000,000 |
| Lanzas and Medias Annatas | 3,000,000 |
| Masterships of the Military Orders - - - - - - | 2,000,000 |
| Medias Annatas of Ecclesiastics - - - - - - | 3,000,000 |
| Escusado and Subsidio - - | 12,000,000 |
| Rights of Lodgment - - | 800,000 |
| Pasture of the Serena - - | 140,000 |
| | 460,940,000 |

APPENDIX. N° II. Revenue.

It is still more difficult to calculate the general expences than the receipts, particularly during the latter part of the reign of Charles, which was a period of actual war, or warlike preparation. Lerena stated the expence in 1784, at 685,068,068; the british embassador calculated the disbursements of 1787, at about 476,000,000. In either case there was a considerable deficit.

This deficit was covered by the american revenue, which, though nominally amounting, according to some writers, to near 500,000,000, and others to 350,000,000, was yet so far reduced by the expences of the colonial establishment, as to give a clear return of about 3,000,000 even in favourable times. In war, however, this branch of the supply was subject to defalcation and loss, and in the recent troubles had been almost wholly absorbed by the additional charges required for the maintenance of tranquillity.

In estimating the debts of the crown, we cannot suspect the minister of exaggeration, and therefore we adopt without hesitation his statement of 1,543,906,944 reals. Part of this being raised on the church and other property, on the condition of restitution, bore no interest; the remainder, consisting principally of the royal vales, or notes issued by the bank of San Carlos, appears to have borne an annual interest of 25,000,000. Of this debt 100,000,000, or about 10,000,000 sterling, may be attributed to the american war.*

Nothing, however, can shew in a stronger

* This account of the spanish revenue and system of taxation, is drawn from Uztariz, Ulloa, also Clarke, Townshend, Burgoing, La Borde; and finally from official and other documents collected in Spain; and communications from the spanish ministers, resident in foreign courts, which I obtained while abroad.

light the defective system of the spanish finances, than the circumstance that a debt, so small in comparison with those of other countries, and bearing an annual interest of not more than 300,000*l.* should have proved a source of serious embarrassment to the government.



AT the close of the austrian dynasty, the Army did not consist of 20,000 men, and, as we learn from St. Philip, it was in the highest degree inefficient, undisciplined, and ill provided. The war of the succession, and the example of the french, with whom they were united in arms, contributed to form the troops; and a considerable augmentation took place between 1703 and 1713. In the two most trying periods of that contest, Philip owed the preservation of his throne to the enthusiasm of his spanish subjects, who flocked in crowds to his standard, and proved the energy and resources of the nation when roused into action. Army.

In the subsequent wars of Philip, the spanish troops maintained their character, particularly in Italy; and during the interval between the peace of Utrecht and his death, the military establishment was considerably increased.

In the pacific reign of Ferdinand the army again fell into neglect, from the policy of Ensenada, who directed his principal attention to the navy. Hence, in the succeeding war, its inefficiency was deeply felt; and it was fortunate for Spain that her military exertions were principally confined to America, and to the desultory and unsuccessful invasion of Portugal.

At the eve of the rupture with England, relative to Falkland's Islands, its deficiency did

APPENDIX. N° II. Army.

not amount to less than 18,000 men. Accordingly, a new system of recruiting, by drafts from the militia, was adopted; and under the vigorous administration of d'Aranda, its organization, equipment, and discipline, were advanced to the same state of improvement as had taken place among the military nations of Europe. We learn from Florida Blanca that this new system was continued during his administration; and at no period under the bourbon dynasty, did Spain possess so efficient a military force, as in the american war.

The convulsed state of Europe, and the maxim which the spanish court adopted after the peace, to preserve such an attitude as was calculated to maintain the public tranquillity, and secure their own independence, did not permit any considerable reduction of the army after the cessation of hostilities. Towards the close of the reign of Charles, the military establishment consisted of

*Infantry.*

| | |
|---|---|
| 12 battalions of spanish and wallon guards, 700 each | 8,400 |
| 44 regiments of 2 battalions, 700 each | 61,600 |
| | 70,000 |

*Cavalry.*

| | |
|---|---|
| Guards and carabineers, 2 regiments 600 men each | 1,200 |
| 14 regiments, 600 each | 8,400 |

*Dragoons.*

| | |
|---|---|
| 5 regiments | 4,800 |
| | 14,400 |

*Artillery.*

1 regiment of 4 battalions, also a company of 127 cadets.

To this department belonged the royal mathematical academy at Segovia, for the instruction of officers and cadets.

A corps of engineers, consisting of 140 officers, and 2 battalions of sappers and miners.

Attached to this branch were the royal mathematical academies at Barcelona and Oran.

*Invalids.*

46 companies rated as capable, including 5 of artillery.

26 companies incapable of active service.

In 1734 the establishment of 28 provincial regiments of militia took place in the kingdoms attached to the crown of Castile; and in 1766, this force was increased to 42 regiments. These, forming one battalion of 600 men each, amount to 25,200 men. Also one regiment of 2 battalions in Majorca.

In 1762 there was another augmentation of this species of force, consisting of 113 companies of local or town militia, at 100 each, 11,300 men. Also four fixed companies in Catalonia, Aragon, Ceuta, and Oran; and 10 on the coast of Grenada, amounting to 8,000 men.

The provincial and town militias were a respectable and useful force. Like our militia,

APPENDIX. N° II. Army.

they were raised by ballot, and in times of peace embodied one month in the year. In time of war, they were called into service with the troops of the line, and were advantageously employed in maintaining internal tranquillity, or defending the frontier. The patriotic zeal and excellent organization of these bodies, contributed essentially to the successful resistance opposed to the tyranny of France.

GENERAL ESTIMATE.

*Regulars.*

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Infantry | 70,000 | |
| Cavalry | 14,400 | |
| | | 84,400 |

*Militia.*

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Provincial | 25,200 | |
| City and town | 11,300 | |
| Fixed and other companies | 8,000 | |
| | | 44,500 |
| | | 128,900 |

exclusive of artillery and engineers, and the companies of invalids capable of garrison and other duty.

Navy.

AT the accession of Philip, the navy of Spain was reduced to a still more inefficient state than the army. The scanty remnant of a naval force, once so formidable, received a fatal blow at Vigo; and during the remainder of the contest for the spanish succession, the only protection of

the spanish trade and colonies was afforded by the navy of France.

Under the administration of Alberoni, however, the most strenuous efforts were made to restore the naval force; and during the attempt to re-unite Sicily and the italian territories to the spanish crown, Europe beheld with astonishment a fleet of 20 sail in the Mediterranean, and nearly an equal number rapidly constructing in the different docks of Spain. The loss incurred in this contest again reduced the naval force to the lowest state. But under the active administration of Patiño, new exertions were made for its restoration both in Europe and in America, and its increase at length gave umbrage even to England.

In the succeeding maritime war relative to the colonial and commercial disputes, the spanish navy took a respectable part, and rather increased than diminished. We find the ministry of Ensenada no less active than that of Patiño; and in the reign of Ferdinand, though pacific, the increase of the navy amounted to 20 ships of the line. At the accession of Charles, the naval force, though not on a par with that of the great maritime powers, was yet highly respectable, compared with its state in preceding periods. The official account given by Clarke states the amount in 1762 at 47 ships of the line. In the subsequent war, it suffered heavy losses, particularly at the capture of the Havannah.

The spanish court, however, never intermitted its attention to so important a branch of the national strength. The preceding losses were repaired; and though it again suffered severely in the american war, a respectable establishment

APPENDIX. N° II. Navy.

was still maintained. At the close of Charles's reign it amounted to

8 ships of 112 guns, built subsequent to 1769.
2 - - - 94 - - - - - - - - - 1765.
5 - - - 80 - - - - - - - - - 1760.
38 - - - 70 - - of which 9 since 1760.
9 - - - 64 - - of which 8 since 1760.
3 - - - 58.
1 - - - 54.

66

4 - - - 40.
39 frigates, mostly built in the reign of Charles.
40 corvettes, xebeques, and urcas.
79 vessels of smaller force.

According to the regulations, this navy was to be manned by registered seamen, of whom between 50 and 60,000 appeared on the registers; but the effective amount was very inadequate to the demand, and in cases of necessity, the government was obliged to have recourse to the impress.

The mercantile marine, however, which is the real nursery of a naval force, made a rapid progress during the reign of Charles, as will appear from a brief comparison of the number of vessels at the different ports.

*At Cadiz.*

The six years ending in 1776 - - 984
——————— in 1788 - - 1,867

*Alicante.*

Six years, ending in 1776 - - - 722
——————— in 1788 - - - 2,187

*Malaga.*

Six years, ending in 1778 - - - 641
——————— in 1788 - - - 1,059

*Barcelona.*

Six years, ending in 1779 - - - 401
——————— in 1788 - - - 749

To the naval department was attached a company of guardias marinas, consisting of 180 cadets, established at Cadiz, where there was an academy for their instruction.

A corps of 5,000 marine infantry.

A corps of royal marine artillery, amounting to 1,000 men, with schools of theory and practice, in the three departments of Cadiz, Ferrol, and Carthagena.

A corps of marine engineers, consisting of four directors and forty members.

A corps of pilots, with schools of instruction in the three departments.

A college of surgery, consisting of 80 members.*

* For this account of the army and navy, we have principally relied on the spanish official statements, compared with the account of travellers and statistical writers, and rectified by the MS. collections of lord Auckland.

FINIS.

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